Influences on relationships between Ministers and Civil Servants in British Government: A study based on the perceptions of former Ministers by Stokes, David
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D. STOKES 
JUNE 2016 
DOCTOR OF PROFESSIONAL STUDIES
   
 
 
 
 
 
Influences on relationships between 
Ministers and Civil Servants in British 
Government:  a study based on the 
perceptions of former Ministers 
 
 
Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the 
University of Chester for the degree of Doctor of Professional 
Studies 
 
 
by David Stokes 
 
 
June 2016 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I owe a huge debt of gratitude to my employers, the Ministry of Justice. Each and every 
person who has managed me since embarking on this project has given everything I asked 
of them. Most recently: David Holmes, Hannah Payne and Sarah Jennings. Many colleagues 
have made additional efforts to support me down the years: my friends Mandy Banks, 
Shirley Benson, Narinder Sahota and Iram Akhtar especially. Looking further back, I want to 
thank three people in particular. Firstly, Anne Johnston. Back in 2004 Anne enthusiastically 
supported my application to undertake a Foundation Degree. I wasn’t sure whether to 
apply, and her attitude was fundamental to my decision to give it a crack. Secondly, Robert 
Wright. He supported my progression to degree level study a few years later, despite the 
fact that I was stepping into an extremely busy team. And lastly, Steve Jones – who 
championed my doctoral application and secured funding for the course. Every time I sat in 
the House of Lords tea room it was with Steve’s blessing. 
 
The core of this work is based on interviews with twenty-five former government ministers. 
A full list is available in Appendix II. I was struck by their honesty, their straight-forward 
approach, and how self-effacing many of them were about their time in office. That is an 
encouraging set of qualities to identify in a class of people whose motivation is often 
maligned. I would like to thank each of them for freely giving me their time. I want to single 
out Dominic Goggins for his positive engagement at a very difficult time for him and his 
family. Thank you Dominic.   
 
I also interviewed five former Civil Servants as part of related research: Lord Butler, 
Christopher Jary, David Laughrin, Martin Stanley, and Alastair Macdonald. Thanks to them 
all – and for Chris, David and Martin’s ongoing advice and help. I hope the Civil Service 
continues to recruit and retain people of their calibre.   
 
My friends have provided me with incredible support throughout. Special thanks to Daniel 
and Selma Fisher, Katie Easton, Matt de Giorgio, Lisa Tham, Michael Strachan, Dan Godoy, 
Claire Butcher, Sarah and Anya Burrow, Ross Harper, Peter Hajinian, Dr Ruth Chapman, 
Magda Bugajska, Richard Kashmiry, Catherine, Laura, Chris and Matt Birch, & Rachael and 
Helen Fowler. Katy Davies, Claudia Holt, and Janice Tong all played an important part too. 
Dr Sylwia Szostak was my inspiration, and Cora Kolosso was always there. There are many 
others I cannot list. Thank you all for believing that this day would come (even when I 
   
 
didn’t), for listening to my constant ‘progress’ updates, and for making me forget about it 
all in your uniquely different ways.  
 
Thanks to my family – particularly Jenny, Dominic, Jasper and Jemima Stevens. Jasper and 
Jemima’s endless academic achievements definitely motivated their uncle to get his finger 
out! Thanks to Angie Stokes, and to my parents Tony and Alyson, for everything they have 
done for me. Dad, you’ve been a tower of strength. And mum, it would have taken me even 
longer without your transcription skills. Thanks for a magnificent contribution. 
 
Finally thanks to those at the University of Chester who have helped me along the way. Dr 
Tony Wall and Dr Neil Moore looked at an early draft of the work and conducted a mock 
viva. Dr Michelle Tytherleigh and Dr Peter Hayes provided their expert insights. Rosamond 
Peet and Dr Claire Irving were always happy to answer my questions.  
 
And last, but by no means least, thanks to my tutor, supervisor and friend Dr Jon Talbot. 
I’ve known Jon for over a decade. His personal faith in me has been critical to this 
achievement. He suggested that I take the doctorate on and, whilst I may have cursed that 
advice at various times, it seems he was right in the end. Jon always told me to search for 
the golden thread. The line you could draw through the heart of your writing on which 
every thought would hang. When it comes to my time at Chester, Jon was the golden 
thread. I will always be grateful. 
 
 
CONTENTS 
 
Abstract         P. 1  
   
Introduction         P. 3  
 
Chapter One:  
The Westminster model and Haldane: old structures and new realities  P. 7  
 
Chapter Two: 
Ministers and officials: a review of literature     P. 23 
 
Chapter Three: 
Research methodology        P. 41 
 
Chapter Four: 
Potential positive and negative influences on relationships: Ministers  P. 49 
 
Chapter Five: 
Potential positive and negative influences on relationships: Civil Servants  P. 69 
 
Chapter Six:  
Explaining the disparity between the Ministerial literature and the views of  P. 85  
Ministerial interviewees about Civil Servants 
   
Chapter Seven:  
Systemic issues which may be negatively influencing relationships  P. 93 
    
Conclusion         P. 109 
 
References         P. 117 
 
Appendices         P. 129 
1 
 
ABSTRACT  
This thesis focuses on the relationships between Ministers and Civil Servants in British 
Government. It is argued that the deliberative space for officials to devise and critique 
policy in tandem with Ministers is contracting. The change occurred after Margaret 
Thatcher incentivised officials to behave in certain ways, and her embrace of New Public 
Management made relationships within government more transactional. Given this 
scenario the thesis explores how relationships between Ministers and officials can be 
improved. To determine this twenty-five former UK Government Ministers were 
interviewed complementing an earlier study which examined the issue from the 
perspective of senior officials. These Ministers reported that successful relationships were 
most likely to be established when Civil Servants demonstrated effective leadership, 
commitment to implementing policy, honesty, technical skill, and awareness of political and 
external realities. In addition it is thought that time invested early in the relationship helps 
to communicate Ministers’ expectations.  Ministers also reported what they feel to be 
behaviours which undermine the relationship: misunderstanding the professional role of 
officials, relying upon special advisors rather than direct contact with officials, a lack of 
managerial experience, and public criticism of officials. Ministers also identified Civil 
Servants’ behaviours likely to result in poor relationships - appearing averse to change, 
being unable to rationalise the advantages of existing approaches, and a reluctance to lead 
or assume responsibility. Some of the perceptions identified in the literature, such as Civil 
Servants seeking control and lacking competence, were not afforded the same prominence 
by Ministerial interviewees. They highlighted systemic issues including the feudal and 
hierarchical nature of Whitehall, and their perception that the wrong skills and behaviours 
are incentivised. They also noted the lack of training for Ministers and their inability to pass 
on their experiences to colleagues. In addition to these observations about personal 
relations respondents expressed a deeper concern about the changing roles and 
expectations between Ministers and officials. Despite the evident contradiction between 
contemporary practice and the constitutional position created by Haldane in 1918, 
Ministers still appear to accept the latter as the basis for their relationships with officials.  
Further research may be required to explore this, alongside the disparity identified 
between the ministerial view from the literature and my interviewees, and the training 
lacuna. The thesis concludes by making a number of recommendations concerning future 
practice.  
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SUMMARY OF PORTFOLIO 
The connection between this thesis and other elements of my doctoral study is set out in 
this summary of portfolio. This thesis constitutes my “major” doctoral project. It follows 
from my “minor” doctoral project which involved a piece of qualitative research, based on 
personal interviews with five former Civil Servants, including Robin Butler. I ascertained 
views about relationships with Ministers from the Civil Servants’ standpoint. In this way I 
was able to examine the reverse perspective to the one focused on in my major project. 
Although the sample size for the minor project was small, the views expressed often appear 
to corroborate those of the former Ministers interviewed for the major project.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The relationship between Ministers and their Civil Servants is important to the lives of 
ordinary citizens across the UK. The exact nature of the relationship is largely concealed 
given the roles the participants play. However, since the publication of Richard Crossman’s 
diaries in the mid-1970s, a succession of diaries, memoirs and other public commentaries - 
mainly from politicians - have been published. Often these present the relationship as 
problematic. In recent times the relationship appears to have become even more strained 
than in the past. As Lord Hennessy puts it: 
 
“…the governing marriage, as one might call it, is in trouble…The marriage, to an 
outside observer like myself, at the moment seems to be in more trouble than 
usual. The relationships are particularly scratchy.” (Public Administration Select 
Committee, 2013, Q2) 
 
In recent years, problems in the relationship have often been exposed publicly. Alleged 
briefing against certain Civil Servants from Government sources and the extensive front 
page coverage that The Times (2013) devoted to the subject are examples. However, 
finding material which offers helpful insights into the nature of the difficulties that appear 
to exist is relatively difficult. The problem with the accounts of politicians is that they are, 
by nature, one sided and may be self-serving. Academic research provides some valuable 
insights from the external perspective, but does not generally focus on relationships.  
 
Civil Service input is rare given the nature of the role. I am a Government official. My 
research is neither intended to further my personal reputation or provide a ‘glimpse into a 
hidden world’ through an ethnographic study based on my own observations. My 
experiences are emphatically not the subject of this paper. That would be inappropriate. 
However, I start from a privileged position, given my intrinsic understanding of the context. 
My role is arguably both a critical strength and weakness of this thesis. This is explored 
further in Chapter 3 (Research Methodology) and in my conclusion. My intention is to 
develop better insights with the aim of optimising relationships between Ministers and Civil 
Servants. I am also motivated by a desire for my work to have utility and practical 
application. I hope that this work - in some form - will be a resource that both aspiring 
Ministers and Civil Servants can draw from.   
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The use of the terms ‘Civil Servants’, and ‘Civil Service’ throughout this work needs some 
qualification. I am concerned with the elements of Whitehall that regularly deal with 
Ministers. My focus is on central government departments, and the Civil Servants within 
them who interact with Ministers, whether in person, or through the nature of their work 
(e.g. providing written advice). This will include Senior Civil Servants, and many other more 
junior officials who work in Whitehall. References in the work to the Civil Service or Civil 
Servants should be seen in this light, unless otherwise specified in the text.  
 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. In Chapter One, I consider the systemic pressures on 
the relationship, and the pressure on the Westminster model and the Haldane convention. 
My contention is that the role of the Civil Servant has changed in recent years; primarily as 
a result of a radical reimagining under Thatcher who embraced New Public Management 
(NPM). The deliberative space for Ministers and Civil Servants to craft and critique policy 
together, a hallmark of the relationship from the 1918 Haldane report, has contracted. The 
constitutional position no longer reflects the reality. This dissonance has increased tensions 
on individual relationships. Other interlinked pressures include demands for greater 
accountability, the increase in special advisors, changing societal expectations and the 
impact of ceaseless reform programmes. Despite this, I argue that a radical constitutional 
recalibration of the relationship between the Civil Service and Ministers is unlikely. I do not 
think there is the political appetite for this to happen. For this reason my research focuses 
on the optimisation of individual relationships, within a paradigm which is, admittedly, 
under extreme strain. 
 
In Chapter Two, I present the results of my literature review, in light of my findings above. I 
have analysed three broad sources for insights into relationships. The first is Ministerial 
memoirs and diaries; the second is material produced by Civil Servants; and the third is 
academic publications (including those dealing with NPM). The Ministerial literature is the 
richest source. From this I draw out insights which fall into the categories of “competency” 
and “control” when it comes to concerns about Civil Servants. However, this literature does 
not offer a balanced view. Civil Service and academic literature provides useful insights – 
particularly when it comes to the changing nature of the relationships within government. 
Despite this, practical material dealing with individual relationships is limited. As a result I 
conclude that there are some deficiencies in the existing literature - as it does not generally 
deal with individual Ministerial-Civil Servant relationships in great depth. 
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In Chapter Three, I set out my research methodology. I start by explicitly clarifying my 
professional role as an active Civil Servant and ‘insider researcher’. I explore and reflect on 
the potential affect on my research. I then explain my overarching methodology – and why 
I have used the constitutional approach as the frame for my work (whilst acknowledging 
the other potential methodological approaches to analysing British government). I then set 
out my primary research methods. I explain my rationale for conducting personal, 
extended, qualitative interviews – and how I selected who to approach. I also deal with 
ethical considerations and the presentation of my findings.  
 
In Chapter Four, I present the first set of thematic findings from my primary research. I 
consider potential traits and behaviours that my interviewees thought might influence 
relationships with Civil Servants, both positively and negatively, from the Ministerial 
perspective. I conclude by summarising the behaviours that my interviewees thought 
Ministers should display and avoid. I also consider the potential connection with the 
arguments I advance in Chapter One concerning the challenges to the Westminster model. 
 
In Chapter Five, I consider potential traits and behaviours that my interviewees thought 
might influence relationships with Ministers, both positively and negatively, from the Civil 
Service perspective. I conclude by summarising the behaviours that my interviewees 
thought Civil Servants should display and avoid. I consider the connections between the 
views of my interviewees and the erosion of Haldane as examined in Chapter One. I 
consider whether the “competence” and “control” themes identified in Chapter Two are 
consistent with my interviewees’ perceptions. I conclude that there is a disparity. 
 
In Chapter Six, I consider this disparity. I asked my interviewees for their views about the 
established narrative the literature presents, and why it exists (apparently in contrast with 
many of their views). I also give my own views about the potential reason for the disparity, 
what its methodological basis might be, and what can be drawn from it.  
 
In Chapter Seven, I consider institutional issues with the Civil Service – many of which the 
Ministers I spoke to felt underpinned problems with individual relationships, negatively 
influencing them. Despite my focus on individual, human relationships, the affect of 
systemic issues also needs to be recognised. Preparation, training and induction are 
systemic issues that I contend can and should be addressed.  
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My conclusion includes reflection on my own role and practice. Haldane is endorsed by my 
interviewees, but in reality appears in decline. My key findings are summarised, along with 
recommendations for future areas of research and practice.  
 
It is also important to note that my Ministerial interviewees have given specific consent to 
be cited by name, and have cleared the quotations that appear in this thesis. Whilst citing 
interviewees by name is somewhat unusual in this context, I am confident that the work 
benefits from this: the names of the Ministers I spoke to add credibility and power to the 
themes that collectively emerge from their words. In my judgement, their enthusiasm for 
this project and their agreement to be openly cited makes the work more compelling. That 
is particularly important given the practical aims of my research. 
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CHAPTER ONE – THE WESTMINSTER MODEL AND HALDANE: OLD STRUCTURES AND NEW 
REALITIES  
  
In this Chapter, I consider the framing context in which individual relationships between 
Ministers and Civil Servants exist. My contention is that the Westminster model and the 
Haldane convention have been put under increasing strain in recent years. I explore some 
of the factors that have contributed to this rising systemic pressure. In particular, I suggest 
that the approach of Margaret Thatcher and the influence of New Public Management 
(NPM) are critical. Additional factors which have added to the strain include demands for 
greater accountability, the rise of special advisors, and increasing societal expectations. The 
realities for Ministers and Senior Civil Servants have changed as a result, but the formal 
constitutional underpinning to their relationship has not. Arguably, this dissonance has led 
to individual relationships between Ministers and officials becoming more difficult. In 
addition, waves of civil service reform have never fully addressed the fundamental nature 
of the relationship between Ministers and officials. No government in recent years has 
shown any appetite to address it. This historical reluctance has led me to focus, in the rest 
of this thesis, on individual relationships within the existing framework. As I conclude at the 
end of this Chapter, my aim is to generate material that might help Ministers and officials 
optimise their individual relationships, despite their existence within a creaking paradigm. 
 
The Westminster Model 
 
The Westminster model is the overarching historical frame for relationships between 
Ministers and officials in the UK. Officials are accountable to Ministers, who are in turn 
accountable to the electorate – but as representatives rather than delegates. They rule 
indivisibly, as an elite body, with the best interests of the nation at heart (Richards and 
Smith, 2016). The Westminster model is one example of the gradual evolution of 
convention, tradition and informal rules in the UK system – potentially as a consequence of 
the lack of a codified written constitution. Dowding (1995, p.162), considers that because 
our constitution is not codified, in effect we have no constitution at all. Britain is unusual in 
having no such written constitution, and is one of only three modern democracies that does 
not – the others being New Zealand and Israel (Bogdanor, 2009, p.9). In this context, the 
importance of the ‘Westminster Model’ or ‘Westminster System’ is clear. 
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A cornerstone of the Westminster model is the Northcote Trevelyan report of 1854 
(Hennessy, 1990, Pp 31-55; Grant & Jary, 2010, P. 92). One of the most important principles 
it established was political neutrality: 
 
“...the Government of the country could not be carried on without the aid of an 
efficient body of permanent officers, occupying a position duly subordinate to that 
of the Ministers who are directly responsible to the Crown and to Parliament, yet 
possessing sufficient independence, character, ability, and experience to be able to 
advise, assist, and, to some extent, influence, those who are from time to time set 
over them.” (Northcote & Trevelyan, 1854, p. 3)    
 
The influence of Northcote Trevelyan is clear when the current Civil Service Code is 
considered. It sets out the four key values of the modern Civil Service as integrity, honesty, 
objectivity and impartiality. (Cabinet Office (1), 2015).  
 
Haldane and its legacy 
 
The Haldane Committee report of 1918 was commissioned to improve the functioning of 
government and reappraise its structures. Haldane recommended departments were 
formed on the basis of service provided (e.g. Health and Education), rather than class of 
person (e.g. paupers or unemployed) (Ministry of Reconstruction, 1918, Pp 7-10), and that 
each was the responsibility of a minister. Critically Haldane stated that: 
 
“...adequate provision has not been made in the past for the organised acquisition 
of facts and information, and for the systematic application of thought as 
preliminary to the settlement of policy and its subsequent administration.” (ibid, p.6 
– emphasis added). 
 
Alongside this, Haldane confirmed and strengthened the position concerning ministerial 
responsibility, which I examine below. Haldane dismissed alternatives as “...less effective in 
securing responsibility for official action and advice than the system followed in 
Departments where full responsibility is definitely laid upon the Minister...” (ibid, p.11). 
Collectively these last two findings are often labelled the Haldane convention. In other 
words, Ministers and Civil Servants exist in a symbiotic relationship, inseparable 
constitutionally, with a space embedded to design and critique policy before it is unveiled 
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(Richards and Smith, 2016, Pp.6 - 7; Public Administration Select Committee, 2013, p. 8). 
This constitutional fusing of elected governments and their administrative servants is 
recognised in law. The Carltona1 doctrine allows officials to exercise powers given to 
Ministers in statute without any further delegation. Even more importantly, symbiosis also 
underpins the Whitehall convention of ministerial responsibility. The traditional deal that 
flows from Haldane is that Civil Servants pledge their loyalty to Ministers; and Ministers 
take the blame publicly when things go wrong2. 
 
Considine (2005, p.47) suggests that Ministerial responsibility is a major constitutional 
convention, even though his view is that Ministers are less likely to resign than they used to 
be if their Civil Servants are the ones at fault. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, Home Secretary in 
1954, articulated the convention of Ministerial responsibility as follows: 
 
“The Minister is not bound to defend action of which he did not know, or of which 
he disapproves. But...he remains constitutionally responsible to Parliament for the 
fact that something has gone wrong, and he alone can tell Parliament what has 
occurred and render an account of his stewardship.” (Maxwell-Fyfe, cited by Gay & 
Powell, 2004, p.12) 
 
This is another example of Haldane being woven into the governing fabric. The current 
Ministerial Code makes it clear that ‘Ministers have a duty to Parliament to account, and be 
held to account for the policies, decisions and actions of their departments and agencies’ 
(Cabinet Office (2), 2015, p.1). In plain language: Ministers are accountable for the actions 
of their officials. History suggests that many Ministerial careers have failed because of the 
actions taken by Civil Servants (see Gay & Powell, 2004, particularly Pp 14-37). I cite David 
Blunkett’s views in Chapter Two concerning the resignation of Bev Hughes in 2004: he 
considers it grossly unfair that she had to step down because she was supplied with 
erroneous information by her Civil Servants. McNaughton (2015. p.6) cites the examples of 
Michael Howard and Derek Lewis (Director of the Prison Service in 1995) and Iain Duncan 
Smith and Sir Robert Devereux (his Permanent Secretary, in 2013). For McNaughton, the 
first fallout illustrates the accountability problem that is tied to the convention and the 
second shows the conflict and constitutional confusion that result when a Minister feels 
compelled to publicly criticise one of their own Civil Servants (ibid). 
                                                          
1
 Derived from the judgment in: Carltona Ltd v Works Comrs [1943] 2 All ER 560 (CA). 
2
 See, for example, Lord Hennessy’s comments in the debate he called in 2014 (Hansard, 2014, 
columns 354-355). 
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Haldane helped define relationships in government through much of the twentieth century. 
But it was challenged in the 1980s by Margaret Thatcher’s approach to the civil service and 
by the rise of New Public Management. 
 
Thatcher and New Public Management 
 
Margaret Thatcher significantly altered the relationship between Ministers and Civil 
Servants during her tenure as Prime Minister. She connected a bloated civil service, 
artificially protected from economic storms, with ways of working that she characterised as 
“…an obstacle to good administration” (Thatcher, 2011, p.47). By her own admission “she 
took a close interest in senior appointments in the civil service from the first…” (ibid, p.46) 
citing their importance in terms of morale and efficiency. Reflecting on a dismal meeting of 
Permanent Secretaries at the start of her tenure, where she sensed an acute aversion to 
change, she decided on her approach: 
 
“It became clear to me that it was only by encouraging or appointing individuals, 
rather than trying to change attitudes en bloc, that progress would be made. And 
that was to be the method I employed.” (Thatcher, 2011, Pp. 48-49).  
 
Subsequent analysis confirms that this is exactly what occurred. Thatcher favoured “can do-
ers” over those who operated more traditionally (Richards, 1997, King, 2015, Page, 2010, 
p.414). She dominated the senior appointment process (Richards, 1997, p.133-151). Whilst 
she did not overtly politicise the Civil Service, she did personalise it. This in turn affected the 
culture and socialisation of Whitehall, exactly as she intended. Those searching for rapid 
promotion looked to ensure that they reflected the values of managerialism and positivity 
that Thatcher personally valued – causing a “centre effect” (ibid, p.176). The traditional role 
of the Civil Servant as “congenital snag-hunter” (to borrow Hugh Dalton’s acerbic phrase) 
was diminished as a result.  
 
Sir Ian Bancroft, who was moved out of his role early in Thatcher’s tenure, was seen as one 
of the old guard – confident enough to speak truth to power without fear of the 
consequences (Stanley, 2015, Hennessy, 2011). He bemoaned the tendency among some 
Civil Servants to “make their advice what Ministers want to hear rather than what they 
need to know” (cited by Ponting, 1989, p.37). Reward was on offer for those who delivered, 
rather than those that questioned (Dowding, 1995, p.112). Those that wanted to prosper 
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needed to re-conceptualise their relationships with Ministers, focusing on being able to 
deliver political priorities, rather than to test their foundations. This in itself meant that the 
indivisibility grounded in Haldane began to be diluted within Whitehall.  
 
Intertwined with Thatcher’s personal reaction to the Civil Service, was a move towards 
managerialism. Prior to the 1980s, the field of public policy was generally labelled as “public 
administration”. This was characterised in post-war Britain by a vision of statehood where 
public administration met the social and economic needs of its citizens (Osborne, 2010). 
The 1960s and 1970s saw a loss of faith in Whitehall and officialdom, with traditional 
methods of statehood no longer going unchallenged (Richards and Smith, 2000). In the 
1970s, as Jonathan Powell puts it, “The Civil Service were in control as a series of weak and 
short-lived governments, Labour and Conservative, succeeded each other” (Powell, 2010, 
p.58). The perceived inadequacies of the Civil Service, combined with its perceived power, 
also seemed to coincide with the end of “public administration” as a credible organising 
philosophy.  
 
In the 1980s, this perspective gave way to what became known as ‘New Public 
Management’ (NPM), as retrospectively labelled by Hood (1991).  Exactly what NPM means 
has been the subject of ongoing debate, but features include: added attention to private 
sector management techniques; an emphasis on “management” itself; an increased 
distinction and distance between policy-makers and implementers; an emphasis on 
entrepreneurial leadership; added focus on inputs, outputs, cost and evaluation; and 
increased out-sourcing of public services (adapted from Osborne, 2010; also see Massey & 
Pyper, 2005). Separating service delivery and management, and increasing efficiency 
through the pursuit of private contracts are other key features of NPM that Osborne and 
Gaebler (1993) identify both conceptually, and in the actions of the Thatcher government. 
Richards and Smith (2016) argue that Thatcher’s embrace of NPM was not purely borne of a 
desire to increase management efficiency3; it was intrinsic to her political philosophy4. Her 
approach was to divide the indivisible: through changing the nature of her Civil Servants’ 
roles. This was done by pushing them to manage, to deliver, and to implement; rather than 
                                                          
3
 This is further explored in Chapter Two- where I cite the views of Hughes (1998); and Massey and 
Pyper (2005) – in corroboration of the view that politics is intrinsic to NPM in the UK. 
 
4
 Former Civil Servant Clive Ponting adopts a similar view – suggesting that Heath and Thatcher’s 
attempt “to import a more professional style of management from the private sector…(was)… 
motivated more by an ideological or instinctive dislike of the public sector.” (Ponting, 1989, p.11).  
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just to create and critique policy in tandem with Ministers5. Through implicitly rejecting the 
traditional model, under the auspices of management efficiency, she took steps to covertly 
politicise Whitehall (ibid, Pp 9-10). 
 
Haldane undermined? 
 
Thatcher’s own willingness to remove Ministers who she did not consider were delivering 
meant that Ministers were incentivised to adopt her philosophy in dealing with their own 
Civil Servants. The relationship had moved from a collaborative to a hierarchical one and 
“…the conception of the minister’s role established by Thatcher has remained the 
prevailing conception ever since” (King, 2015, p.181). Hughes (2010) suggests that the most 
important change for civil servants was that they were now responsible for achieving 
results and needed to take personal responsibility. In effect, a more transactional, principal-
agent relationship had emerged.  
 
As summarised by Burnham and Horton (2013), a principal - agent relationship is based on 
an assumption that the agent (the Civil Servant in this case) pursues their own self-interest. 
It also generally assumes there is an intrinsic conflict between the goals of the principal (the 
Minister) and the agent. In the private sector this would be a contractual and conflictual 
relationship. The way Thatcher perceived the motivations of her Civil Servants was in direct 
contradiction to the motivations assumed in the Westminster model – that officials serve a 
higher cause, that they can be trusted (ibid, p.32) and that they embody the public service 
ethos (see Richards and Smith, 2000). Thatcher saw officials as “budget maximisers” who 
were driven by self-interest, not national interest (Smith, 2015, Pp 73-75). In other words, 
they were acting on the basis of “rational choice”. Campbell and Wilson (1995, p. 304) are 
fiercely critical of the traction that rational choice theory established in the field of political 
science. By moving the relationship to a principal – agent footing, Thatcher incentivised 
Civil Servants to behave in certain ways. 
 
The change to the nature of Ministerial – Civil Servant relationship that occurred under 
Thatcher has not been reversed. New Labour strengthened central power – informally 
through the important decisions Blair took with his trusted set of friends and advisors; and 
formally through the creation of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit (PMDU) – which gave 
                                                          
5
 For example: “Some Permanent Secretaries had come to think of themselves mainly as policy 
advisers, forgetting that they were also responsible for the efficient management of their 
departments.” (Thatcher, 2011, p.47). 
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Number Ten a crucial role in the creation of policy (Richards, 2008, particularly Pp 124-129). 
This federalisation of power meant that civil servants and departmental ministers had 
additional elements to factor into their interactions (namely, the prior actions, and likely 
reactions, of Number 10). The high profile afforded to Public Service Agreements (PSAs), 
chimed with the previous evolution of more transactional and principal–agent relationships 
within government.  
 
One key consequence of the altered relationship is the contraction of deliberative space for 
officials (Richards and Smith, 2016). King and Crewe (2013) chronicle government blunders 
over a number of years and find that a “deficit of deliberation” exists, in a system where 
there are limited opportunities for veto. In addition, King (2015, p.196) suggests that 
various policy failures could have been prevented if the civil servants involved had not 
feared being seen to be obstructive in their Minister’s eyes. As Foster and Plowden (1996) 
put it: 
 
“…changes to the civil service, whilst managerially desirable, have weakened its 
capacity to act in an advisory capacity and weakened the ethos which allowed it to 
restrain ministerial excess without giving it the skills or authority to undertake the 
managerial roles now required.” (ibid, p. 245).  
 
Governments in recent years have also adopted a more pluralistic approach to the policy 
process – removing the monopoly that Civil Servants use to hold. This intention is set out in 
the most recent reform plan (Cabinet Office, 2012), and one recent example of this in 
practice is the commissioning of the IPPR to conduct an investigation about accountability 
arrangements in other jurisdictions (IPPR, 2013). With an increasing suite of policy sources 
open to Ministers, there is a risk that Civil Servants could be tempted to further moderate 
their advice in order to retain their individual policy stake. 
  
Things change – what’s the problem? 
 
Whilst the extent to which the factors outlined above have changed the governing 
relationship can be questioned, there is little doubt that the relationship has changed from 
Thatcher’s term onwards. This raises the question: what is the problem with this change?  
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One answer is that the quality of the governing executive may have suffered. The challenge 
to the public service ethos, the changing incentives (with rewards for those operating on 
the basis of an arguably cynical rational choice mindset) and the diminution of capacity and 
space for deliberation and advice are unlikely to have improved things in my view.  
 
A second answer is that the official, constitutional position has not changed – and it is this 
disparity between the altered reality on the ground, and the unaltered official position that 
is problematic. Haldane is still pervasive: the Civil Service code, the Cabinet Manual, and 
the Carltona doctrine are all contemporary examples predicated on the classic Westminster 
model. Successive governments show no appetite to make any changes to the official 
constitutional position or question the key underlying principles. A recent example is the 
coalition government’s rejection of the Public Administration Select Committee’s (2013) 
recommendation that a Parliamentary Commission is held into the future of the Civil 
Service. The current constitutional framework for the relationship is being pushed far 
beyond its design specifications.  
 
This raises a further question: if there is a problem with the established constitutional 
position, why do Ministers and Civil Servants defend it? There are a number of possible 
answers. Richards and Smith (2000) suggest it may be to protect a set of mutually beneficial 
power relationships (i.e. for both Ministers and Civil Servants). The same authors also 
contend that relationships within government rely on the Westminster tradition, and 
individual relationships fail when one side or other deviate from the script (2004). For this 
reason, the narratives behind each perspective sustain (‘historical impact’ for Ministers, 
and ‘constitutional propriety’ for officials) (ibid, Pp 797-799). Rhodes (2011) suggests that 
actors in Whitehall play out their beliefs about the constitution in their interactions with 
Ministers and with each other – and so the mythology endures. Richards and Smith (2016) 
also suggest that the consequences of admitting any deficiency in the status quo would be 
a possible diminution in power for those in the executive, and the end to a system which is 
essentially self-regulating.  
 
I would add a further answer here: given the complexities and priorities inherent in modern 
government, I think that there is little incentive for any administration to address an 
extremely difficult problem with minimal electoral traction. I doubt there is a “simple” 
solution, and I suspect any answer would span electoral cycles (needing ratification across 
the political spectrum), and would be hugely controversial if precepts such as 
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independence and permanence were challenged. Put simply, I do not think there is the 
political appetite6. The Fulton report did not deal with ministerial – civil service relations, so 
it is ninety-eight years since the last strategic view was taken (Haldane). My view 
concerning the limited prospects for a constitutional overhaul has also determined my 
focus on individual relationships within the existing framework in this thesis.   
 
Other tensions on the relationship – the demand for greater accountability 
 
A connection can be drawn between NPM and demands for clearer accountability in 
government. My contention is that the inward focus of NPM has actually made it more 
difficult for the public to understand who is democratically accountable for what. Ferlie et 
al. (2007, P.205) argue that managerialism has compounded problems concerning 
accountability by exposing the difficulty of drawing a line between policy and operations. 
Deleon (2007, Pp 103-105) summarises the body of opinion that suggests NPM reduces 
citizens to customers and therefore excludes them from rightful democratic participation. 
These authors consider NPM weakens democratic institutions by assuming passivity on 
behalf of the public. A connection is also drawn between entrepreneurship and rule 
bending – with markets rarely serving the public interest. Lynn (2010, p.110) also states 
that “relegating democratic institutions...” is a key weakness of NPM. This is an important 
line of argument, especially given the contact points that most citizens have with the state. 
Frustration with bureaucracy is highlighted by my interviewees in Chapter Six.  
 
Greater accountability is also being demanded by parliament – particularly through the 
Select Committee System. These committees scrutinise performance and hold the 
executive to account for its actions. The Osmotherly rules set out the approach officials 
should adopt if summoned to appear. The rules state that officials must answer questions 
in a manner approved by their Minister. They also give Ministers a role in deciding which 
official should be permitted to appear (Dowding, 1995, Hennessy, 1990). During the 
Westland affair a letter was leaked by a Civil Servant, but the Cabinet Secretary Sir Robert 
Armstrong refused to allow a select committee to speak to the Civil Servants under 
suspicion. In accordance with Osmotherly, he maintained that Civil Servants had no 
constitutional personality or responsibility separate from the elected Government 
(Dowding, 1995, Pp. 152-153).  
                                                          
6
 As cited later in this Chapter, the Institute for Government (2014) ascribe the problem with the 
most recent Civil Service reform programme as a practical one – it was not high enough on the 
agenda of Ministers and senior officials.  
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Select committees have an increasingly democratic mandate. Chairs and members are now 
elected by MPs, independent of Whips, in response to the Wright committee’s report 
(Select Committee on Reform of the House of Commons, 2009, Pp. 15-30). Their rapid 
evolution and rising profile are making them an extremely important part of our 
parliamentary system. They expose the extreme tension between demands for greater 
accountability and Haldaneian inseparability. If their strength and influence continues to 
grow, the tension they have to bear is likely to grow accordingly. Margaret Hodge is one 
former Chair agitating for change as a result: 
 
“The old tradition of civil servants being accountable to ministers, and ministers 
being accountable to Parliament, is broken… ministers feel furious when they’ve 
got to defend what they see as mistakes made by civil servants, and civil servants 
feel absolutely livid if they feel they’ve got to defend ridiculous decisions made by 
ministers – and nobody wins! That’s why I think you have to revisit the whole 
constitutional settlement about civil service and ministerial accountability, and 
open it up a little bit… You can’t say that civil servants are accountable to ministers 
who are accountable to Parliament if ministers can’t hire and fire those civil 
servants… It’s a nonsense.” (Hodge, 2014) 
 
It is an eloquent characterisation of the difficulties that Haldane’s legacy presents for both 
sides. Unsurprisingly, Senior Civil Servants have hit back at both Hodge’s style and 
substance (Guardian 2012; Penman 2012). Baroness Quin has described the terminology 
used in select committee hearings as “…more redolent of criminal proceedings…” (Quin, 
2010, p.124)7. However for Hodge and others, this is one area where parliament is 
accurately reflecting societal demands for openness and accountability – and the executive 
is simply not keeping up.  
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 John Hutton and Leigh Lewis – a former Minister and Permanent Secretary respectively – are astute 
in warning that the way in which the Public Accounts Committee operates actually risks further 
institutionalising risk aversion in the Civil Service (Hutton & Lewis, 2014, Pp 133-142) – one of the 
very behaviours that the Ministers I spoke to despaired of (see Chapter Five). This is because the 
consequences of an innovative idea that fails are so personally and reputationally severe, that most 
will not want to take the risk. As they put it: “Few, if any, Permanent Secretaries have been hauled 
before the PAC for simply doing averagely well this year what they did averagely well last.” (ibid, 
p.139). 
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Other tensions on relationships – the rise of the special advisors 
 
The increasing prevalence of Special Advisors (SpAds) is both indicative of the approach of 
recent governments, and another factor which can add pressure to Ministerial – Civil 
Servant relations. SpAds are politically appointed, temporary civil servants.  While outside 
advisers have been employed by politicians from as far back as the early twentieth century, 
their recognition as a group dates back to the 1960s and 1970s (Yong & Hazell, 2014, Pp 17-
18).  
 
Historical data suggests that in the last year of the Major administration (1996-7), there 
were a total of 38 SpAds employed (BBC, 2014). In June 2010 the total was 61 SpAds 
(Cabinet Office, 2010). According to recent figures, 103 SpAds were employed as of 
November 2014 (Cabinet Office, 2014). The recent implementation of Extended Ministerial 
Offices also allows external advisers to be recruited (Cabinet Office (2), 2013). Special 
advisors add a complicating factor to relationships within government. As I discuss more 
fully in Chapter Four, when SpAds are used appropriately they can be of great advantage to 
all involved; when they are not relationships can become dysfunctional. Their increasing 
presence is an additional variable for Ministers and Civil Servants to manage as part of their 
relationship.  
 
Other tensions on the relationship – societal expectations 
 
The changing expectations that society has about Government performance have provoked 
a vigorous debate amongst academics: some suggest this is a “supply” based problem (i.e. 
that Government and the wider political class needs to alter its approach in line with civic 
society’s needs); others suggest that it is a “demand” based problem (i.e. that societal 
demands of Government are now simply unrealistic and people refuse to fulfil their own 
civic responsibilities in return). For a comprehensive summary see Richards (2014, Pp 15-
38) and Hood and Dixon (2015) who consider further research is required concerning the 
‘changing context’ for government8. Regardless of the arguments about causation, these 
pressures are all affecting relationships between Ministers and Civil Servants. 
                                                          
8
 One potential explanation Hood and Dixon (2015) provide for the apparently underwhelming 
impact of UK government reforms – in terms of cost and administrative quality - is that the social 
context may have changed: “In particular, changes in the size and composition of the population and 
its behaviour and attitudes might possibly have served to override what might otherwise have been 
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There has been a move towards pluralism in terms of the sources of advice that the 
government is prepared to consult. But service delivery has also become more pluralistic. In 
an interview conducted in support of related research, former Cabinet Secretary Lord 
Butler told me that increased societal demands had fundamentally altered the transaction 
between the Government and the public: 
 
“I think that government has become very much more complex and the public 
demand for good public services, but not only good public services but services 
tailored to their particular needs, has developed. That puts pressure on politicians 
to deliver and politicians put pressure on civil servants, so there’s been a much 
greater emphasis on outcomes and also things not going wrong. Whereas again, 
when I started, one size fits all was very much more acceptable.” 
 
The twenty four hour news cycle and the intensity of media scrutiny have also had 
consequences for the relationship. Civil Servants need to retain their impartiality, 
presenting the Government’s position in the best light without straying into political 
territory. This is not the easiest boundary to tread. New Labour’s election in 1997 appeared 
to herald a culture shock for some Civil Servants who were not prepared for the demands 
that the new administration made of them, and were not equipped to respond9. In addition 
the Freedom of Information Act and the ubiquity of social media have led to increasing 
transparency in Government, and fuelled demands for ever more transparency10 (Bertot, 
Jaeger and Grimes, 2012). One consequence of this has been that the presentation of policy 
                                                                                                                                                                    
the decisively cost-reducing and quality improving effects of successive makeovers of the 
administrative machine.” (ibid, p.187). 
 
9
 For example, a former Senior Civil Servant, who I interviewed as part of related research, told me 
that the Civil Service were initially slow to react to the new approach to the media that New Labour 
instigated in 1997: “So some ministers can be frustrated in what they see as a slow pace of the civil 
service.  Rebuttal being the order of the day with Labour and I think the civil service was slow to 
realise how quickly ministers wanted to get material back from us and it came across therefore as 
ponderous and slow.” Baroness Armstrong, one of the former Ministers I spoke to, also told me 
about a shambolic visit to a homeless shelter early in the New Labour era. She told me that her 
Department’s press officers “…just were terrified.  That was one of the reasons why we reorganised 
media, I mean I got such a shock because that was bread and butter compared to what we’d had to 
do in opposition ourselves.” Personal interviews with the author. 
 
10
 Recent data released by the Ministry of Justice illustrates the general trend: “Between Q3 2006 
and Q3 2014 the number of FOI requests recorded by monitored bodies increased by 63%. In the 
third quarter of 2014, monitored central government bodies received 11,234 non-routine Freedom 
of Information (FOI) requests.” (Ministry of Justice, 2014, p.6).  
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and the anticipation of future data access requests are now part of everyday reality within 
Whitehall.  
 
Other tensions on relationships – civil service reform 
 
As summarised, in my assessment there was a political element to the civil service reforms 
instigated by Thatcher in the 1980s. There has been an apparent shift towards 
managerialism, localism and individuals being asked to take responsibility for delivery, and 
to account for it. Societal expectations can also be seen as a driver for these reforms. The 
Next Steps initiative was perhaps the most significant structural change – it sought to 
increase efficiency through separating out delivery functions. The recent Civil Service 
Reform plan emphasises policy capability, tightening accountability and strengthening skills 
(Cabinet Office, 2012). The IPPR report (2013) commissioned by the coalition 
administration also focuses on accountability and responsiveness. The authors suggest that 
responsiveness and independence are two values that need to be balanced, but that this is 
not a zero sum game (ibid).  
 
Between 2010 and 2015, the Minister for the Civil Service was Francis Maude. He was 
unapologetic about his aims, one of which was “…how to address persistent weaknesses 
that downsizing has exposed more starkly” (Cabinet Office, 2012, p.3). He also attributed 
part of the drive for reform to societal demands: “The public wants change... The public 
wants services to be delivered better” (ibid, p.4). Whilst Maude has always denied briefing 
anonymously against Civil Servants11, commentators have suggested that this has been a 
feature of his tenure.12 In a personal interview, as part of related research, I asked Lord 
Butler about recent criticism of the Civil Service by Ministers. He was forthright in his 
response:  
 
“Well I have got views. I regret it. I think that quite a lot of it stems from politicians, 
from Ministers expecting Civil Servants to do things that are impossible and putting 
requirements on them in response to public pressure. Like, for example, putting 
                                                          
11
 In a recent interview, Francis Maude, when asked about anonymous briefings said “Not from me, 
or my team” (Civil Service World, 2015).  
 
12
 For example, Peter Oborne, writing in the Daily Telegraph: “Unfortunately friends and allies of Mr 
Maude have a long and disgraceful record of briefing journalists against civil servants.” (Oborne, 
2014).  
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targets to reduce the number of asylum seekers. Well if you’ve also got rules that 
state when people should be given asylum it may not be possible to reconcile these 
two things. So that’s the sort of unfair pressure that can be put on Civil Servants.” 
 
What the quotation above exposes is one of the inherent contradictions in the system. 
Richards and Smith (2016, p.32) make a related point about the extent to which Ministers 
are prepared to devolve power: “No government has been able to reconcile the desire for 
decentralised implementation outside of the civil service with the desire to retain 
ministerial control (and of course it cannot be reconciled), which is why targets remain an 
important tool.” In 2014, five former Cabinet Secretaries spoke in a debate called by Lord 
Hennessy about the future of the Civil Service (Hansard, 2014). It is noteworthy that they 
felt compelled to make the case for the defence of the Civil Service in such strident terms. 
 
There are considerable questions over whether the recent programme of reform has been 
successful. The Cabinet Office’s own assessment, in July 2013, was that “…too little of what 
was set out to be delivered by this point has been fully executed.” (Cabinet Office (1), 2013, 
p.4). The Institute for Government praises the Civil Service’s response to the previous 
administration’s agenda, but suggests that the reform programme has underwhelmed 
(2014, p.7). The report goes on to criticise the failure of politicians to get sufficient buy-in 
from civil service leaders, and criticises leadership in the Civil Service.  
 
I consider a broader study about the effectiveness of central Government reform over 
thirty years in Chapter Two (Hood & Dixon, 2015). One potential explanation its authors 
advance for the apparent failure of reform (on their measure) is that “…what was said on 
the tin did not convey the real purpose of those makeovers or, if it did, that it failed to take 
account of all the ways that well-placed interests could make use of the makeovers for their 
own benefit.” (ibid, p.191). Hood and Dixon question the success of managerialism. Their 
contention is that reform is not as simple as it is often presented as being – neither in terms 
of how it is conceived, what it is motivated by, or how it is judged. The broader point is this: 
some of the most important changes to the interaction between civil servants and ministers 
have come from the behaviours and attitudes of political leaders, rather than their 
administration’s official articulation of reform policies. Thatcher’s “can-doer” preference 
and Blair’s centralisation of the policy process, serve as two examples.  
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Conclusion 
 
In this Chapter I have set out the challenges to the Westminster model and Haldane. It 
seems clear that the relationship between Ministers and Civil Servants has been altered. 
The behaviours and attitudes of certain administrations and Prime Ministers are likely to 
have been critical to this change. The Westminster model is dealing with variables it was 
not designed to. The symbiosis of Haldane is being challenged. One consequence appears 
to be a contraction of the deliberative space at the heart of government. King and Crewe 
(2013) suggest that this lies behind a number of failures. The dissonance between the 
changed reality and the frozen constitutional position is problematic. It appears to be 
putting pressure on individual relationships between Ministers and Civil Servants within 
government. In addition, other factors are increasing this tension. These include demands 
for greater accountability, an increase in special advisors, changing societal expectations, 
and recurring civil service reform initiatives. In reality, these other factors are interlinked – 
societal expectation, for example, may underlie demands for greater accountability. 
Relationships may be getting more difficult as a consequence.  
 
In my assessment, radical, formal change to the long-standing constitutional framework 
underpinning the relationship is unlikely in the near future. There is a lack of consensus 
across the political spectrum for change. No viable alternatives to the official lines of 
accountability derived from the Westminster model have yet been developed (Pollitt & 
Bouckaert, 2004, p.147). Elected governments are reluctant to cede implicit ministerial 
power – which a clarification of roles would almost certainly require. Given this scenario, 
the majority of my research focuses on the personal, human relationships at the heart of 
Government.  I have decided to concentrate on the interaction between Ministers and Civil 
Servants in this research – because I think that improvements can still be made to 
relationships within the existing paradigm. A paradigm which I consider will prevail for now, 
despite the difficulties I have outlined. The insights and experiences of former Ministers are 
used as a basis for trying to optimise individual relationships. This is territory which is often 
overlooked.  
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CHAPTER TWO - MINISTERS AND OFFICIALS: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
In the previous Chapter, I explained why relationships in government may be coming under 
increasing strain. I concluded that a formal constitutional overhaul of ministerial – official 
relationships is unlikely. As a result, the focus of this thesis is on relationships within the 
existing paradigm. In this Chapter, I review the published literature, especially in respect of 
Ministerial perceptions of civil servants. The major source for this material is ministerial 
memoirs and diaries. Two other broad sets of sources are considered: material produced by 
Civil Servants; and academic material (including an examination of NPM). The sources are 
not of equal weight or possibly value. Personal accounts of actions are likely to be highly 
biased. Unsurprisingly there are considerably more accounts by politicians than officials. 
 
Ministerial Literature (Memoirs and Diaries) 
 
Relationships between Ministers and officials feature in a number of political diaries and 
memoirs. They can hardly be considered as unbiased accounts of events although they do 
provide some insight into the perceptions of ministers. The motivation of any politician who 
writes a diary or memoir is an important factor. Baroness Shirley Williams provides the 
following reflections on her erstwhile Cabinet colleague, Richard Crossman’s diaries: 
 
“Dick Crossman’s diaries are not an accurate reflection of what actually happened, 
they’re an excessive reflection of what Dick Crossman wanted to think people 
thought that he did...Dick suddenly appeared on the scene (as a) huge, influential 
character, whereas most of us thought that he was much the same as the rest of 
us.” (Williams, 2011). 
 
Crossman literally and metaphorically wrote his own part – he was unlikely to diminish his 
own importance, nor to downplay the systemic failings he perceived – which he saw as 
frustrating his decisions and ambitions. This is particularly important as Crossman arguably 
set the mould. It is unlikely that any politician will not be motivated by some degree of self-
interest, or the desire to construct their legacy in terms most favourable to them. As Ken 
Clarke puts it:  
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“I have read colleagues’ memoirs which contained what I think (are) glaring mis-
statements of fact or recollection…far too many of my contemporaries’ memoirs 
could be subtitled Why I was always right but my colleagues did not understand it 
at the time and also taking credit for things which I seem to recall they were against 
is another shameless thing that takes place.” (Public Administration Select 
Committee, 2009, Ev 45).  
 
Shirley Williams and Ken Clarke do not use the language of social psychology but identify 
what we might describe as hindsight and self-serving bias, along with choice supporting 
memory distortion.  Nonetheless I have considered the individual, personal insights of 
Ministers, rather than considering them as de-personalised, formal actors and have used 
diaries and memoirs as source material. I chose a sample of Ministerial literature to read. 
The sample spans different time periods (1960s through to 2010), political administrations, 
strength of administration (the thin majorities of the 1970s compared to the large 
majorities of selected administrations during the Thatcher and Blair years) and ranks of 
politicians (from the most junior Ministers to Prime Ministers). Memoirs are more common 
than diaries, and my selection also reflects that. I have not attempted to stratify my findings 
against these factors, because I do not think this would be viable or revealing given the 
nature of the material I am considering and the size of the sample (see Appendix I for a list). 
Two clear themes emerged: the tendency of Civil Servants to seek control; and concerns 
about their competency. 
 
Control 
 
One of the most prevalent themes identifiable in the Ministerial literature is what I have 
broadly categorised as ‘control’. This is where Ministers consider that their Civil Servants 
are seeking to control or dominate them. Richard Crossman, at times, felt in danger of 
being a cog in the Civil Service machine. After his first few days as a Cabinet Minister in 
1964 he remarked: 
 
‘The Private Secretary’s job is to make sure that when the Minister comes into 
Whitehall he doesn’t let the side or himself down and behaves in accordance with 
the requirements of the institution…one has only to do absolutely nothing to be 
floated forward on the stream.’ (Crossman, 1979, p.25). 
 
25 
 
Crossman uses similar imagery in assessing the weakness of the Wilson cabinet in 1965, 
when he talks of the government ‘drifting along, with our momentum halted and the Civil 
Service taking over more each day’ (ibid, p.113). Crossman also considered the cabinet 
committee system, and the way minutes were taken, greatly strengthened the Civil 
Service’s hand – illustrating their version of what happened, in accordance with their 
expectations of what should have happened – with Ministerial discussion lost in the 
margins (ibid, Pp. 92-93).  
 
Michael Heseltine mentions Civil Servants who would ‘skilfully draft the likely conclusions 
to every meeting long before the meeting itself takes place’ (Heseltine, 2000, p.489). 
Dennis Healey thought that the UK Civil Service “…had no intellectual superior in the world” 
(Healey, 1989, p.376), although he considered that vast intellect was often used to stifle 
initiative and change, and that “...the Treasury knew the price of everything and the value 
of nothing.” (ibid). Civil Servants may take a longer term view, and will often be categorised 
as conservative in nature, and protectors of the status quo (Hennessy, 1990, p.492 and 
Mottram, 2008, p.4).  
 
Roy Jenkins, having just been appointed Home Secretary in 1966, describes a battle of wills 
with his Permanent Secretary, Sir Charles Cunningham, who oversaw all Ministerial 
submissions; which he had reduced to two pages – with no background documents 
supplied to Ministers. Jenkins thought this was absurdly hierarchical and provided no 
evidential basis for Ministerial decisions. He overhauled the system (reducing Sir Charles to 
tears and precipitating his retirement) – and marvelled at the failure of his last three 
Ministerial predecessors to have tolerated such control (Jenkins, 1991, Pp 181-185). One 
manifestation of Civil Service ‘control’ will be in the balance of the advice that Civil Servants 
provide, especially if it appears skewed. Ernest Bevin, when Minister of Labour in the 
1940’s, dealt with the so called “Whitehall veto” masterfully: 
 
‘You’ve just given me twenty good reasons why I can’t do this; I’m sure clever chaps 
like you can go away and produce twenty good reasons why I can.’ (cited by 
Hennessy, 1990, Pp. 497-498).  
 
Ministers sometimes feel that the Civil Service does not support a certain policy, and the 
rationale for their reluctance is created retrospectively. This can often leave the advice 
against action looking slightly ludicrous. Jim Callaghan, recalling his time as a Junior 
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Transport Minister in the late 1940s, refers to the scrap he had with his officials over the 
introduction of Catseyes to Britain’s roads: 
 
“…officials in the Ministry of Transport were strongly opposed to their use on trunk 
roads, and I had to use all my powers of persuasion before I eventually overrode 
the Department. The principal objection of one official was that to place the studs 
on the crown of the road would encourage car-owners to drive in the middle during 
a fog and a dreadful series of collisions would follow.” (Callaghan, 1987, p.97).  
 
Tony Benn (1996, Pp 287, 293-4, 302-3) describes a dispute with his “impossible” 
Permanent Secretary, Antony Part, who he considered was trying to undermine his 
industrial policy at every turn13. Benn advances another potential motivation for the Civil 
Service’s desire to resist reform in this instance: “This is the way in which the Department 
of Industry acts, simply as a mouthpiece for the CBI, and this is what I won’t have.” (ibid, p. 
287). Former Prime Minister John Major corroborates Benn’s point in his memoir:  
 
“Whitehall has a tendency to lapse into cosy relationships with the representatives 
of public service providers. This is preferable to hostility, but it must not prevent 
rigorous scrutiny being advocated or upheld as it so often has in the past.” (Major, 
2000, p. 262). 
 
Alan Clark thought that his officials delighted in tying him in knots, and talks of them 
browbeating him as a team, with “one bespectacled Guardian reader in sole charge of each 
‘Scheme’”, as Clark ‘blunders around like a bull on sawdust with the picadors galloping 
round him sticking in their horrid barbed banderillas’ (Clark, 1993, p.22). David Blunkett 
was deeply troubled by what he saw as undue interference on behalf of senior Civil 
Servants; he writes scathingly about the approach of his permanent secretary in 2001, 
suggesting that a set of aims and objections he had produced had been rewritten by the 
permanent secretary, demonstrating how the ‘senior Civil Service seek to interfere if the 
Secretary of State is prepared to let them’ (Blunkett, 2006, p.275). Chris Mullin finds a 
chance meeting with a former private secretary insightful. The official in question rated him 
as a good Minister because Mullin “...turned up on time, did your work and did as you were 
                                                          
13
 As Dowding (1995) points out: “Most of the published memoirs of Labour politicians and policy 
advisers of the 1964-1970 government suggested an undirected but nonetheless conspirational civil 
service thwarting their plans” (ibid, Pp. 63-64). 
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told” (Mullin, 2010, p.191). The synergy with Crossman’s words, relating to his experience 
in 1964, is obvious.  
 
I have considered Margaret Thatcher’s overall approach to the Civil Service in Chapter One, 
but the control theme is clearly evident in her memoirs. One example concerns the NHS. On 
a visit to the Department of Health and Social Security, some of the Civil Servants she spoke 
to countered her suggestion that hospitals with excess land should sell this to the private 
sector and spend the proceeds on patients. One of the arguments put to her was that 
“…this was somehow unfair on those hospitals which did not have the good fortune to have 
surplus land” (Thatcher, 2011, p.47). For her this was indicative of the “desire for no 
change” and complemented her overall conclusion that the civil service thought it “could 
be insulated from a reforming zeal that would transform Britain’s public and private 
institutions…” (ibid, p.48). 
 
Not all of the literature I have read suggests that Ministers consider their Civil Servants 
behave like this. A number of Ministers are well aware of the positive qualities of their Civil 
Servants. Douglas Hurd says he only ever had one private secretary that he could not 
“invite to become a confidant and friend” (Hurd, 2003, p.320). Nigel Lawson is generally 
positive about the Civil Service, and talks of working harmoniously with them (Lawson, 
1992). Alan Clark, often fiercely critical, commends the loyalty and support of his private 
office staff (Clark, 1993, p. 390). Lord Howe specifically praised the attitude he found from 
officials in the Treasury when he arrived there in 1979 (Howe, 1995, p.127).  
 
Baronness Joyce Quin is also more measured in her approach than some of the diarists I 
have cited.  She puts most mistakes made by Civil Servants down to “…understandable 
human error or an organisational failure rather than the result of hidden agendas.” (Quin, 
2010, Pp. 127-8).  
 
The control theme seems to have some longitudinal consistency over a number of years. 
However, from the literature I considered, it appeared most clearly in accounts written 
prior to Thatcher’s rebalancing of power towards Ministers in the 1980s. It also emerges 
strongly in the accounts of politicians who could be characterised as more radical in their 
approach (e.g. Crossman, Benn, and Clark). One potential explanation is that those with the 
highest expectations of power may have been most disappointed by the constraints 
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imposed by reality, particularly at a time before power was rebalanced towards Ministers 
(as explored in Chapter One).  
  
Competency  
 
One of the less nuanced views that the literature reveals is that Ministers think that many 
Civil Servants are simply incompetent. Richard Crossman had an obviously sceptical attitude 
to the Civil Service as an entity. He was surprised and disappointed that the Radcliffe report 
of 1967 was not accepted by Harold Wilson. This report confirmed to him the ‘total 
lackadaisicalness of the Civil Service’ (Crossman, 1979, p.356). Crossman was disappointed 
with the drafting skills of those tasked with summarising a Bill (ibid, p.43) and heard that a 
quarter of social security claimants were getting less than they were entitled to due to the 
incompetence of staff (ibid, p.480). These are some of many references to Crossman’s 
dissatisfaction with the quality of his Civil Servants’ work. 
 
Tony Benn’s diaries also suggest that he had a dim view about the competence of the Civil 
Service. When Postmaster-General, he delights in the appointment of a private secretary 
who “…is free from the usual Civil Service rubbish…” (Benn, 1996, p.118). He also recounts a 
wonderful exchange with Sir Donald Banks, who had been the first Director General of the 
Post Office in 1934. At that time the Postmaster General would appear twice a week: 
 
“All the minutes for him to sign would then be laid around a long table in his office 
and he would walk round and sign them one after the other, have another glass of 
port and then disappear…senior civil servants worked from 10AM to 4.30PM…Life 
was leisurely…But it was during those years that the rest of the world caught up 
with and overtook us.” (ibid, p.152).  
  
Benn here, as with Crossman earlier in this section, is one of the few Ministers to imply that 
a historical link exists between perceived laziness and competence.  
 
Margaret Thatcher identified clear incompetence in the Civil Service Department (CSD), on 
a visit early in 1980, which confirmed many of her worst fears: 
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“I met able and conscientious people attempting to manage and monitor the 
activities of civil servants in departments of which they knew little, in policy areas 
of which they knew even less. Because the staff of other departments were aware 
of the disadvantages under which the CSD worked, they took scant notice of the 
recommendations they received from it” (Thatcher, 2011, p. 48). 
 
Thatcher here recognises that the incompetence identified relates closely to the structure 
of Whitehall, and also that power relationships between departments will closely influence 
the individual behaviours of civil servants within those departments. She scrapped the CSD 
shortly after her visit. 
 
David Blunkett’s diaries make his opinions about the competency of the Civil Service quite 
clear. A good example is his impassioned view about the handling of the deaths of several 
cockle pickers – a tragic episode that also cost Bev Hughes, the Home Office Minister in 
charge of the policy, her job: 
 
“…Jonathan Baum14…had the absolute audacity to say that so often Ministers 
blame Civil Servants for decisions that they had taken…(but) so often Ministers 
cover for Civil Servants who are utterly useless, incompetent and ineffective. 
In…(the case of Bev Hughes)…this was demonstrated by the gross misinformation 
she had been given to put in a letter to Geraldine Smith, about the particular 
actions and interventions in relation to gangmasters and cockle pickers.” (Blunkett, 
2006, p.607). 
 
Blunkett’s diary is one of the most fiercely critical I have read – and there are numerous 
entries that speak directly to the incompetence theme. He bemoans the fact that the best 
way to remove an incompetent Civil Servant is to promote them (ibid, p.314); he comments 
on the “total dsyfunctionality” of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate of the Home 
Office (ibid, p.618); and again remarks upon the downfall of Bev Hughes referred to above, 
saying that they had previously requested the official who had produced the faulty report 
be moved, to no avail (ibid, p. 630). Gerald Kaufman, whose Guide to being a Minister is a 
key text on the relationship, is also alive to the fact that the Civil Service can abdicate all 
responsibility for a difficult decision if it wishes to, presenting very neutral advice to a 
Minister – and effectively ‘washing their hands’ of it (Kaufman, 1997, p.122). 
                                                          
14
 Jonathan Baum was General Secretary of the First Division Association of Senior Civil Servants. 
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Jonathan Powell may not have been a Government Minister, but his perceptions on the 
relationship are also of interest. He cites an example of Civil Service incompetence through 
the lens of fatalism. He recalls a Home Office team giving a presentation about how the 
crime rate would rise ‘inexorably’ because the economy was growing and thus more 
temptation was put in the way of criminals. When Powell asked what would happen if there 
was a recession the official said ‘crime would rise because people would be deprived and 
more of them would have to resort to robbery to survive.’ (Powell, 2010, p.72). He is also 
critical of the capacity of individual departments to produce “original thought”. He 
considered them very weak in policy making as Thatcher had hollowed them out (ibid, 
p.180). 
 
Douglas Hurd praises the quality of oral briefing that quite junior Civil Servants in the Home 
Office would frequently provide (Hurd, 2003, p.351). Although Tony Blair’s relationship with 
the Civil Service was at times extremely controversial, he was also able to appreciate its 
qualities: 
 
“The Civil Service had and has great strengths. It was and is impartial. It is, properly 
directed, a formidable machine. At times of crisis, superb. Its people are intelligent, 
hard-working and dedicated to public service.” (Blair, 2010, p.206) 
 
Blair, however, also says that the Civil Service was out of date – and that inertia was 
problem (ibid, p.19) – hence his moves to reform it.  
 
The competency theme also appears to have some longitudinal consistency – but was 
slightly more prominent in the sample of post Thatcherite material I read. As noted above, 
Jonathan Powell makes a direct link between Thatcher’s approach and the subsequent 
inability of departments to innovate and create.  There is a clear consistency here with my 
contention in Chapter One concerning the changes that occurred under Thatcher.  
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Civil Service Literature (Memoirs and Training Material/Academic Papers) 
 
Whilst material written by former Civil Servants is very limited because of the constitutional 
convention of impartiality - some valuable insights can still be gleaned. No clear and 
consistent central themes emerge, but a series of more isolated observations are still of 
value. I have split the literature between memoirs and training material/academic papers. 
 
Civil Service – Memoirs 
 
Former senior Civil Servants Sir Antony Part and Roy Denman have both published memoirs 
of their time in Whitehall (post war through to the 1970s). Clive Ponting, infamous for his 
role in leaking papers concerning the sinking of the Belgrano, has written several books. 
Christopher Meyer (former Ambassador to the United States) and Sherard Cowper-Coles 
(former diplomat) have written more recent memoirs, primarily relevant to Blair’s time in 
office.  
 
Roy Denman points to the natural tension at the heart of the relationship (2002, p.23), and 
his anecdotes about a resistance to interchange with the private sector (ibid, p.26), and the 
constrictions of hierarchy (ibid, p.42), suggest that these ongoing concerns have a historical 
root. The Ministerial qualities he admired in Harold Wilson were his intellect, humour and 
geniality (ibid, p.28). The qualities he admired most in fellow Civil Servants were authority, 
clarity and courage – all to be found shining through in their advice to Ministers (ibid, p.49). 
His own position became near impossible given his distaste for the Labour administration of 
the 1970s (ibid, p.157), his own role in negotiating entry into Europe and his own passion 
for the previous Government’s policy. 
 
Antony Part rejects the contention that change is anathema for Senior Civil Servants – for 
him they exist to help enable it (1990, p.107). His extremely difficult relationship with Tony 
Benn appeared doomed from the start (ibid, p.169). Benn felt Part and his Department had 
a clear agenda and that his Permanent Secretary did not respect him (see Benn, 1996, 
p.287 & p.294). Part felt that his Minister deliberately created an atmosphere of hostility, 
was politically isolated and was pursuing an impossible policy (Part, 1990, p.172). Kaufman 
considers in these circumstances, the Minister will always be ultimately to blame for not 
carrying his Civil Servants (1997, Pp.32-33).  
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Clive Ponting, writing in 1989, considered that the biggest problem for Whitehall was that it 
was operating a nineteenth century model, which had not been adapted to fit the modern 
world (Ponting, 1989). Ponting condemns the notion of ministerial responsibility, developed 
at a time when departments contained a handful of officials, as a “meaningless charade” 
(ibid, p.10).  Ponting criticises the structure of Whitehall and its personnel – and suggests 
the establishment of small, policy focused departments (with administration being 
separated out). He is critical of Whitehall’s “cosy, club-like spirit…” (ibid, p.37) and suggests 
that the cult of the elitist, intellectual, amateur and the out-dated notion of political 
impartiality is no longer either desirable or tenable (ibid, p. 47).  Twenty-seven years after 
Ponting called for fundamental and strategic reform of Whitehall – encompassing 
ministerial-civil service relations – no such exercise has taken place.  
 
Meyer and Cowper-Coles’s insights are both centred on the New Labour years. Meyer’s 
reflections are more universal. He highlights the importance of Ministers saying thanks and 
being strong whilst also believing that they are inthrall to the press (Meyer, 2006, p.35). For 
him good ministerial qualities are intuition, political skill, frankness and grasp of policy 
detail (ibid, Pp. 77-8). Negative ministerial qualities include hesitancy, quietness and 
defensiveness (ibid, p.78-9). By implication, he also thinks that relationships between 
Ministers and Civil Servants will be much harder to forge when a new Government is 
elected after long years in opposition (ibid, p.78). 
 
Cowper-Coles’s reflections come from his every day interaction with Robin Cook – so 
complement Meyer’s neatly. Early in his career he understood that Civil Servants must 
adjust for the political demands on their Minister (Cowper-Coles, 2013, p.15), and whilst 
working with Cook he achieved a successful relationship by understanding his Minister’s 
needs and then adapting to them (ibid, Pp 201-4). He was supportive, but also found ways 
to ensure his Minister got through the mundane but essential every day work. Two 
beautifully simple examples show the importance of personal chemistry in all relationships. 
The first where Cook did not get on with someone who constantly smelled of cigarettes 
(ibid, p. 206); the second where Cook perceived that his Permanent Secretary did not 
approve of him – especially as they were cut from similar cloth (ibid, Pp 211-12). Cook’s 
disquiet at a candidate for Permanent Secretary who he didn’t consider would be tough 
enough with him is also revealing (Pp. 228-9). Cowper-Coles also provides an impassioned 
warning about the importance of unvarnished advice (ibid, p.299).   
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The overall vision these insights create is complex and nuanced – no abiding themes 
emerge in the way that they do from the Ministerial literature. Denman confirms some of 
the historically perceived issues with the Civil Service (insular, hierarchical) whilst Part 
rejects others (change averse). Ponting’s criticisms are strategic ones; and many of the 
issues he highlights are still relevant. The limitations in the weight of the material also 
means drawing general conclusions is dangerous – especially given the snapshots of distinct 
periods of time, uneven in length.  
 
Civil Service –Training material and academic papers 
 
There are a limited range of sources that I have also considered which are focused on the 
job of the Civil Servant, and how Civil Servants can work with Ministers more effectively. 
Jary (2008, p.5) notes that the relationship between Ministers and Civil Servants is 
symbiotic. Ministers bring democratic legitimacy and accountability, political direction and 
a common sense approach to government. Civil Servants bring expertise, specialism, 
objectivity and continuity. In terms of what one group wants from the other he believes 
that Ministers want: practical advice about using the government machine; clear, objective 
and expert advice in line with their aims; early warning of problems; and efficient and loyal 
implementation of decisions.  Civil Servants want: accessibility and readiness to listen; clear 
direction and feedback; decisiveness and consistency; and fluent and persuasive 
articulation of policy to the public (ibid, p.14). The similarity with the classic Haldaneian 
view summarised in Chapter One is clear. 
 
Marshall’s handbook (2010) advises Ministers to understand the perspective of officials if 
they want to get the best from them. He urges simple planning, diary keeping, and ruthless 
prioritisation: “If you have more than three priorities, you’re deluding yourself. That’s called 
a shopping list” (ibid, p.9). He emphasises the importance of investing in human 
relationships (ibid, p.25-28) and the need for reflection – with Ministers needing to ensure 
that the urgent does not always triumph over the important (Pp. 35-6). Marshall’s guide 
exposes some of the seemingly intractable issues that governing presents, at times in stark 
terms. It received some negative press coverage (Brady, 2011). 
 
Grant and Jary (2010) contend that senior Civil Servants are often strong intellectually and 
analytically but emotionally shy and lacking in people skills. They think that this in turn has 
shaped a Civil Service “that is much more comfortable with theory, process, analysis and 
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control than with practical action and decision, leadership and management and simple 
human communication15.” (Grant & Jary, 2010, p.96).  
 
Whilst this might not be revelatory in itself, they go on to cite statistical evidence to suggest 
that the stereotype is valid. The results of a recent sample of senior Civil Servants 
undertaking the Myers Briggs analysis of styles are: 
 
“…71% shared two out of four characteristics (out of a possible sixteen) and 65% 
shared three out of four. Nine of the sixteen characteristics were unrepresented 
within the group. Julian Rizzello…(NSG psychologist)…regards this as a typical 
sample. His long experience suggests that between 50% and 75% of senior Civil 
Servants fall into a few closely related types of the sixteen identified by Myers-
Briggs. This is a large enough cadre to maintain a dominant culture.” (ibid, p.96).  
 
Grant and Jary’s contention appears to be that the culture demands a certain type of 
person; and that type of person demands a certain culture.  
 
                                                          
15
 It is worth briefly cross referring to Rhodes’ insights into Civil Service language here: 
“…preferences for politeness, understatement, distance and detachment pervade the everyday 
phrases used by the Civil Service. They are examples of the way in which the Civil Service takes the 
emotion out of everyday life.” (Rhodes, 2011, p.191).  He goes on to criticise a passage in a working 
with Ministers booklet, authored by Chris Jary, which lists jargon words to be avoided. Rhodes is 
rather disappointed that the terminology, which he considers represents “…the everyday language 
of managerialism” (ibid, p.203) is subjected to this treatment. He considers the mere fact that such a 
list was published indicates that the Cabinet Office were undermining management reform. I do not 
agree with the implication Rhodes draws here (as I have argued in Chapter One). Rhodes’ own 
academic standpoint, as briefly discussed in the next sub-title, is important context when considering 
these remarks.  
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Academic Literature 
 
Academic research does not corroborate some of the dominant, negative themes that 
emerge concerning Civil Servants from the Ministerial perspective.  Two of the major 
academic contributors in recent years are Rhodes and Richards. Rhodes is interpretivist in 
his approach. Richards is more traditional; a critical realist/empiricist who considers 
political theory to be important. There are two dominant governance models that underpin 
Rhodes’ and Richards’ views. Rhodes is the co-creator of the differentiated polity model 
(see Rhodes, 1994; Bevir & Rhodes, 2008) – which suggests that the state is being hollowed 
out and power exchange relationships are now dispersed between a large number of 
actors. Richards is the co-creator of the asymmetric polity model (Marsh, Richards and 
Smith, 2003) – which suggests that the dispersal of power from the centre can be 
overemphasised and unequal power relationships at the heart of Government are still 
extremely important.  
 
Rhodes (2011) was embedded within a Department, which allowed him to conduct an 
ethnographic study and gain rare access to Ministers and Civil Servants interacting daily. 
Rhodes notes that Civil Servants are cautious for good reason, and that this caution will 
often be misinterpreted – understandably – by a keen Minister (2011, p.128-9). He found 
the Civil Servants he observed tended be hard working (ibid, p.272), loyal (ibid, p.13) and 
found no evidence that they tried to undermine Ministers (ibid, p.185). Rhodes’ conclusions 
are particularly interesting. Despite his clear view that the Westminster model is a flawed 
theoretical construct, he acknowledges that “Westminster beliefs…remain core beliefs for 
both Ministers and permanent secretaries and help to shape their actions” Original 
emphasis (Rhodes, 2011, p.284). Rhodes highlights the importance of stories and 
mythology, and was surprised that: 
 
 “As I watched ministers and civil servants enact their everyday stories, I saw them 
re-enacting the nineteenth century constitution.” (ibid, p.280).  
 
His ethnographic research leads Rhodes to an interesting place. In essence the models and 
belief systems which he considers are outdated and lack relevance are the very models that 
he finds those within Government still base their actions and relationships on. As an 
interpretivist, he deserves credit for drawing this conclusion, which must have been an 
uncomfortable one for him to derive. 
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Richards’ research suggests that power was rebalanced by the Conservatives from Civil 
Servants to Ministers (1997) – and further by New Labour towards the Prime Minister 
(2008). There was a personalisation rather than overt politicisation of the Civil Service 
under the Conservatives (1997, Pp 133-151), but this eroded the objectivity of the advice 
being provided (ibid, p245). Under New Labour, “joined-up” Government was intended to 
be the strategic solution to an age old Whitehall problem: feudalism (2008, Pp. 124-129). 
However, “game playing” ensued (ibid, p.126), some individual Ministers felt undermined, 
and I suspect that relationships between those Ministers and their Civil Servants became 
much more difficult as a result. Diamond (2014), writing after the conclusion of the 
complete Labour term in office, concurs with Richards in broad terms that New Labour 
operated within the bounds of the existing model. He also avers that they lacked the 
requisite constitutional knowledge and strategic vision to substantially redraw its 
boundaries, despite having a clear opportunity to do so (ibid, p. 286). 
 
Page and Jenkins (2005) conducted a number of in depth interviews with Civil Servants.  
They found that junior officials may often be blamed by Ministers initially (2005, p.162), but 
that many Civil Servants are of a high quality and demonstrate creativity and vision (ibid, 
p.145). As with Rhodes they find no evidence of Civil Servants trying to undermine 
Ministers (ibid, p.133; p.170).  
 
New Public Management 
 
In Chapter One, I set out the overarching principles of NPM, with reference to the work of 
Hood (1991), Massey & Pyper (2005), and Osborne (2010). I also considered material by 
Burnham and Horton (2013) concerning principal agent relations, and the works of Ferlie et 
al (2007), Deleon (2007) and Lynn (2010) on the discrete issue of accountability. In addition, 
I have also considered some of the extensive literature which considers how NPM may have 
changed relationships between politicians and officials.  
 
Pollitt & Bouckhaert (2004) consider the validity of the NPM vision of the Ministerial role 
(as strategists and opinion leaders – who communicate values and commit resources – but 
who are not responsible for operations or management). In their view, “…there is little 
evidence that this is a credible vision of any likely reality” (ibid, p.150).  They suggest that 
most ministers have little interest in management reforms, that incentives are still short 
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term, and that the pressures on politicians mean that they want to be able to “…intervene 
dramatically when things appear to be going wrong…” (ibid, p.150). The new models 
developed do not properly account for political incentives, and to pretend that managerial 
reform is an apolitical process is a fallacy. The public will continue to hold politicians 
accountable, and boundaries concerning responsibility can be shifted accordingly (with 
policy weakness being presented as managerial failure) (ibid, Pp. 156-157). The dissonance 
between the rhetoric and the reality is unlikely to make relationships between Ministers 
and Civil Servants, trying to deal with the dynamics above, any easier. 
 
Hughes (1998), a supporter of NPM, acknowledges that politics are critical to 
managerialism – which corroborates the views I set out in Chapter One about the political 
motivations bound up in Thatcher’s approach. Massey and Pyper (2005) note that “…the 
role and purpose of the central civil service is increasingly under scrutiny” (ibid, p.177), with 
delivery functions increasingly out-sourced, but its role providing policy advice threatened 
by the rise of special advisors in particular. The political element of NPM and its successor 
reforms seems clear, and is intertwined with some of the other societal and contextual 
pressures building on relationships between Ministers and officials which I examined in 
Chapter One.  
 
Campbell and Wilson (1995) consider that Whitehall was fundamentally altered by NPM. 
They specify six examples of change that they cannot see being reversed: (i) the breaking of 
the monopoly of the civil service as policy advisors; (ii) alterations in the architecture of 
Whitehall which allowed departmental advice to be challenged by the centre; (iii) 
generational socialisation of officials into a culture of subordination; (iv) the view that the 
civil service is no longer a bespoke ‘profession’; (v) increasing interaction with Europe 
affecting attitudes; and (vi) the rise of the career politician who is more concerned with 
making his or her mark than providing steady leadership (ibid, Pp. 294 – 298). Many of their 
points seem to chime with more recent arguments advanced concerning the challenges to 
the traditional model (as I explored in Chapter One).  
 
Page (2010) suggests that of all the changes that have affected the Civil Service in recent 
years, the rise of managerialism has been the most significant. In his view, “It is as holders 
of political power that the most significant erosion has taken place” (ibid, p.421). The 
diminishment of the Senior Civil Service’s role in policy terms, has not been replaced by a 
significant role as managers of delivery (as this has largely been outsourced). They are 
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confined to managers of policy development within departments, but should consider 
playing a greater involvement in that development themselves in an effort to reassert their 
traditional role and improve policy.  
 
Hood & Dixon (2015) set out a detailed analysis of NPM, and have identified and created 
datasets in an attempt to ascertain whether Government has worked better and cost less in 
recent years in the UK. They conclude that “…far from falling, running costs rose 
substantially in absolute terms over thirty years, while complaints soared” (ibid, p.178). 
They question orthodox public management principles as a result but fall some distance 
short of endorsing the views of anti-managerialists. Their conclusions are striking in their 
moderation, as they acknowledge: 
 
“…the data examined here broadly seems to point to a more middle-of-the-road 
conclusion that UK central government ‘cost a bit more and worked a bit worse’ 
over the thirty years considered here. That conclusion is strikingly at odds both with 
the heavy drumbeat of political and managerial rhetoric surrounding successive 
makeovers of central government and with the common academic view that NPM 
and many of the changes that went along with it had major consequences…” (ibid, 
p.183).  
 
Hood and Dixon make some interesting observations about the potential futility of just 
‘trying harder’ (ibid, p.195) to repeat reforms, given the extremely limited evidence of 
success. If relationships between Ministers and Civil Servants have altered over recent 
years, it is far from clear that there has been any quantifiable benefit as a result.  
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Conclusion 
 
The majority of the material I elicited from ministerial diaries and memoirs concerning 
relationships with Civil Servants fell into two broadly identifiable areas: control and 
competence. Both were seen as predominantly negative influences on relationships with 
Ministers.  
 
The control theme was most clearly evident in pre-1980s literature. The perception that 
Thatcher formed of the Civil Service when she first became Prime Minister is consistent 
with the views of contemporary diarists, such as Benn and Crossman. The perception that 
Civil Servants were change averse and sought control appears to have been common at 
that time, across radically different parts of the political spectrum. 
 
The competency theme could be identified more easily in the sample of post Thatcherite 
material I read. Whilst it is hard to draw any firm conclusions from this, it would appear to 
be consistent with the changes that took place in the 1980s under the Thatcher 
administration (as explored in Chapter One).  Ministerial concerns may have shifted from 
the power their Civil Servants held, to their delivery and managerial skills.  
 
Collectively, the thematic consistency I identified in ministerial memoirs and diaries might 
point to the existence of an established narrative concerning the Civil Service. The Civil 
Service’s limited ability to adapt and change, as recorded by Ministers, points to a serious 
difficulty. This emerges despite the extreme subjectivity of the source material.  
  
Civil Service material is limited for obvious reasons. Ponting’s (1989) observation about the 
distance between the official position and the reality is consistent with the argument I have 
made in Chapter One. Grant and Jary (2010) suggest that personal typology is an important 
factor in deciding who climbs to senior civil service positions – and the culture that may 
subsequently endure. If their contention is correct, it may offer an additional explanation as 
to the consistency of the themes identified in the ministerial literature.  
 
From the academic perspective, material focused directly on relationships is rare. Rhodes 
(2011), Richards (1997; 2008) and Diamond (2014) find that a traditional conception of the 
state and constitution still frames the actions of those in Government – despite the changes 
to the relationship that have taken place in recent decades. Pollitt & Bouckhaert (2004), 
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Hughes (1998), Massey & Pyper (2005), Campbell & Wilson (1995) and Page (2010) show 
how NPM and the rise of managerialism have affected the role of the Civil Service and 
challenged Westminster model orthodoxy. Hood & Dixon (2015) find that the efficiency and 
‘quality’ of Government has not changed significantly in recent years despite the changes 
that have taken place.  
 
Despite the variety of the existing source material, some important conclusions can still be 
drawn. Ministerial concerns about the Civil Service have persisted over time. The formal 
constitutional position has been challenged but prevails. NPM has changed the informal 
role of Civil Servants and is likely to have affected relationships with Ministers as a 
consequence. These conclusions align with my findings in Chapter One and my focus on 
personal, individual relationships. Arguably, it makes it even more important for these 
relationships to be better understood and optimised, especially given the apparent 
difficulties with systemic reform. Having reviewed the relevant literature, I wanted to 
generate new and discrete insights to test and supplement the existing material, focused 
clearly on optimising relationships. In the next Chapter, I set out my primary research 
methodology for doing so.  
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
My role 
 
In this Chapter I set out the methodological approach taken in this research. Before doing 
so it is worth noting that l do not fulfil the traditional role of external, disinterested 
researcher. I am a Senior Policy Advisor at the Ministry of Justice. I have been a civil servant 
since 2002. My current grade is Senior Executive Officer (a junior management role). I have 
worked for Labour, Coalition, and Conservative administrations (serving Ministers from all 
three parties). The frequency of my contact with Ministers has varied depending on the 
preferences of the Ministerial team, and the exact positions I have held. I have always 
worked in a policy environment, so I am familiar with the types of issues that Ministers and 
Civil Servants have to deal with. My own experiences are not the subject of my work. That 
would be completely inappropriate. There is no reference to them throughout this piece. 
The idea for the work was my own; all the research was conducted unaided, and the final 
piece reflects my own personal views. It has been produced purely in my capacity as a 
doctoral candidate.   
 
However, it is inevitable that my own role has affected my perceptions, created inherent 
biases and informed my approach. My own role is both a potential strength and weakness. 
The knowledge underpinning the subject area, the perceived credibility of the work, and 
the potential for actual change to result are highlighted as possible strengths of insider – 
research. Weaknesses may include a perceived lack of impartiality, vested interests in 
reaching certain conclusions, and an unwillingness or inability to analyse data generated 
from a fresh perspective (Costley, Elliott and Gibbs, 2010, Pp 6-7). I consider my intrinsic 
understanding of certain scenarios Ministers have to deal with could be perceived as a 
potential strength of this work.  
 
My “agency” as a practitioner (ibid, p.116) may have affected the way I perceive and 
construct relationships within government, the theoretical underpinning to my work, and 
my decision to focus on optimising individual relationships within the existing framework 
(as set out in Chapter One). That could be perceived as a potential weakness in the work.  
As set out by Soobrayan (2003), researchers themselves are often the main research tool. 
Dealing with the small “p” political implications of research is a process of judgement – my 
views as to the motivations of my interviewees and their aims are important to the way 
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that I have weighed and presented their views. As set out below, my overall judgement is 
that my interviewees genuinely wanted to help improve practice.  
 
Contrary to what might be expected, I do not consider that my own role helped me secure 
access to any former Ministers. As explained below, I wrote a number of letters to former 
Ministers with whom I had no connection at all. I do consider that my role may have 
persuaded potential interviewees to accept my invitations, and may have persuaded them 
to agree to be cited by name. That, in itself, may say something about their attitude to the 
Civil Service in turn (i.e. that they intrinsically trusted me, as a Civil Servant, to deal 
responsibly with the results and to characterise their views fairly – despite the fact I was 
engaging with them in my capacity as a research student).  My role also underlies my belief 
that the work could have potential utility for Ministers and Civil Servants; and that there are 
deficiencies in the existing material which considers the human interaction at the heart of 
government (see Chapter Two). Those who read this work will be able to draw their own 
conclusions about its potential value, in this light.  
 
Overarching methodological approach 
 
The overarching methodological approach I have adopted is considered below. There are 
several different methodological approaches to analysing British Government. Richards and 
Smith (2004) suggest that there are four main ways to analyse the relationship: the 
constitutional approach, rational choice theory, materialist, and interpretative.  
 
The constitutional approach is the classic lens through which interaction has been 
understood. It emphasises conventions, behaviours, and the gradual evolution of 
traditional ‘club’ rules – some of which are now codified principles. This approach is based 
on ageing Westminster precepts that appear to endure, as explored in Chapters One and 
Two.  
 
Rational choice theory provides a stark alternative – focusing on the motivation of 
Ministers and Civil Servants. The central contention is that rational self-interest drives 
behaviours. Ministers want re-election and political progression. Officials are utility 
maximizers looking for increased budgets, or to reduce the “costs” to themselves of 
transactions with Ministers, by reshaping their environment to suit their own needs 
(Dowding & James, 2004).  I argue in Chapter One that Thatcher saw the underlying 
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motivation of Civil Servants through the prism of rational choice, and this drove many of 
the changes to the relationship that she subsequently imposed (see Smith, 2015, p.73).  
 
The materialist approach suggests that central state intervention in the economy or society 
was not seen as desirable or necessary as a result of the way Britain developed from the 
Victorian era onwards (Richards and Smith, 2004, p.779). The argument is that this drove 
the emphasis on generalists in the civil service, rather than specialists – with the need to 
serve their Minister, rather than the state as a whole, also featuring. 
 
Finally, the most recently developed approach is an interpretive one. This has been 
developed principally by Bevir and Rhodes (2004) in relation to political science. It considers 
that to understand the actions of individuals, it is necessary to understand the traditions 
and beliefs that underpin them. Richards and Smith (2004) argue that the principal belief 
and tradition applicable to British government is the Westminster model. And, as explored 
in Chapter Two, Rhodes (2011) himself reaches a very similar conclusion in a later work, 
based on embedded, ethnographic research 
 
There are strengths in the rational choice and materialist approach. I deal directly with one 
rational choice argument put to me by my interviewees (see Chapter Six) concerning the 
motivation behind portrayals of the relationship. Some of the results of my primary 
research could be seen as validating a materialist approach to analysing the role of 
Ministers and Civil Servants. For example, elements of Chapter Seven focus on the Civil 
Service’s lack of specialist skills and loyalty to individual Ministers over the Government as a 
whole. As Richards and Smith (2004) identify, the interpretative approach is useful for 
understanding why slightly different versions of the Westminster model may have evolved, 
from the perspectives of Ministers as compared to Civil Servants. However, my assessment 
is that the Westminster model remains the most important frame for understanding 
relationships between Ministers and officials. In my view, the interpretative approach ends 
up yielding stories, beliefs and descriptions which add richness and nuance to the 
overarching Westminster narrative. But, as Rhodes (2011) found, these stories end up 
corroborating the Westminster model’s primacy. For this reason, I have adopted the 
constitutional approach, with the Westminster model and Haldane as the theoretical 
framework for my investigation.  
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Primary research methods 
 
At the end of Chapter Two, I concluded that the existing literature concerning relationships 
between Ministers and Civil Servants has some deficiencies. I wanted to generate more 
sophisticated and detailed findings through primary research, in concert with my focus on 
individual relationships. I decided to approach former UK Government Ministers to elicit 
their perceptions about relationships with Civil Servants. I had explored the Civil Servants’ 
perspective in related, smaller scale research, but felt that the ministerial perspective was 
most important, given the asymmetric power relationships between the two groups.  
 
I briefly considered a “scoping” stage to the research – where I would send out a combined 
invitation along with a Likert scaling or semantic differential survey to potential 
participants. I did not proceed with this as metric data would not have yielded the type of 
nuanced insights that the literature had generally lacked.    
 
I decided to conduct semi structured, extended, qualitative interviews given my focus 
(relationships) and my desire to generate rich data. Cresswell (2003, Pp.21-22) states that a 
qualitative approach may be best when there is little existing research about a problem and 
it needs to be understood. I had broad areas I wished to investigate on the basis of the 
insights into the relationship that I have already set out. I also wanted to allow my 
interviewees scope to explore areas that they wished to when considering the relationship. 
I opted to request in-depth personal interviews, rather than a group discussion or a Delphi 
study. I wanted to hear examples and stories of human relationships rather than facilitate 
formal group discussions – where participants moderated or compromised their views in 
order to reach a collective conclusion.  
 
I decided that in order to ensure the objectivity of my work that I would exclude all 
Ministers in the coalition administration from the scope of my studies. I would also exclude 
all Ministers that I had worked with during my time in the civil service. I decided to limit my 
potential pool of interviewees to the Thatcher, Major, Brown and Blair administrations. In 
addition, I excluded Ministers who had only served in the first Thatcher administration. This 
meant I was considering the period 1983 to 2010. It meant as equitable a chronological 
balance as I could achieve between Conservative and Labour administrations (14 years of 
the former; 13 years of the latter) and encompassed three successive outright election 
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victories for both parties (1983, 1987, and 1992 for the Conservatives and 1997, 2001, and 
2005 for Labour).  
 
I used each election as a basis for the construction of my potential sample. Reliable source 
data concerning the occupation of each Ministerial post in Government exists for each of 
these years in the Times Guide to the House of Commons (published after each election). 
This allowed for the potential stratification of my sample and a longitudinal analysis (for 
example I might be able to examine whether perceptions had shifted over time)16. I 
generated a list for each year that included the three great Departments of State (Treasury, 
Home Office, and Foreign and Commonwealth Office). These three departments have been 
largely immune from the machinery of government changes that regularly re-draw the map 
of Whitehall.  In addition to these departments I also selected two other Departments that 
have existed in various incarnations from 1983 to 2010 (Health and Environment). These 
departments have altered in size and scope over the years – but have retained their 
fundamental responsibilities with respect to health and environment at least.  
 
I generated a list of all Ministers in these Departments, in the governments formed after 
each election. The completed list provided a “snap-shot” of the occupants of all Ministerial 
jobs in my selected Departments at six fixed moments in time (the first post-election 
ministerial cadres of 1983, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2001, and 2005). 
 
Establishing contact details, interview requests and response 
 
Having generated this list, I then tried to find contact details for each of the people I had 
identified. I used the UK Parliament website as my principal source. A small number of 
former ministers had sadly died. Many more of the former ministers on my lists were sitting 
in the House of Lords. I was able to establish contact details for around 100 of the Ministers 
I identified. I wrote to these former Ministers, explaining my role, the purpose of my 
research, and asking for an interview. 
 
In excess of one in three (35%) of former Ministers I wrote to agreed to be interviewed. 
This exceeded my expectations. I declined the last few Ministers who wrote back to me, 
because I decided to cap my sample at twenty-five interviews (for a table of interviewees 
                                                          
16
 In actual fact, when analysing my primary research, given the nature of the insights I gathered and 
my sample size, I decided not to attempt to stratify the results longitudinally or against any other 
fixed variable.  
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see Appendix II). I did not believe I had the time or resources to conduct or analyse any 
further interviews. Some of those I spoke to told me that they never agreed to do 
interviews but they had made an exception given the importance which they attached to 
the issue. Each took around an hour out of their schedules, some considerably longer, and I 
paid no fees.   
 
Ethics 
 
I have abided by Chester’s statement of principles in regard to my research. I have 
considered the established ethical principles of autonomy, beneficence and justice 
(Childress, Meslin, Shapiro, 2005). I explained to my interview participants who I was, what 
my intentions were in conducting the interviews and what I intended to do with the results. 
I clarified that the purpose of the research is to maximise the effectiveness of future 
working between Ministers and Civil Servants for the mutual benefit of both. In terms of 
justice, there is no intention in my work to suggest changes to the system which might 
negatively affect either party. As set out below, my participants provided clearance for me 
to use the quotations I selected in my work (see Appendix III).  
 
Interviews 
 
The interviews took place between August 2012 and November 2012. Most of them were 
conducted “in person”, with some taking place over the phone. I recorded and transcribed 
each interview and subsequently sent a transcript back to each participant for their 
approval.  
 
Organisation & Presentation of findings  
 
I codified my interview transcripts manually, having considered the use of Nvivo software to 
achieve this. My decision was based on the importance of capturing the overall message I 
considered my interviewees were providing and being able to split this flexibly, iteratively 
and gradually into themes that emerged as I analysed the scripts. Personally, manual 
codification of printed transcripts was the method that allowed me to achieve this most 
effectively. 
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All responses may have been subject to bias, but there is no independent means of 
verification. In one sense this does not matter as I am concerned with perceptions rather 
than objective social reality. It is also the case that the respondents were all genuinely 
concerned with the research topic rather than attempting to self-justify. To ensure 
consistency I asked essentially the same set of questions to each interviewee which 
provided me with a firm base for comparing and weighting the comments made. There is 
also a reflexive element to the analysis and presentation of my findings in the next four 
Chapters. The words of the Ministers I spoke to dominate, but I have interwoven references 
with my analysis where I consider the views emerging challenge or corroborate the existing 
literature. This approach aims to maximise the strength and richness of my findings.  
 
This codification and analysis has led me to present the different themes that emerged over 
the next four chapters (all drawn from the views of my Ministerial interviewees). Chapter 
Four deals with potential positive and negative influences on individual relationships from 
the Ministerial perspective. Chapter Five deals with influences from the Civil Service 
perspective. Chapter Six deals with the apparent disparity between the views of my 
ministerial interviewees, and the views in the ministerial literature, about Civil Service 
behaviours. And Chapter Seven deals with systemic issues.  
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CHAPTER FOUR - POTENTIAL POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE INFLUENCES ON RELATIONSHIPS – 
MINISTERS 
 
Having set out my methodology, in Chapter Four I consider potential positive and negative 
influences on relationships with Civil Servants, from the Ministerial perspective. I have 
summarised in bullet form the traits and behaviours that my interviewees perceived that 
Ministers should display which might positively and negatively influence relationships with 
their Civil Servants. It is also worth noting that some of the factors considered are 
contextual ones beyond Ministerial control (e.g. whether they are Cabinet or Junior 
Ministers).  
 
POSITIVE INFLUENCES 
 
 Those who show leadership, direction and set clear expectations  
 Those who understand the importance of the embryonic relationship  
 Those who have energy and charisma, even though they may overstep their bounds  
 Those who treat their Civil Servants with respect  
 Those who are able and are perceived to be so by their Civil Servants  
 Those who challenge their Civil Servants  
 Those who carry their Civil Servants even when making wholly political decisions  
 
Those who show leadership, direction and set clear expectations  
 
Paul Goggins told me that leadership was the single most important ministerial quality. This 
was critical to good relationships with Civil Servants and for their own effectiveness: 
 
“Civil servants rightly expect Ministers to take a lead. If Ministers just let civil 
servants take the lead then the machine doesn’t go very fast. It does enough to 
keep things safe, but nothing really changes; it just chugs on.”  
 
John Denham neatly summarised the spectrum of traits that Ministers may possess and the 
reaction these traits are likely to provoke from their Civil Servants: 
 
“…there are ministers who are stupid, there are ministers who bully, there are 
ministers who are capricious, and there are ministers who don’t know what they 
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want to do. There are also ministers who are visionary, focused, have very clear 
ideas, and are able to set priorities. I think that civil servants as a whole, including 
the senior leadership, respond well or overwhelmingly (well) to the latter type of 
minister and badly to the first lot.”   
 
Ben Bradshaw, in reflecting on some variation in the performance of his Civil Servants 
highlighted leadership as critical, not least from their political masters: 
 
“That often depended on the leadership within that department and the quality of 
that leadership, and also the leadership provided by the Ministers and Secretaries 
of State actually which is often overlooked. They have an important role setting out 
the priorities and being clear as to what they want to achieve...” 
 
Very similar views were advanced by a significant number of my interviewees (John 
Denham, John Healey, Sir Malcolm Rifkind, Lord Moore, Baroness Armstrong, Lord Cope 
and Lord Blencathra). The strongest single point to emerge from my interviewees was the 
critical importance of Ministerial leadership to the relationship. The perceived importance 
of leadership is also consistent with the Westminster model – and the narrative that 
Richards and Smith (2004) contend that Ministers appeal to within it. This is their “historical 
impact” on policy and politics (ibid, Pp 787-790) and their ability to shape events almost 
regardless of the context. The consistency of the message about the importance of 
leadership indicates that my interviewees thought the key variable in the whole 
relationship was not Civil Service behaviour, outside events, or political context – but simply 
the strength and ability of the Minister in question. From this perspective it corroborates 
much of the extant literature.  
 
Those who understand the importance of the embryonic relationship 
 
The early stages of any relationship can be crucial, and those between Ministers and Civil 
Servants are no exception. Lord Cope made an important point about the initial attitude of 
Ministers towards their Civil Servants: 
 
“Some Ministers make the mistake of starting to regard them (Civil Servants) as 
their enemies and that is a major error, because it’s not true and secondly because 
it’s not the way to get the best out of them.” 
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Lord Blencathra (formerly David Maclean MP) shared the story of his move to the 
Department of Environment following the 1992 election – where Michael Howard was to 
be his Secretary of State. Howard rang him and told him about a routine meeting, and told 
him not to worry about travelling to attend. Then his new private secretary called him: 
 
“‘Mr Maclean, there is a very important meeting tomorrow, (it’s) absolutely vital 
you get to the department.’ 
I said ‘Oh I can’t be bothered.’ 
‘What?!’  
‘Tell old Howard I’m too busy. I’ve other things to do. I’ll see him on Monday.’  
‘But minister, it’s vital...’ 
‘Don’t worry, we’ll just take it as it comes on Monday.’ 
 
That was me being mischievous and also making a kind of point, for the life of me 
I’m not sure what the point is, but I made that point.”   
 
When he arrived at the Department Lord Blencathra told his Private Office staff that he 
wanted to spend the first day with them, he did not want to meet the Permanent 
Secretary, and he did not want to look at any briefs. The point that Lord Blencathra made, 
but could not identify, was - I think - that he was going to be a strong Minister who led his 
officials, and he was going to do things his way. He was mischievous, but he was setting the 
parameters of the relationship immediately. By then refusing to see anyone but his Private 
Office staff on his first visit to the Department he implied that his relationship with them 
was of more importance than anything else. He had sent them the message that he was his 
own man, and that they were more critical to him than the Permanent Secretary, or the 
government brief for which he was now responsible. With this simple act he had probably 
engendered loyalty, admiration and a stock of good will that I suspect carried him through 
his entire time in office. There is a connection with Haldane here: Lord Blencathra was 
demonstrating, through his actions, that he intended to work in close partnership with his 
officials.  
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Those who have energy and charisma, even though they may overstep their bounds 
 
Lord Moore also provided an example which shows just how important the individual 
charisma and energy of a politician is to their relationships with Civil Servants. In the 
scenario he talks about, Lord Moore was perilously close to entering territory that is seen as 
the preserve of the Civil Service – i.e. its structure. He realised that winning the intellectual 
and public debate about privatisation was absolutely key, and he also realised that Treasury 
officials were the ideal resource he needed to deploy to help him achieve his goal. He spoke 
to one of his officials: 
 
‘“Well privatisation... You know the state shouldn’t be over it. We all know that, but 
that isn’t the feeling in the outside world. I want to change the colour of the water 
in which the fish swim. I want to create a team of people to help me articulate the 
case.”’   
 
Lord Moore took a calculated gamble in having this conversation. Not only did he persuade 
those in the Treasury to help him refine and articulate his argument, at a quite 
philosophical level, but he also got the Department to specifically allocate people and time 
to enable this. I suspect he was successful in this endeavour because of his sheer 
enthusiasm, dynamism and charisma17.  
 
 In Chapters One and Two I considered the challenges to the Westminster model and 
Haldane. The deliberative space Lord Moore carved out for himself here is arguably larger 
than anything envisaged by Haldane, and the task he set was the creation and articulation 
of policy. The example is drawn from a time when the changes to the broader relationship 
under Thatcher were still in their infancy.  
 
Other Ministers who have tried to take the same approach have been rebuked for 
operating outside of long established rules and conventions (I cite the example of an 
anonymised Minister later in this Chapter). Personal chemistry and charisma appears 
essential to whether a Minister can cross the Rubicon and achieve their goals without 
irretrievably damaging their relationships with officials. But trust, loyalty and co-
                                                          
17
 Michael Heseltine is another Minister who was seen to overstep traditional boundaries, but 
tended to succeed because, in the words of Lord Hennessy (1990, p. 607) he was a Whitehall ‘freak’ 
who was ‘…fascinated by the machine’ (ibid). 
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dependence are fundamental here too. Baroness Armstrong also told me about changes to 
Civil Service structure that she made during her last year in post. It seems she succeeded as 
a result of a strong relationship with the Cabinet Secretary. In both scenarios, the end 
seemed more important than the methods used to achieve it. They succeeded in these 
examples, but may have run into much starker internal opposition had they been politicians 
of lesser calibre.   
 
Those who treat their Civil Servants with respect  
 
Lord Knight articulated a prosaic truth about the way in which Ministers can ensure that 
Civil Servants produce their best: 
 
“I was of the view, that not all Ministers stick by, that you’re much better off having 
them on your side than shouting at them and bullying them and in the end getting 
them working for you because they have to.” 
 
Baroness Cumberlege’s thoughts on the matter also suggest that a Minister who regularly 
loses their composure might in turn lose some of their authority: 
 
“I just have never felt that losing your temper gets you anywhere. I can be pretty 
tough, but I wouldn’t ever do it by raising my voice.”  
 
Paul Goggins, Baroness Armstrong, Lord Triesman and Lord Luce all made very similar 
points. Lord Bradley stressed how important it was to form good relationships with private 
office staff. He told me that confidentiality was critical to the relationship, and both sides 
needed to ensure that this was treated as sacrosanct: 
 
“You can have huge disagreements but your public face must be at one. Again I 
chair a hospital - if my chief executive and I have huge disagreements, they’re 
behind closed doors and we work them through, our public face is one of absolute 
unity, not a cigarette paper between us.” 
 
Fiona Mactaggart considered that her personal style might have affected her interaction 
with her Civil Servants: 
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“I’m not a very measured person and I think civil servants sometimes found that 
odd… I would be unmeasured, I would be extreme, I would use extreme language, I 
would thump tables occasionally and things like that which I think is relatively rare 
behaviour in junior ministers.”   
 
It appears from the extracts above that Ministers who are temperate and respectful when 
interacting with their Civil Servants are more likely to get the best performance from them. 
This statement seems so glaringly obvious as to be a truism. Paradoxically, it is this which 
makes it particularly interesting from a research perspective. The diaries of Benn (1996), 
Crossman (1979), Blunkett (2006) and Clark (1993) all contain examples of them losing their 
temper with their Civil Servants to no great effect. Rawnsley (2010) alleges that former 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown would lose his temper with Civil Servants at Number Ten, 
some of whom were junior members of staff. The phenomenon is not new, nor is it 
unexpected. However, I suspect the pains my interviewees went to in mentioning it might 
speak to its increasing frequency. Lord Knight and Lord Bradley’s examples also suggest that 
relationships may be positively influenced when Ministers make sure there is a safe, private 
space for discussion in line with a traditional view of the Westminster model.  
 
Those who are able and are perceived to be so by their Civil Servants 
 
Paul Goggins told me that Civil Servants ask a number of questions concerning the skills of 
new Ministers, and the answers to these questions will affect the nature of their 
interaction: 
 
“They will make a judgement call very quickly on a Minister… ‘are they prepared to 
learn, do they work hard, do they care about what they’re doing, do they have a 
clue about what they’re doing, do they have the judgement?’” 
 
Lord Waldegrave eloquently captured his own vision of Ministerial character and flair: 
 
“The sort of people who go into politics are rather like the sort of people who go 
into being actors. They’re applause seekers, they are extroverts. That’s inevitable: 
the Greeks knew that if you didn’t want those kind of people, you’d have to draw 
lots, but if you had elections you’d have people who are good at winning elections.” 
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It is of course many of these qualities that allow them to succeed politically, not least on 
the floor of the House, and in persuading their colleagues of the utility and appeal of their 
policies and ideas. Rather than resent these qualities, most Civil Servants cherish them. Nick 
Raynsford, Sir Malcolm Rifkind and Lord Skelmersdale expressed similar views.  
 
Baroness Armstrong shared an assessment that a Civil Servant, who had worked with her, 
and her successors, had made: 
 
“You weren’t nearly as bright and intellectual as the two that followed…but you 
were a better minister because you understood what the job was and you had the 
ear of the Prime Minister and you could get the civil servants to really work for 
you.” 
 
What seems clear from these words is that Civil Servants do not long for a Minister in their 
own reflection.  
 
Ministers who prove themselves to their Civil Servants are likely to inspire a better 
response from their officials in turn. Civil Servants will at times make a judgement about 
their Minister’s political capital, strength and patronage. If Civil Servants have no faith that 
the policy they are working on will ever be realised, that may affect their dedication to it.  
 
The above could also be seen as corroborating the academic literature which points to the 
complementary but ultimately consistent views that Ministers and Civil Servants have of 
the Westminster model and the way in which they should interact (Richards and Smith, 
2004). Problems occur if one side or other departs from the ‘rules of the game’ or does not 
have the ability to fulfil their role. 
 
Those who challenge their Civil Servants 
 
The last two subtitles confirm that it is important for Ministers to show their Civil Servants 
respect, and that it is important how Civil Servants perceive their Minister. However, 
neither reduces the necessity for Ministers to challenge their Civil Servants. Ultimately this 
encourages them to raise their game, increase the rigour of their thinking and is likely to 
positively influence relationships in time.  
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John Denham told me about the reaction of one of his senior Civil Servants when he 
resigned over the Iraq war: 
 
“(He) described me as a challenging minister which I think he didn’t mean as a 
compliment, but I always rather took as a compliment because I always 
found...(that) the really good people used to love working for me as minister 
because it was exciting, and I knew what I wanted and I fought reasonably hard for 
it.”   
 
Lord Blencathra felt that his Civil Servants were invigorated by the nature of his interaction 
with them. For his part he would not accept written advice without discussing it: 
 
“…very often there was an A minus or an A plus instead of just option A, B or C. 
Those were often good fun meetings too, to create the relationship with civil 
servants and then they picked up the vibes on where you’re coming from on 
various things.”   
 
This links directly to a point I discuss in Chapter Five, concerning the importance of Civil 
Servants taking the time to understand their Minister’s philosophy.  
 
Fiona Mactaggart sometimes found the relationship with her Civil Servants a difficult one, 
as I discuss below. However, she cited one example when her passion and drive concerning 
an extremely traumatic subject jolted her Civil Servants out of their routine and focused 
their minds. Her tactics were unusual but extremely effective: 
 
“…when I took over the junior stuff on prisons there I noticed that the first notes in 
my box were all these suicides, I couldn’t bear it, I just couldn’t bear it, so I started 
saying to my team ‘you have to text me when someone kills themselves’.  I tell you 
what, it actually made people really focus, they didn’t want to send the minister a 
text saying there’s been another suicide.  Actually it just ramped it up a bit and that 
was a moment when I realised that sometimes one of the problems of the civil 
service is you get into a routine, even if you’re dealing with something appalling like 
people killing themselves.”  
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By connecting her Civil Servants personally with each tragic event, and making them dread 
the act of communicating this news to the Minister, she made each death real to them. She 
would have dreaded the receipt of such a message as much as the Civil Servant who had to 
send it. Their dread and sorrow can be of nothing compared to the families involved. With 
this simple and unusual challenge, Fiona Mactaggart focused the minds of her staff.   
 
Whilst none of my ministerial interviewees named the Haldane convention, the answers 
above show how integral they thought internal challenge was to positive relationships with 
their Civil Servants. In other words, they did not just want to allocate a managerial task for 
their Civil Servants to deliver, they wanted to probe their policy advice before acting on it.  
 
Those who carry their Civil Servants even when making wholly political decisions 
 
Lord Whitty highlighted the fact that occasionally Ministers have to make decisions for their 
own reasons: 
 
“I think there are points where it is necessary for a political or strategic imperative 
to be spelled out, and they find that quite difficult. It is different from their pre-
conceptions, and sometimes I found that as well.” 
 
There is a clear tension here with the contents of the preceding sub-title. Lord Whitty’s 
example is closer to a more “transactional” exchange, with the Minister as “principal” and 
his official as “agent”.   
 
Lord Moore gave a fascinating example of the importance of being able to carry your Civil 
Servants where you are forced to make a decision for political reasons. It poses the 
question ‘when is the right decision not the right decision?’  
 
For Lord Moore, the route of a proposed Channel Tunnel link through his constituency 
proved to be the perfect storm. He realised that issues concerning the link route had been 
the element of the original Bill which had scuppered the project under Labour. When he 
became Transport Secretary, he knew that the link had to be scrapped in order for the 
Tunnel to be built. He describes the moment he informed his officials: 
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“I’ll never forget the absolute horror on their faces and they argued very, very hard, 
but they were intellectually right you know.  But practically I knew they knew all the 
Tory seats and the background. I knew that would mean we’d be into a hole in the 
ground… There was no... angst with them afterwards; you never had any sort of 
problem.” 
 
The example above is a testament to the Minister. The trust he had previously established 
with his Civil Servants meant that his decision was respected. He was also honest enough to 
admit the decision was intellectually wrong, but politically necessary. He knew that his Civil 
Servants appreciated the reality too18. The reaction of his officials – arguing their case 
vigorously – indicates that they had a safe deliberative space to operate in with their 
Minister. Lord Moore appears to have established a Haldaneian relationship with his 
officials, rather than one based on conflict or paranoia.   
 
                                                          
18
 Former Senior Civil Servant Roy Denman expresses a similar view on this general principle in his 
memoirs: “But of course while a plan might ultimately be right does not mean that it is saleable 
years in advance. This must be a political judgement and cannot be left to unelected officials.” 
(Denman, 2002, p.249).  
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NEGATIVE INFLUENCES 
 
 Those who mediate their relationships with Civil Servants through Special Advisors  
 Those who lack experience outside of politics  
 Those who occupy more junior Ministerial posts  
 Those who do not work cohesively with departmental Ministerial colleagues  
 Those who openly criticise their Civil Servants  
 Those who frequently change their mind about policy or do not think strategically  
  
Those who mediate their relationships with Civil Servants through Special Advisors 
 
Sir Malcolm Rifkind suggested that there was “a period of politicisation” of the service, 
which he conceded may have started towards the end of John Major’s administration. But 
he thought that the rise of the special advisor had a negative impact on the relationship 
between Ministers and officials: 
 
“Civil servants don’t like being obstructed by Ministers, they accept that’s the 
constitutional propriety, but they get pissed off if somebody who has just arrived 
from another occupation, and is essentially a political appointee, but is not an 
elected Minister, has that kind of authority.”  
 
Sir Malcolm’s concession that the direction of travel predated New Labour’s election may 
suggest that any variation of the terms of the relationship is a consequence of political 
modernity, rather than the approach of one party or the other.  It also chimes with my 
findings in Chapter One about the pressures that SpAds can put on relationships, as part of 
the wider pluralisation of policy advice.  
 
For Lord Cope, it wasn’t necessarily just an issue of authority – problems could occur if the 
Minister decided to use his special advisors as a comfort blanket, and mediate relationships 
with Civil Servants through them: 
 
“…it kind of insulates the Minister from the civil service to an extent and that is a 
danger if there’s too many of them and they stick together all the time. Secondly it 
makes the civil service more political because they feel they’ve got to try and take 
account of the political calculations...” 
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Lord Cope’s general point was given concrete illustration by Nick Raynsford. He explained 
how a Minister who attempts to cut his Civil Servants out of decisions concerning their own 
Department’s policy will quickly mean relationships become toxic: 
 
“[When]…Minister X was Secretary of State…it was totally dysfunctional because he 
did not understand how to work with departmental civil servants. He’d fairly early 
on established a regime which involved direct communication between himself, 
and his special advisors, with Number Ten. I found myself, very early on, in conflict 
with him over his attempt to essentially sideline senior officials within the area that 
I was responsible for, and it was very uncomfortable...” 
 
The Minister in question appears to have removed any deliberative space for his officials, 
bypassing their traditional role and causing significant resentment as a consequence. 
Mutuality still appears to be an important ingredient in the relationship between Ministers, 
Civil Servants and Special Advisors. Even if there is an acceptance that tri-partite 
relationships will increasingly define the future, they all still play different roles, and neither 
one of them can substitute for another without the formal and informal rules which 
underpin governance in Westminster unravelling completely. Deviation from the ‘rules of 
the game’ caused the Minister in question here the same sort of difficulties that the likes of 
Tony Benn and Michael Howard previously encountered.  
 
Those who lack experience outside of politics 
 
Lord Glenarthur considered that a lack of career experience outside the political realm was 
problematic for today’s politicians: 
 
“(Ministers)… don’t have that broader experience that most of us had thirty years 
ago, either in business, the law, the military, in the civil service themselves or in the 
diplomatic service. So I think there is a more idealistic approach by ministers…”  
 
Lord Moore had a very similar view – having been critical of some of the policies proposed 
by the current political generation: 
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“I didn’t become a Minister until my forties... These guys doing things in their 
thirties it’s just lack of experience, they’d all been research assistants… They’d not 
actually had to fire anybody, to hire people, they hadn’t grown... you make 
mistakes in life and you learn about it.” 
 
Lord Jenkin had a similar view. Former Ministers suggested that the rise of the career 
politician19 has had a profound effect on the relationship. This is particularly important 
when considered in tandem with the most important positive influence that my 
interviewees identified from the ministerial perspective – the ability to lead. If that ability 
and vision is grounded in ideology, with less appreciation of the practicalities, it is not 
surprising if the relationship is infused with increasing tension. Politicians from previous 
generations are critical of policies that unravel because – in their view – today’s Minister 
lacks the external experience to always understand what is viable and what is not.  
 
The Civil Service is criticised by my interviewees (see Chapter Seven) for the lack of external 
experience its constituents possess. If both Ministers and Civil Servants are less likely to 
have had lengthy career experience outside of Westminster and Whitehall, decision making 
may be collectively poorer, particularly when big infrastructure projects are concerned. 
Whilst Ministers are seeking external advice more often, to compensate for an apparent 
lack of outside experience amongst themselves and civil servants, there is no current 
process for doing so, nor any empirical analysis of the merits of such advice (Levitt, 2016).  
 
Those who occupy more junior Ministerial posts 
 
A fascinating sub-plot emerged through the course of my interviews concerning the effects 
of the rank held by Ministers on their relationships with officials20. In general terms, the 
more junior the Ministerial post, the more difficult and frustrating the Ministers that I 
                                                          
19
 The rise of the career politician is widely heralded as a hallmark of Westminster modernity (see, 
for example, Cowley, 2012). Barber (2014) has pointed out that whilst political leaders now tend to 
lack “outside” experience in career terms, they are more grounded in political experience given 
increasing years spent as special advisors. In my assessment, that does not equate to “real world” 
experience.  
 
20
 There are three main “ranks” of Minister: Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (PuSS) is the 
most junior role; Minister of State (MS) is the middle ranking position and Secretary of State (SoS) is 
the most senior. There are of course further distinctions, based on the seniority of the Department 
the Minister is based in and their portfolios.  
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interviewed tended to find their working relationship with Civil Servants. Ben Bradshaw 
offered an explanation: 
 
“…it’s often not appreciated that being a cabinet minister is a lot easier than being 
a junior minister because you’ve got a lot more support… You have to do a lot of 
the dogsbody work, doing debates in Westminster Hall, end of day debates in the 
early hours of the morning, answering all the PQs and all the letters… A lot of 
ministers fall by the wayside I think, not necessarily because they’re not good or 
haven’t got the potential, just because the support systems aren’t there for them.” 
 
Lord Knight made a similar point – from his perspective frustration at the Civil Service is 
often frustration at junior ministry and the tasks it entails. Although Lord Glenarthur was 
extremely positive about the Civil Service, he also highlighted the fact that Ministers at a 
junior level do not have the same political traction as their senior colleagues, so are more 
beholden to their Civil Servants as a result. When I asked him what role his Civil Servants 
had played in his greatest achievements, he answered: 
 
“I think they played an enormous role. The Government is a big machine, going in a 
particular direction, and all that the junior ministers are going to be able to do is to 
put a tweak on the tiller at some particular point21.” 
 
In Lord Glenarthur’s case, there was no frustration about his role – but his view was atypical 
on that point. Fiona Mactaggart - in response to the same question - told me: 
 
“You know when you’re a PuSS you don’t have very many finest hours: you’re there 
to clean up the garbage.” 
 
There are numerous echoes in the literature I have read, for example Mullin (2010, 
particularly p.30); Clark (1993, particularly p.22); and Cowper-Coles (2013, p.215). The 
perceived frustration of junior Ministers might indicate that Civil Servants can adopt a 
                                                          
21
 Former Senior Civil Servant Roy Denman uses the same seafaring metaphor when reflecting on the 
role that the Civil Service sees itself playing: “…unless otherwise instructed they will devote their 
energies to the not inconsiderable task of keeping the ship humming safely along with those minor 
changes of course every now and again made necessary by the political winds and the tides.” 
(Denman, 2002, p.247).  
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‘rational choice’ approach; affording more attention on their Secretary of State, who will 
generally have more influence on the department’s overall strategy. 
 
For the reasons above, I consider that ministerial rank has an important influence on 
relationships with officials. Unless a new administration takes power after years in the 
political wilderness, most Ministers will start at a more junior level before progressing to 
Secretary of State. One reason relationships with Civil Servants may be more positively 
influenced as a consequence is the priority and relative level of support the Civil Service 
give their one senior Minister, in comparison with the others. The potential solution might 
be to increase support to junior Ministerial posts. Another solution might be to encourage a 
paradigm shift in the way that junior Ministerial office is perceived.  
 
Those who do not work cohesively with Ministerial colleagues in the same Department  
 
Lord Whitty thought that the inter-relationships between Ministers in a Department were 
often overlooked. If there are splits between Ministers, this can in turn negatively influence 
Ministerial-Civil Servant relationships, because Civil Servants may not know which direction 
they need to be travelling in: 
 
“The DETR was a very big department, and had strong secessionist views in the 
transport part of it which eventually triumphed… Civil servants who were from, and 
of, the transport side were trying to commandeer their Ministers to take a 
secessionist view.”  
 
In this example, it seems that sets of Civil Servants with very different policy responsibilities 
and views were subsumed into one Department, which led to intradepartmental rivalries 
between its own Civil Servants, and between its own Ministers.  
 
If Ministers within one Department are not united, they are also likely to suffer, because 
there may be times where the Civil Service uses this to its advantage. Lord Blencathra 
provided a colourful example by recounting the words of one of his Civil Servants: 
 
“Oh it was good fun here in the past because we had a Home Secretary and then 
we’d Ken Clarke, we’d David Mellor, and we just put a wedge between them. So if 
they wanted to do things and I didn’t like it I would just get David Mellor to say one 
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thing, the Home Secretary the other and then I carried on my policy. You two 
buggers, you and Michael Howard, I can’t put a wedge between you.”   
 
If Civil Servants feel compelled to play one Minister off against another, this speaks to 
failing relationships between Ministers and Civil Servants in a broader sense. Ministers in 
the same Department who cannot work together productively may also damage their 
relationships with Civil Servants, because they insert an extra variable – one which Civil 
Servants may factor in, to the detriment of the quality of the advice they provide.  
 
Those who openly criticise their Civil Servants 
 
A number of my interviewees thought that Ministers who were openly critical of their Civil 
Servants were simply passing the blame for their personal failure to those who they had 
worked closely with (see Chapter Six). Ben Bradshaw thought that public criticism from 
Ministers negatively influenced relationships. Although couched in party political terms, the 
crux of his argument is equally valid regardless of the party in power: 
 
“You show me an effective ministerial team and you’ll get an effective department 
that’s delivering for them. I’m afraid the sort of abuse that we are getting now from 
this government of the civil service is much more a reflection on the Government’s 
incompetence and unprofessionalism than it is on the quality of the civil servants.” 
  
Lord Blencathra told me about his approach when he was speaking to potential Ministers in 
the Conservative ranks in the run up to the 2010 election: 
 
“I used to bash into them in 2007, 2008, 2009 ‘For God’s sake don’t attack the civil 
service, don’t say Labour’s been in power for twelve years the civil service are all 
pinkos, don’t attack them. If there are difficulties in the civil service you’re the 
Minister, you sort it out, you change your private office or give them policy’.”   
 
This aligns with the traditional Westminster view (Tant, 1993, p.191; Diamond and 
Richards, 2012, p. 189) that the inner workings of government should be confidential, with 
advice generally exempt from release. Ministerial responsibility remains relevant. That 
former Government Ministers had an extremely low opinion of Ministerial colleagues that 
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openly criticised Civil Servants, again suggests how fundamental the Westminster model is 
to the parameters of the relationship. On a related note, Lord Luce said: 
 
“I think so many politicians don’t seem to understand what the point of a good, 
strong, robust, impartial civil service is.” 
 
A clear connection can be drawn here with the erosion of Haldane that I suggest has 
occurred in Chapter One.  
 
Those who frequently change their mind about policy or do not think strategically 
 
Lord Waldegrave highlighted another Ministerial characteristic that can negatively 
influence relationships with Civil Servants: a tendency to regularly change their minds. He 
thought this was one of the reasons that Tony Benn had struggled: 
 
“My view is that when Tony Benn, for example, in his memoirs talks about how he 
couldn’t get his civil nuclear policy through – it was because (a) the civil servants 
knew that he didn’t have the backing of his colleagues in Cabinet; and (b) because 
he kept changing his mind so they didn’t know what he was trying to do.”  
 
Lord Waldegrave is suggesting that Tony Benn is guilty of a fundamental attribution error 
here – in blaming the Civil Service for their intransigence, when actually the problem was 
the inconsistency of his message to them, and their assessment that he was out on a limb 
politically and that none of his policies would be approved by the Cabinet. This is consistent 
with the views of Antony Part (see Chapter Two), and Richards and Smith (2004) who 
contend that the relationship suffers when one party to it ignores the rules of the game, or 
appeals to something radically different from Westminster tradition.  
 
Lord Moore also told me that indecision, or a lack of strategic thought from Ministers, 
means that the Civil Service’s role is enhanced: 
 
“…if you dither or if you haven’t thought it through of course the civil service will fill 
the vacuum. Of course its policy has to continue; you can’t live in a vacuum.” 
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Fiona Mactaggart highlighted her own tendency to change her mind and the consequences 
for her relationships with her Civil Servants: 
 
“…they all thought I was a bit strange because of my passion, because of my, I call it 
flouncing with my team in here, I’ll flounce about something and make a plan then 
have to change it.”   
 
Fiona Mactaggart’s passion was clear, as was her belief in what she was trying to do22. 
However, several of my interviewees thought that a Minister who frequently changes their 
mind will leave Civil Servants slightly confused and unsure how much time and energy to 
invest in developing a specific policy.  
 
                                                          
22
 Fiona Mactaggart was the only Minister I spoke to who argued that the Civil Service should be 
politicised. 
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Conclusion  
 
According to my interviewees, the single most important positive influence on relationships 
with Civil Servants is leadership from Ministers. The Ministers I spoke to placed great stall in 
their latitude to make a difference, appealing to a classic narrative within the Westminster 
model – what Richards and Smith (2004) call their ability to make a “historical impact”. My 
interviewees also thought those who devote time to simple human interaction early on 
may be more likely to engender trust, loyalty and confidence. Relationships may be 
positively influenced as a result. Lord Blencathra’s quirky start to life in the Home Office 
illustrates this. 
 
Ministers who regularly show anger and frustration may find relationships are negatively 
influenced. Those who have created an environment of respect should challenge their Civil 
Servants. This may drive a higher level of performance and instil the relationship with the 
dynamism that it ideally needs.  Ministers who attempt to mediate relationships with Civil 
Servants through Special Advisors may find those relationships are negatively influenced. 
Mutuality is still perceived as an important factor in successful tri-partite relationships 
between Ministers, Civil Servants and Special Advisors. Ministers who lack experience 
outside Westminster might not have an intrinsic understanding of what is viable in policy 
terms. This could lead to additional tension borne of Ministerial frustration at perceived 
Civil Service resistance – even if not wholly warranted.  
 
Another less obvious influence appears to be Ministerial grade. My interviewees perceived 
that it was more difficult for junior Ministers to form good working relationships with Civil 
Servants, than more senior Ministers. Their own knowledge of the system, the contents of 
their Ministerial portfolio and the relative levels of support with which they are provided all 
help explain this distinction. Ministers who fail to work cohesively with their Ministerial 
colleagues may find their relationships with Civil Servants are negatively influenced. My 
interviewees were not impressed by colleagues who openly criticised the Civil Service – this 
undermines trust, which is a touchstone. Ministers who frequently change their mind on 
policy may also find relationships with their Civil Servants are negatively influenced. In 
addition, the tension created when unrealistic expectations are questioned by Civil Servants 
may cause difficulties. 
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Many of the perceived positive influences from the Ministerial perspective seem to have a 
connection with Haldane and the Westminster model in their classic form. Lord Moore, 
Lord Bradley, Lord Knight, Lord Blencathra and Fiona Mactaggart all gave examples where a 
safe space had been established with their officials, allowing a full and frank exchange of 
confidential views. Ministers who trust themselves to engage with their Civil Servants in 
this way were seen as more effective by their peers.   
 
Conversely, a link can be drawn with many perceived negative Ministerial influences on 
relationships and the challenges to Haldane and the Westminster model. Isolating officials, 
diminishing their role, mediating relationships through special advisors, and creating 
undeliverable expectations grounded in ideology all negatively influenced relationships. 
These behaviours may be more prevalent where a cultural erosion of Haldane has occurred 
and Ministers either lack the confidence to change the rules of engagement they find, or 
simply do not realise that things can be different (and perhaps once were).  
 
None of my interviewees made explicit reference to any of these concepts; most of them 
were probably reflected subconsciously. However, the relevance of these historical, 
traditional and stable concepts to the way Ministers still perceive relationships in 
government seems clear.  
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CHAPTER FIVE – POTENTIAL POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE INFLUENCES ON RELATIONSHIPS – 
CIVIL SERVANTS 
 
Having summarised potential positive and negative influences on relationships from the 
Ministerial side in Chapter Four, I look at the reverse perspective in Chapter Five. I have 
summarised in bullet form the traits and behaviours that my interviewees perceived that 
Civil Servants should display which might positively and negatively influence relationships 
with their Ministers. I asked each of my Ministerial interviewees whether positive or 
negative examples better represented their overall view of the Civil Servants they worked 
with collectively. From their answer to this question and my overall analysis of each 
interview, I gave each script a rough score. Thirteen of my twenty-five interviews I scored as 
“generally positive” concerning Civil Servants; ten I scored as “generally mixed”; and two I 
scored as “generally negative.” Whilst my sample size is too small to draw any quantitative 
conclusions, this is important context to consider when looking at the traits I have drawn 
out, and the balance of material quoted to support each point made.  
 
POSITIVE INFLUENCES 
 
 Those who show commitment and demonstrate expertise  
 Those who display fearlessness, honesty and independence 
 Those who are committed to delivering policy once Ministers have made a final 
decision, regardless of their views about the merits of that policy  
 Those who understand their Minister’s philosophy  
 
 
Those who show commitment and demonstrate expertise 
 
Lord Bradley spoke in glowing terms about Civil Servants in the Department of Health who 
supported an independent review of mental health and criminal justice. He thought they 
were “…superb because of their utter, total commitment to this discrete project that we 
were working on.” Whilst he experienced variable performance from his Civil Servants, his 
view was typical of many I spoke to in that the good examples comfortably outweighed the 
bad.  
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Commitment, hard work and pride were seen as extremely positive influences on 
relationships with Ministers, especially when Civil Servants could combine these with a 
keen intellect and strategic mind. Lord Skelmersdale, Lord Triesman, Ben Bradshaw, Lord 
Waldegrave, Lord Whitty, Baroness Liddell, Nick Raynsford, and Lord Browne all highlighted 
the quality and commitment of many of the Civil Servants they worked with.  
 
Lord Browne highlighted the following traits as being most important in good Civil Servants: 
 
“I admired them because they were intelligent, strategic, and analytical. Not only 
that, but they could deliver, they were brave on many occasions, they took 
responsibility and they had a very keen sense of public service.” 
 
His invocation of the public service ethos suggests that his better officials were not 
operating from a rational choice perspective. Paul Goggins praised the imagination, effort 
and energy of Civil Servants. He highlighted another characteristic which he admired in 
Senior Civil Servants – that they did not pretend to know everything, that they had faith in 
their juniors and gave them due credit, but that they used their knowledge and expertise to 
give a view when the issue was then being discussed: 
 
“…more relaxed senior people would say – ‘well Joe, or Mary, have done all the 
work here, so let them explain’. And then at the end they would say ‘this is my 
reading of it – this is what I think are the strengths of this and the difficulties and 
the risks’. And that’s what you want: you want the senior people to show 
judgement but let the younger people with real drive and enthusiasm explain 
themselves, because they’ve done the work.”  
 
This example demonstrates confidence in more junior Civil Servants with the knowledge of 
the detail, and in their own ability to read the situation strategically. It is an example which 
suggests that Civil Servants performing their traditional advisory role will be seen in a 
positive light by Ministers.  
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Those who display fearlessness, honesty and independence  
 
Lord Luce told me about the principle he himself had lived by in his jobs as Governor of 
Gibraltar and as Lord Chamberlain to the Queen, and that he judged his Civil Servants by 
too: 
 
“The principle is that you are only valuable as an advisor if you are – and I use that 
word repeatedly – fearless in the advice you give. Courteous but fearless, because 
you’re really no good unless you’re taking that view.” 
 
Baroness Armstrong underlined the fundamental importance of the relationship with 
private office staff in particular. She also highlighted the need for vigorous debate and 
challenge from her officials: 
 
“I don’t just want people to play the game, as it were. Good decisions come if you 
can get into the depth of the argument and I always appreciated that that was what 
they helped me to do.” 
 
Lord Glenarthur, Lord Knight, Lord Triesman and Ben Bradshaw expressed very similar 
views about the nature of the relationship and the critical importance of honest and 
unvarnished advice. What the Ministers I spoke to were articulating here connects closely 
to the deliberative space inherent in Haldane, as examined in Chapter One. Civil Servants 
who command this territory were seen as invaluable. There was a balance of Ministers 
from the Thatcher era, and the New Labour years, who expressed this view. 
 
Honesty and frankness is even more valued when a Minister can see it is underpinned by 
clarity of thought. Sir Malcolm Rifkind told me about one occasion where a Civil Servant 
combined cogency and fearlessness in a situation where most would not dare to. He was 
interviewing for a new Private Secretary. One candidate took a different approach: 
 
“…instead of trying to impress me by agreeing with the Minister, he started an 
argument with me. He said ‘no, I think you are quite wrong Minister, I’m of this 
opinion.’ And we had an argy-bargee, and I thought actually this might be quite 
refreshing! So I appointed him as my private secretary.” 
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The fact that there was a strong consensus on the value of these qualities from my 
interviewees also complements other findings that I have made. In Chapter Four, my 
interviewees told me that Ministers who lead, and are strong and decisive, positively 
influence relationships with Civil Servants. I have made a complementary finding here 
about the traits Ministers valued in Civil Servants: they may be most likely to positively 
influence relationships with Ministers when they are being strong Civil Servants. In both 
cases the qualities highlighted are sometimes characterised as the ones responsible for 
dysfunctional relationships – the dictatorial Minister against the argumentative Civil 
Servant. In actual fact, there is a mutual recognition of role from those who have a greater 
insight into the realities. It also seems that the traditional duality of Haldane is still seen as 
something that both parties to the relationship should aspire to. 
 
Those who are committed to delivering policy once Ministers have made a final decision, 
regardless of their views about the merits of that policy 
 
This finding follows from the one above, in that it concerns the actions of Civil Servants 
once they have given their advice and Ministers have taken a decision. One of the most 
instantly surprising tributes to his Civil Servants came from Lord Waldegrave. He cited the 
work of his Civil Servants on one of the greatest political disasters of modern times, the Poll 
Tax, as an exemplar: 
 
“…they did what was asked and made the best of what I think, in their heart of 
hearts, they thought was a bad policy. But they made it work; they couldn’t prevent 
it finally going wrong when we tried to introduce it all in one go – that was bound 
to be a catastrophe. But the mistakes were political23.”  
 
John Healey had a very similar outlook. His best Civil Servants “understood the role and the 
nature of the relationship between elected politicians and the Civil Service.” He praised the 
                                                          
23
 As one of the architects of the Poll Tax, Lord Waldegrave’s defence of his Civil Servants here is 
particularly interesting - given the tendency for other observers to see it as an example of what 
happens when the Civil Service is not sufficiently robust. Examples include: Andrew Adonis, who 
chose to use the Poll Tax example in a workshop for prospective Labour Ministers prior to the 1997 
election (Nick Raynsford attended); and Diamond (2014, p. 283). Roy Denman also considered that 
the Poll Tax was an example of a disaster caused when “…Ministers are told what they want to hear 
by timeservers pathetically anxious to please…” (Denman, 2002, p.49).  
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value of honest counsel, but thought that the ideal Civil Servant was quick to recognise that 
once the Minister had finally taken a decision, their role was clear. 
 
Lord Blencathra provided a vivid example of a Civil Servant he described as “wonderful”, 
and told me what he had said to him once their relationship had been established: 
 
“ ‘Minister, do know where I’m coming from. If you don’t tell me what to do and 
you want me to draft a policy on juvenile offenders then I’ll say “don’t send them to 
prison, it’s all society’s fault, it’s the government’s fault, I’ll slap them on the 
knuckles and that’s it”, that’s what I’ll draft. And if you tell me you want a policy to 
lock the little bastards up for life I will draft that policy. I will point out the flaws but 
if you insist on it as a civil servant I will do my damndest to carry through your 
orders.’ 
 
He was maybe a one off, but he is my abiding memory of the British Civil Service. A 
man who said what he thought, but if you told him what to do, by God, he’d die in a 
ditch to do it.”   
 
Lord Triesman provided an example, with a very similar formulation. He praised the 
straight-forward and direct approach that his Civil Servants took, particularly during 
international crises when the stakes were extremely high. These are his reflections on the 
Persian Gulf capture in 2007, when British lives were in grave peril: 
 
“(My Civil Servants)…were very, very clear in what they thought and cautioned. I 
regarded that very highly; and then when I wanted to go for the lines that I wanted 
to go for, because I had to carry the can, they gave me every kind of support that I 
could have ever asked for.” 
 
In each example above, their Civil Servants gave full and frank advice. The Minister actually 
disagreed with the advice, and once his decision had been made, the Civil Servants in 
question were unflinching in their support of the Minister’s position. In each case the 
Minister and the Civil Servants involved had an inherent understanding of the nature of the 
relationship between them, neither was impaired in their ability to fulfil their role and each 
had an intrinsic respect for the other party. It is particularly interesting that the most 
impassioned and praiseworthy reflections about individual Civil Servants all came within a 
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scenario where the Minister did not agree with the advice that he received. These 
reflections should be noted particularly by those in favour of reducing the impartiality or 
independence of the Civil Service. Again, the corroboration of core tenets of the 
Westminster model and Haldane seems clear.  
 
Those who understand their Minister’s philosophy 
 
In talking about a Civil Servant understanding their Minister, Lord Moore alights on a critical 
point. If a Civil Servant “gets” their Minister’s philosophy, then they can design policy in this 
light. Sometimes this will mean persuading them that there is a better alternative which still 
holds true to their vision: 
 
“Service means advising, thinking, helping to think through the ways in which they 
can achieve their policies and helping to create alternative policies that might 
achieve their objectives better and not being afraid to argue and articulate this.” 
   
Paul Goggins also admired adaptability – he liked those who “…got the message that I 
wanted to work in that particular kind of way.”  
 
The same point was made by John Denham. One of the examples he quoted concerned the 
introduction of ethical investment policies relating to pension schemes. The official in 
question understood the Minister’s intended policy direction and turned that goal into 
something concrete: 
 
“…there was a civil servant who took what I wanted away and came up with 
something which was not only workable but had a major effect on investment 
behaviour in The City of London…”   
 
These examples speak to the Civil Servant’s ability to understand his or her Minister and 
adjust their behaviour accordingly. Again honesty and mutuality are important – a Minister 
who communicates clearly and openly with their Civil Servants will make this task a much 
easier one.  The dynamism and creativity in the examples above suggest that the Civil 
Servants in question were working in tandem with their Ministers to create policy, rather 
than being separately tasked to deliver or manager it ex post facto. 
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NEGATIVE INFLUENCES 
 
 Those who lack competence 
 Those who undermine policy and seek control 
 Those who are averse to change 
 Those who lack external experience  
 Those who do not lead, take responsibility, or communicate clearly  
 
Those who lack competence 
 
As I discussed in Chapter Two, the diaries and memoirs I examined suggested that a lack of 
competence and a desire to seek control were weaknesses which Ministers often associate 
with Civil Servants. The Ministers I spoke to provided relatively few examples of simple 
incompetence from their Civil Servants, but those that Lord Luce and Fiona Mactaggart 
provided had a negative influence on their relationships. 
 
Lord Luce had varied experiences with his Civil Servants. The worst he encountered was an 
incompetent Private Secretary who made his life very difficult: 
 
“…in the Foreign Office my very first private secretary was a disaster and I found 
that he hadn’t brought to me parliamentary questions which needed my answer 
quickly. I was set a ten day working day target and I found them one day in a 
cupboard.” 
 
The individual actually left the service as a result of this incident, but Lord Luce describes 
this eventuality as rare.  
 
Fiona Mactaggart told me about an instance where the incompetence of her officials had 
left her badly prepared for a meeting with a foreign delegation, the results of which were 
confusing and embarrassing: 
 
“…the delegation alleged that I had agreed to something which I had no 
understanding of having agreed to and I don’t believe I did agree to... I might have 
given them the impression that I agreed to something which I didn’t agree to. I 
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think that was one of the worst, I can deal with politics but I can’t deal with being in 
a situation where you don’t really know what’s going on, that’s not fair.” 
 
In this scenario she was utterly let down by her private office staff, in conjunction with 
those responsible for briefing her on the meeting, its content, format and goals. This was an 
example of incompetence at a very basic level – it left a lasting impression with a Minister 
who ended up unimpressed with the Civil Service at the end of her tenure. It also serves as 
a reminder that for all the systemic issues my interviewees identify (see Chapter Seven), 
sometimes very simple failures endure. 
 
In any institution, individuals will always make mistakes. In government, the stakes are 
high. The very least that is always at risk is the reputation of the Minister. This might 
suggest one potential rationale for the cautious and hierarchical behaviours that are 
examined in Chapter Seven. Examples of simple incompetence were rare according to my 
interviewees. As I examine below, other traits and behaviours were far more concerning.   
 
Those who undermine policy and seek control 
 
My interviewees provided more examples of the second theme I identified in the literature 
(control).  However, these examples were not representative of my interviewees’ general 
experience. Lord Glenarthur’s experiences with Civil Servants were overwhelmingly 
positive, but he did pick out one example where he was frustrated with their behaviour: 
 
“…officials in any of these departments would work on the submission, perhaps for 
a year then it would arrive in the Minister’s box on a Friday night at four o’clock, 
and they would want an answer by Monday morning. Well, one simply had to say 
‘no’.” 
 
Ministers will sometimes feel that they are being ‘bounced’ or ‘rail-roaded’ into decisions 
by their officials (see for example Mullin, 2010, p.31 & p.142). Imposing an urgent deadline, 
with dire consequences if it is missed, is one manifestation. Lord Glenarthur gave no 
indication whether he suspected his Civil Servants were motivated by a desire to seek 
control in this instance, but his response was the only sensible one.  
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John Healey was left frustrated by resistance to a house building initiative – for reasons 
“none of which in the end stood up…”  
 
Ben Bradshaw told me that he had experienced two types of private secretary and whilst 
most tried to help their Minister deliver, he came “across one or two who unfortunately 
saw their job primarily as defending the department from the Minister’s desire to do 
anything.”  
 
John Denham provided an example of the worst that he saw from his Civil Servants through 
his time in office. It goes beyond change aversion, and is more redolent of a conscious 
determination to completely undermine Government policy and seek control: 
 
“…my first job as Secretary of State was at DIUS and I would say that the whole set 
of people who were responsible for skills policy were extremely and obstinately 
resistant to making changes to make the skills system operate effectively.  We 
wasted millions of pounds on a system; they had designed a system which 
produced the numbers that they were meant to produce for the Treasury.” 
 
Lord Triesman considered that he was systematically undermined by a minority of 
individuals in the Foreign Office. He was also very critical of Civil Servants he encountered in 
the Home Office: 
 
“I don’t think their heart was in it, I don’t think they were committed to work, I 
think they systematically undermined things that they didn’t like to do and I think 
that on occasions they were actually out in the open unwilling to do what 
government policy was.”   
 
John Denham and Lord Triesman’s answers demonstrate that some Civil Servants are 
prepared to undermine a clear Ministerial decision. This can be done openly (Lord 
Triesman’s example). However, a subtle approach is more common, though no more 
acceptable. These behaviours had an extremely negative influence on relationships. They 
hint at weak Civil Service management and leadership given the hierarchical nature of the 
service.  
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Those who are averse to change  
 
Lord Knight thought that some Senior Civil Servants were locked in a traditional mindset 
which held them back: 
 
“…there are one or two who were a bit more old school and in the end were 
creatures much more of that silo mentality looking to do things the way they’d 
always been done.” 
 
Whilst Paul Goggins was keen to praise the collective knowledge and memory of Civil 
Servants, which spanned administrations and political masters, he also encountered the flip 
side of that coin. Namely officials who had done “…the same damn job for year after 
year…” and who had a set way of doing it. Even worse was their attitude when a Minister 
endeavoured to draw out their rationale: 
 
“But if you get into challenge or asking ‘well, why is this the case?’  - ‘well, because 
it’s always been or because that’s the way we do it’ well that’s not really good 
enough, when you don’t have a proper understanding now of why this is the right 
answer, not why it was the right answer fifteen years ago…” 
 
Lord Whitty also suggested that intransigence can often be the result of relationships 
between some Senior Civil Servants and external stakeholders being too tight: 
 
“…some have a cosy life, are too close to the stakeholders, and are very resistant to 
change [when the driver is] either colleagues, Ministers, or other Departments.”24 
 
The importance for Civil Servants to have private sector experience and for interchange 
with the private sector to be increased is emphasised by my interviewees later in this 
chapter and forms part of the recent programme of Civil Service Reform (Cabinet Office, 
2012).  
 
                                                          
24
 The dangers of very close relationships between stakeholders and Civil Servants with policy 
responsibility for the same area are highlighted in some of the Ministerial literature I have examined. 
See Chapter Two and the views of Major (2000, p.262) and Benn (1996, p.287) in particular.  
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If Civil Servants are perceived to be resistant to change, this may have an extremely 
negative influence on their relationships with Ministers. Frustration will result and advice 
on any other issue may be tainted in the Minister’s eyes as a consequence.  The literature 
explored in Chapter Two shows that Ministers, historically, have been concerned about the 
willingness and ability of their Civil Servants to adapt to change. As with the competence 
and control themes, a clear disparity emerged between the prevalence of this narrative in 
the literature and the experiences described by my interviewees. I explore this in Chapter 
Six.  
 
Those who lack external experience 
 
Lord Jenkin thought his Civil Servants lacked the necessary professional expertise to offer 
the right initial advice concerning the introduction of VAT. For Lord Jenkin this was an 
example of his principal concern: 
 
“…one of the central weaknesses of the civil service (is that) it’s the only thing 
they’ve ever done.” 
 
John Denham expressed a very similar view. He thought there was too much emphasis on 
the concept of a Civil Service career rather than external interchange. The difference that 
experience could make was illustrated by one official who had worked externally: 
 
“…I had one guy worked at the Home Office, he spent a year running Wandsworth 
Prison, the quality of his advice on 101 issues was in a different league to people 
who’d never run anything. I put a lot of police officers into the Home Office on 
secondment but there’s still not enough in and out movement.” 
 
Lord Whitty, Baroness Armstrong, Baroness Liddell, John Healey, and Lord Cope all 
expressed very similar opinions.  
 
There was a strong consensus that a lack of external experience affects the quality of advice 
provided to Ministers. It will also affect the viability of delivering the policy in reality. As 
noted in Chapter Four, the problem may be compounded by the tendency for Ministers to 
have less career experience outside of Westminster than in times past.  
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Those who do not lead, take responsibility, or communicate clearly  
 
Lord Whitty was concerned about the ability of his Civil Servants to collectively respond to 
outside shocks: 
 
“I picked up Agriculture five weeks into the foot and mouth epidemic. The machine 
had not cohered at that point – it required a whole range of departments and 
agencies to prioritise funding…it was clear that an outside shock like that, which 
happens from time to time, had completely thrown the machine...” 
 
Lord Blencathra also identified this as a difficulty: 
 
“…you wake up one morning and two guys have gone over the wall at Parkhurst, 
often they (the Civil Service) weren’t sharp on the political ramifications of things. 
So their response is ‘I’ll have an inquiry minister’… So response to crisis was often 
poor, not realising the political ramifications of having to do things quickly.” 
 
John Denham considered that he was poorly served by some of his officials in the 
Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills. He was particularly disappointed at their 
refusal to take responsibility when serious problems emerged in relation to a programme of 
Further Education College building: 
 
“…I thought my civil servants just ran away, they ran for the hills and in the end I 
had to do nearly all the heavy lifting, I wasn’t impressed...”  
 
Crisis management per se was seen as a strength by others (e.g. Blair, 2010, p.206), and 
several Ministers I spoke to told me about the effort and commitment their Civil Servants 
had shown. In contrast to Lord Whitty, Ben Bradshaw praised his Civil Servants for their 
work during the foot and mouth crisis25. Lord Whitty and Lord Blencathra’s examples 
concern outside shocks, whereas John Denham’s concerns a crisis of the Civil Service’s own 
making. However, these examples share some common threads – they hint at a tendency 
                                                          
25
 Ben Bradshaw told me: “...we had bird flu and foot and mouth. It’s like running a war and civil 
servants would be working 24 hours a day round the clock, would sleep in the department or sleep 
in hotels, really the team work and camaraderie and dedication that was displayed in crises like that 
was really impressive.” 
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to consider such crises as lying solely in the political realm and a failure of speed and 
coherence in response. Again they raise questions about leadership and a reluctance to 
take responsibility. The fact that some Civil Servants consider that the barrier between their 
responsibilities and their Minister’s responsibilities is so categorical may also suggest that 
some relationships have become more transactional.  
 
If Civil Servants are not completely honest with their Ministers, then the foundation of the 
relationship may be eroded.  Lord Whitty told me that some Civil Servants were reluctant to 
tell Ministers bad news.  
 
Paul Goggins did not like Senior Civil Servants who did not understand policy detail, but 
would pretend that they did: 
 
“The people who hide behind their position, pulling the strings of very able, but 
more junior, colleagues and trying to take all the credit for their ideas and solutions 
when they came26.” 
 
Again, the consequences of a lack of honesty from Civil Servants are clear – as is the ease at 
which the Minister was able to see through the charade. Insecurity coupled with a desire 
for self-promotion at the expense of colleagues is likely to have a negative influence on 
relationships with Ministers and with other Civil Servants.  
                                                          
26
 This is corroborated by the admission of one former Senior Civil Servant -  Stephen Burbridge - 
who wrote that he “blushingly accepted” praise for a brief prepared for his Minister, Keith Joseph. 
He states: “I can say without immodesty that the brief was of a high standard, even up to the 
intellectual demands of its illustrious recipient. It had however not been written by me but my clever 
assistant, though by some secretarial subterfuge my signature at the bottom had suggested my 
authorship.” (Burbridge, 2007, p.5 of extract). Burbridge considers the “special praise” he received 
for the brief he had not written secured him promotion. 
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Conclusion 
 
Relationships are positively influenced, as perceived by my Ministerial interviewees, when 
their Civil Servants demonstrate certain qualities. Civil Servants need to show commitment, 
honesty, skill and awareness. The most impassioned and compelling stories emerged where 
the Minister knew that the Civil Servant did not agree with the course of action he or she 
had chosen, but was unwavering in their support anyway. The importance of honesty was 
also clear.  As Lord Luce said, you are only valuable as an advisor if you are fearless in the 
advice you give. Lord Waldegrave told me that Civil Servants needed to be “...dissident 
without being disloyal...” Skill was often connected with subject specialism and expertise by 
my interviewees. However, skill is not just technical: forming a human understanding of 
their Minister’s philosophy and using that as a template for creating policy was seen as 
invaluable. Political and real world awareness was the final quality identified. Ministers may 
put more faith in advice from Civil Servants who demonstrate this awareness, and 
relationships may be positively influenced. 
 
Although good experiences far outweighed bad, the negative influences identified were 
more varied. Simple and obvious incompetence was rare – but tended to leave a marked 
impression. Aversion to change and refusal to accept changed realities after the event were 
more commonly identified by my interviewees.  There were some isolated cases of 
individuals systematically undermining policy decisions. This raises serious questions for the 
leadership of the Civil Service. A lack of real world experience, refusal to take responsibility 
and lead, and a refusal to furnish the Minister with all the facts were also identified. The 
first refers to a recognised skills gap, the others hint at a desire for self-protection. Adopting 
a parochial attitude is not likely to positively influence relationships.  
 
My interviewees suggested that successful relationships with Ministers are often based on 
symbiosis, mutuality and partnership. In doing so they effectively endorsed many 
traditional elements of the Westminster model. A number of the behaviours they perceived 
as positive are rooted in classic Haldaneian duality, as identified above and discussed in 
Chapter One. My sample size is not sufficient to identify whether Ministerial perceptions 
over time reflect the apparent contraction of the deliberative space that the literature 
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suggests has occurred27. It is worth noting that there was a balance of positive citations 
which implicitly invoked Haldane, between the Conservative and Labour Ministers I 
interviewed. But negative views about Civil Service behaviour were stronger and more 
frequently expressed by the Labour Ministers I interviewed. That appears consistent with 
the literature considered in Chapter One (in that the space began to contract during the 
Thatcher administration, and that the direction of travel has not subsequently been 
reversed). 
 
The dominant themes I derived from ministerial literature about the Civil Service in Chapter 
Two, featuring concerns about “competency” and “control”, were not corroborated by my 
interviewees. There was a significant disparity between the conspicuous references to 
“incompetence” in the Ministerial literature and the experiences of my interviewees. The 
instances identified where Civil Servants undermined policy decisions, withheld 
information, and demonstrated an aversion to change offer limited corroboration of the 
“control” theme. However they were not representative of the overall experience that my 
ministerial interviewees had. The frequency and nature of my interviewees’ experiences 
relating to the “control” theme do not chime with its prominence in the literature. I explore 
this in Chapter Six. 
                                                          
27
 Very recent interview material published by the Institute for Government (2016) suggests that 
several formal Coalition Ministers – including Ken Clarke, David Laws, and Baroness Kramer – think 
that Civil Servants do not always offer sufficient challenge to Ministers. 
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CHAPTER SIX: EXPLAINING THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE MINISTERIAL LITERATURE AND 
THE VIEWS OF MINISTERIAL INTERVIEWEES ABOUT CIVIL SERVANTS 
 
The disparity evident between the prevailing narrative in the ministerial literature and the 
views of my interviewees requires further examination. The themes I identified in the 
literature, concerning the competence of Civil Servants and their desire to seek control 
(Chapter Two), were not borne out by the experiences reported by my ministerial 
interviewees (Chapter Five). I was surprised about the extent of the disparity that emerged. 
I asked my interviewees why they considered this “narrative” about Civil Servants existed, 
in apparent contrast to their overall experience. There were three broad answers to the 
question – and they were not mutually exclusive. Firstly because politicians need someone 
to blame failure on they invoke a “lazy” narrative. Secondly because the public do not trust 
bureaucrats, of whom they are sceptical. And thirdly, because elements of the narrative are 
true. These are considered in turn below.  
 
(i) Because politicians need someone to blame their failures on 
 
Lord Knight identified several points that many of my other interviewees concurred with. 
For him the narrative has prevailed because it is in the interests of certain politicians for it 
to do so: 
 
“If those people commentating are politicians then it’s quite safe and comforting 
…because it means you have got someone to blame if things don’t go right. And…if 
you have a view that government should be as small as possible – public sector: 
bad; private sector: good – then it suits that narrative too. But – by and large – I just 
think it’s lazy.”   
 
The public, private sector split was mentioned in identical terms by Lord Browne who also 
referred to it as a “lazy narrative”. The suggestion here is that some former Ministers are 
critical of individual Civil Servants as a result of their ideological standpoints, which are 
refracted through their stories about relationships within government. Paul Goggins was 
critical of some of the memoirs and diaries that in his view misrepresent the relationship: 
 
“Sometimes you get these books by ex-ministers that are for the most part deeply 
un-helpful about describing the relationship between Ministers and civil servants, 
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and explaining what civil servants are, and do. They seem to rather demean them 
and I think that’s sometimes the sense of failure from the Minister that they didn’t 
make the best of the opportunities they had – and blame the civil servants for it.” 
 
Lord Moore and Lord Whitty both told me that politicians are often prone to trying to 
explain away their failures, and transfer the blame. Ben Bradshaw suggested that there is 
an inverse relationship between effectiveness as a politician and criticism of the Civil 
Service. Lord Blencathra echoed this - saying that he “…could identify a few ministers, 
former ministers who probably didn’t rate their civil servants, but I didn’t rate them as 
ministers.” In his view these individuals were most likely to be insecure and suspicious of 
challenge. Lord Cope shifted the emphasis to the personal ideology of the Ministers 
involved: “…some of my colleagues think of the civil service as being obstructive but they 
are the ones who’d expect to think that they’re obstructive on the whole.” 
 
Lord Waldegrave expressed a very similar view: 
 
“Being a Minister is often a frustrating business because reality won’t do what you 
want it to do. So you have to blame somebody, and you obviously can’t blame 
yourself, because you’re a hero. And the easiest people to hand are the civil 
servants.” 
 
There is a connection here with my assessment in Chapter Two that those politicians with 
the highest expectations of power may have found themselves most disappointed with the 
reality.  
 
As illustrated above, a number of the former Ministers I interviewed effectively laid the 
blame for the existence of a narrative, which they saw as unhelpful, at the hands of other 
politicians. Generally those who they considered had been unsuccessful to some degree 
and had an axe to grind. There is a clear suggestion that those who publicly criticise their 
Civil Servants are – to some extent – being deliberately misleading in order to offset their 
own political failure.  
 
There is also a strong connection here with the self – perpetuating mythology of the 
Westminster model as previously examined (Rhodes, 2011), and the views of Richards and 
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Smith (2004) who suggest that the “narrative” Ministers appeal to concerning the 
Westminster model is one of “historical impact.”  
 
 
 (ii) Because the public do not trust bureaucrats, of whom they are sceptical 
 
Another rationale advanced for the existence of the narrative was the public’s historical 
scepticism concerning bureaucrats – in particular the fact that Civil Servants are often the 
people who have to say ‘no’ to the public, their role is not widely understood and they do 
not have a voice through which to articulate it. The implication is that some Ministers may 
consciously play into the perceptions of the public, when it is in their interests to do so.  
 
Lord Browne thought that the latest political fashion for marketing the value of change, 
whilst not really changing very much at all, was causing further detriment to the reputation 
of the Civil Service: 
 
“Everybody has bought into the Obama/change message: modern politics is about 
defining yourself as near as you can to the status quo, and using the word ‘change’ 
as often as possible. The civil service are, in a certain sense, the ultimate 
manifestation of the status quo. If you define yourself against what you are not, 
then it’s easy to do that.” 
 
Baroness Liddell thought that the narrative existed partly “…because of the challenge the 
citizen has with bureaucracy.” Lord Waldegrave also felt that most functions of 
Government are regulatory, and “involves doing things that mean saying ‘no’ to people; 
and people objected to that.”  
 
Lord Whitty made a similar observation, suggesting that business leaders, campaigners and 
the media get frustrated by their interaction with government and “...put it down to 
caution, risk aversion, bureaucracy, when actually civil servants are doing their job.” 
 
Another important point drawn out by some of my interviewees was that the inherent 
nature of Civil Servants means they are bound to be perceived in a certain way, especially 
by the public. In Baroness Cumberlege’s words: 
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“It’s because they are not meant to be at all high profile, that they are perceived to 
be faceless.” 
 
Arguably, it is constitutionally inappropriate for the public to know the professional 
opinions of Civil Servants under the existing model. It is not the role of Civil Servants to 
refute public perceptions concerning them, nor do they have any voice by which to do so.  
 
(iii) Because elements of the narrative which concern the inherent nature of the 
relationship are true 
 
A number of the politicians I interviewed had a very different answer to my question about 
why the narrative exists. Out of my twenty five interviewees, none explicitly suggested that 
the narrative was simply “true”. However, some thought they were clear elements of truth 
in it.  
 
Fiona Mactaggart was clear that Civil Servants were often to blame for failure. She thought 
that the Civil Service was designed to lack passion and that: 
 
“… (The narrative) is a product of the professional civil service because if you look 
at all these memoirs all these people think “my God, I pull levers and it doesn’t 
happen at the ground”.  It probably does if you’re Prime Minister, but it doesn’t for 
lots and lots of ministers. And when it hasn’t happened, they don’t tell you it hasn’t 
happened, so you have to go and find out that it hasn’t happened and then pull 
again or find some new lever.”   
 
In her view the distance between policy and delivery, in the Home Office for example, was 
deliberately long. That could be seen as an implicit criticism of the legacy of the Next Steps 
initiative. She also thought that the narrative was accurate because the careful usage of 
language was the asset most valued by the Civil Service28, and that this was dangerous. 
 
                                                          
28
 Former Civil Servant Clive Ponting’s views are extremely similar: “Preoccupied with their 
relationship with ministers, top civil servants become too obsessed with presentation and short term 
political requirements. An ability to ‘draft round’ problems and economise elegantly with the truth 
are skills more highly prized in this environment than an interest in good industrial relations or 
forward planning.” (Ponting, 1989, p.16) 
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Whilst Fiona Mactaggart’s acceptance of the narrative represents a clear countervailing 
opinion amongst my interviewees, she made a related point about the importance of fitting 
the mould being a critical qualifier for recruitment and promotion. Lord Triesman 
concurred. He also considered that there were some characteristics of the Civil Service that 
had not changed, and that recruitment practices meant that the Civil Service was not 
sufficiently diverse or representative of modern society.  
 
Lord Whitty considered that there was some truth to the narrative. Alun Michael also 
thought that there were “…too many people at a Director General level who think that they 
know it all.” He felt that the inflexibility of processes and a misguided desire to create 
targets that acted as a “proxy for profit” were unhelpful. There is a clear linkage here with 
my contention that the relationship has become closer to principal-agent, than symbiotic 
partnership. The adoption of managerial, transactional, metrics is not seen as fitting with 
the role that Alun Michael believes the Civil Service should be playing. He also considered 
that Civil Service recruitment practices encouraged a culture where people need to tick a 
box to say they have a certain skillset to advance – whereas the need to actually develop 
that skill was overlooked. All of these behaviours might be serving to further entrench the 
narrative. 
 
When I asked Baroness Liddell about the consistency of the narrative over a number of 
years she said: 
 
“Well I think if you look at any large organisation, they have ways of doing things. 
And because of those ways of doing things, they attract a particular kind of 
person…(T)he nature of the institution moulds people. And if you mould the people 
then you perpetuate the institution.”  
 
There is a clear connection here with the argument advanced by Grant and Jary (2010), as 
considered in Chapter Two.  
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Conclusion 
 
When I asked my interviewees why an established narrative about the Civil Service existed, 
three broad answers emerged. Each one of them is highly plausible and I suspect a 
combination of all three takes us as close to “an answer” as it is possible to get.  
 
To revisit the first broad answer, the openness with which the Ministers I interviewed 
criticised other Ministers, for criticising Civil Servants, was the first point that emerged. The 
implication is that a particular desire to blame officials came from those who were aware of 
their own political failings and wished to assuage them. The second answer cut straight to 
the heart of the public’s relationship with bureaucracy at a philosophical level and their 
healthy scepticism of the unelected official wielding power. The third answer is equally as 
valid – because some elements of the narrative established in the literature are grounded 
in reality.  
 
The ministerial literature I have considered is likely to be biased, with authors playing into 
narratives established about the bounds of their role, within the Westminster model 
(Richards and Smith, 2004). As Rhodes (2012) suggests29 there is a risk that the ministerial 
world portrayed in the literature can be heavily constructed, as many of my interviewees 
thought. However, despite the obvious limitations, memoirs and diaries remain the best 
source material for insights into relationships, and the behaviours of Civil Servants. The 
perspective the literature establishes, as examined in Chapter Two, cannot be dismissed on 
the basis of the views of twenty-five Ministerial interviews.  
 
When preparing my interview scripts, I included a question which asked for views on why a 
narrative about the Civil Service appeared to exist. I characterised this narrative as part of 
the question, with reference to the control and competency themes that I had derived. As 
the interviews unfolded, it became clear to me that the prevailing view of my interviewees 
was more positive than the one established in the ministerial literature. In effect, this 
                                                          
29
 “The Westminster narrative is the classical constitutional view of British government. Its core tenet 
is a belief in centralisation or hierarchy, with its roots in the royal prerogative and the monarchical 
origins of British government…It sustains the view that history is made by great men and, after 
Margaret Thatcher, great women… there are great pressures on authors to conform to a profitable 
template; the narrative drive of the chronological detective story that reveals the true man or 
woman as it excuses their faults.” (Rhodes, 2012, Pp 23-4). 
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question gave my interviewees a chance to explain why a disparity existed between their 
views and the literature. I consider that all their explanations are extremely plausible.  
 
In addition, the enthusiasm my interviewees had to participate needs to be considered. I 
consider the methodology I deployed to identify my potential sample, is sound (as set out 
in Chapter Three). It may be that those former Ministers who responded had a more 
positive view about the Civil Service, than those who chose not to respond.  It may be that 
my presence (as interviewer) may have biased the responses of my interviewees (Creswell, 
2003, p.186), given my role as a Civil Servant. Whilst I cannot rule these possibilities out, I 
am not convinced that either was significant.  
 
I suspect that some other variables may have been more relevant. Firstly, the very different 
nature of responding to questions in a research interview, as compared to crafting a 
narrative for publication in a memoir. Secondly, the time that had elapsed between my 
interviews taking place and my interviewees leaving office. Whilst my literature review also 
spans a broad range of time – there is an important difference. Diaries are created when 
their authors are in office and memoirs are generally published shortly after the author has 
left office. Time for reflection will be limited. It was at least two years since any of my 
interviewees had been in office; and it was in excess of twenty years for some.  
 
Thirdly, although ten of my ministerial interviewees had served in the Cabinet, a number of 
my interviewees were not “household” names – or had not been so for a number of years. 
They may have paid less heed to expectations as a result. Fourthly, my impression was that 
my interviewees were giving me their genuine views, in support of my research aim. There 
were very few attempts to make party political points (potentially as my interviewees 
understood that, as a Civil Servant, this could put me in an uncomfortable position).    
 
Finally - and most importantly - my interviewees did have a number of serious criticisms. 
However, these tended to be systemic rather than personal and were more nuanced than 
much of the material I derived from the literature. I deal with these criticisms in the next 
Chapter.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN – SYSTEMIC ISSUES WHICH MAY BE NEGATIVELY INFLUENCING 
RELATIONSHIPS 
 
At the end of Chapter Six, I concluded that there was a body of opinion expressed in my 
interviews which was not predominantly concerned with individual relationships. Some of 
the disparity between the views of my interviewees and the views expressed in ministerial 
literature can be explained by the nature of the criticism that my interviewees had. This 
took the form of systemic or institutional comments about the Civil Service in general, 
rather than its constituents. Arguably this reflects a broader tendency for Ministers to 
praise individual civil servants for the support they provide, whilst at the same time 
criticising the Civil Service as an institution for its lack of relevant skills (Richards and Smith, 
2016, p.3).  
 
Relationships between Ministers and Civil Servants all operate within a context that many 
of my interviewees had serious concerns about. Some of my interviewees perceived that 
institutional and structural problems are putting pressure on relationships. An awareness of 
these features might assist Ministers and Civil Servants in their interactions and may also 
prevent both parties making attribution errors when considering the others’ role. The 
Ministers I spoke to highlighted a number of strengths that our model holds. However, the 
dominant opinion was that there are a number of institutional barriers which the Civil 
Service creates, and that these may negatively influence relationships between Ministers 
and Civil Servants. In summary: 
 
 Relationships between Departments perceived to be dysfunctional and feudal; 
practices are inconsistent 
 Perceived systemic reluctance to expose Ministers to internal policy debates 
 Frustration with the hierarchical nature of the Civil Service  
 Perception that the Civil Service incentivises the wrong behaviours, values the 
wrong skills and has the wrong recruitment priorities 
 Concern at the changing nature of the relationship and potential politicisation 
 Inadequacy of training, preparation and induction for Ministers 
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Relationships between Departments are dysfunctional and feudal; practices are 
inconsistent 
 
A number of my interviewees perceived cross departmental relationships as problematic. 
This parallels the extant literature concerning the baronial and feudal nature of central 
government architecture. In essence this is the contention that the structure of Whitehall 
imbues each Department and Cabinet Minister with a high concentration of power, but 
provides little incentive for collegiate working across Departments30. Seen it its most 
negative light, the structure of Whitehall incentivises each Minister to pursue their own 
agenda, all the while competing with their own Cabinet colleagues for political capital, 
whilst their Departments compete with each other for the largest possible budget 
allocation from the Treasury. In this light, it is consistent with rational choice theory as 
discussed in Chapters One and Three, with both officials and Ministers acting in self-interest 
as budget or utility maximisers.  
 
Lord Knight told me that the complex inter-relationships between Whitehall departments 
were a critical issue for the Civil Service as a whole: 
 
“…[W]here there is, I think, a degree of dysfunctionality, if that’s not too strong a 
word, is the rivalries and the frictions between departments, so that as a service as 
a whole it is not more than the sum of its parts, to some extent it’s less than the 
sum of its parts.” 
  
Lord Knight also provided a telling example of where a constructive relationship between 
two Ministers was not mirrored by the relationships between each Department’s Civil 
Servants: 
 
                                                          
30
 See Powell (2010, Pp.76-78) for a general summary; Part (1990, Pp 173-4) for a Permanent 
Secretary’s view on whether loyalties should always lie with a Civil Servant’s own Minister; Williams 
(2010) and Crossman (1979) who both suggest that Ministers factor in the relative strength of 
various Departments into potential machinery of Government changes; and Bevir and Rhodes (2008, 
p.7) who consider that baronial politics is a check on Prime Ministerial power.  Kaufman (1997, Pp 
14-17) also urges ministers to avoid what he calls “Departmentalitis” – where Ministers forget that 
they are members of the Government and simply pursue their own Department’s goals regardless of 
the relative merits of the argument or the Government’s broader aims. Jim Callaghan is one Minister 
who admitted he was prone to suffering from this in junior office (Callaghan, 1987, p.98). Diamond 
(2014, p.284) identifies resistance to working across departmental lines, and the dangers of adopting 
a ‘silo mentality’, as part of a range of problems with a structure where power is concentrated 
centrally.  
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“I was working very well with my opposite number at trying to integrate skills and 
employment support more thoroughly and whilst there was joint working on a 
paper, to actually make that happen took more time than I had, or Kevin had, just 
to get the civil service and their different targets and alignments to properly work, 
because – in the end – they just didn’t get it and they didn’t want it.” 
 
Lord Jenkin was of the view that very strong departmental points of view can stymie the 
effectiveness of Government as a whole. As with Lord Knight, in his view the driver for 
departmentalism is the Civil Service itself. He laments the feudal nature of Whitehall where 
each Department defends its own turf feverishly: 
 
“(Civil Servants)…ought, if necessary, to try and resolve their differences with the 
other department, rather than feeling it’s always necessary to use their Ministers to 
fight their corner, and at the end go back triumphantly to the Department saying 
‘well we won that one.’”  
 
Lord Bradley gave an even more prosaic example. A range of staff arrived at his office on a 
Monday morning: 
 
“They hadn’t done their homework, they hadn’t put together a coordinated 
response to me and I realised this within about fifteen minutes.  So I said ‘go away, 
you’ve all arrived in London… come back either later tonight or tomorrow morning 
with a proper response’ and they all trooped sheepishly out of the office.  When 
they came back they had a very effective response.” 
 
I asked Lord Bradley whether he thought that Ministers or Civil Servants were primarily 
responsible for the feudal structure of Whitehall and the culture of departmentalism that 
he was alluding to. He said: “I don’t think it’s driven by ministers; ministers are too 
transient to impose it.” For Lord Knight, Lord Jenkin and Lord Bradley, the Civil Service were 
the drivers for feudalism, not Ministers31.  
                                                          
31
 Cowper-Coles provides an interesting counter-example. For him, the relationship between Robin 
Cook and Clare Short (when Foreign Secretary and International Development Secretary 
respectively) was very difficult, mostly because Short was a Brown ally, and Cook was not. The 
consequence was that Short “…seemed to wage unrelenting war on the Foreign Office and all its 
works.” (2013, Pp 214-5). Cowper-Coles was speaking from a position close to Cook, but his example 
illustrates the potential for inter-ministerial politics to define broader relationships between two 
Whitehall departments, at least temporarily. 
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John Healey pinpointed the systemic difficulty in making changes that had an impact on 
other Departments – and linked this point to the actions of individual Civil Servants. He 
suggests that some Civil Servants use the structure of Whitehall as a means of derailing 
their own Minister’s policy: 
 
“Inevitably, some of the hardest things - even from the Treasury - to get through 
were changes that involved other departments.  I had a period as Minister for the 
Office of Government Commerce - there were examples there, the head at the time 
essentially tried to use the inertia in Whitehall to stop anything changing.”32 
 
Lord Whitty concurred, making the salient point that progress will only be made at the pace 
of the slowest player. Sir Malcolm Rifkind pointed to the flawed privatisation of the railway 
network in the early 1990’s, which he considered was caused by the Treasury’s dominance 
over the Department for Transport: 
 
“Anyway, I lost that battle because the Treasury were convinced that the only way 
you could get competition was by not giving one operator the ownership of the 
track. I argued, and my officials argued, that competition was not from other 
railway operators, the competition was from road and air.” 
 
This is an acknowledgement from the Secretary of State for Transport who privatised the 
railways that he did not fully support his own policy – and that this had been imposed on 
the Department for Transport by the Treasury. The changes John Healey, Lord Whitty, and 
Sir Malcolm Rifkind refer to each indicate the enduring importance of centralised power 
within the executive. Each example is representative of the dynamics of that power.  
 
A slight variation on Sir Malcolm’s point was made by Nick Raynsford. In his case, the other 
variable was Number Ten rather than the Treasury. And in this instance his officials were 
not being overruled by others, they were substituting their own professional opinions and 
beliefs for what they thought that Number Ten might want them to say: 
 
 
                                                          
32
 John Healey’s terminology here (“inertia”) is identical to Tony Blair’s (2010, p.19).   
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“…one quite senior civil servant said to me on a particular policy approach being 
pushed hard by Downing Street, they didn’t think it was right but because Downing 
Street clearly wanted it this is what they would advise me to do. I said ‘This is not 
your role.  You are there to advise the minister in your department what you and 
the department believes is right’… That trend was becoming more obvious: that 
ambitious civil servants would not be seen to be a block to what Number Ten 
wanted.” 
 
He recalls his shock at this encounter, which he thought reduced the interaction to the 
“…Tony Benn view of politics…” where the relationship is not constructive and Civil Servants 
block and Ministers waste energy combating them. There is a remarkable similarity 
between the example above, and one given in the Crossman diaries (Crossman, 1979, 
p.14833) although in the latter example the Treasury is the suitor. The example also 
corroborates the view that New Labour federalised power within Whitehall (Richards, 
2008). 
 
In this particular example, the motivation of the Civil Servants involved was dishonest and 
self serving, but in other situations the Departmental interest will be genuinely different to 
the cross Governmental interest. The Minister will still expect his Civil Servants to consider 
his or her Department first. A recent Public Accounts Committee report also criticises 
corporate leadership and accountability within the Civil Service (Public Accounts 
Committee, 2014). Cabinet Secretary Jeremy Heywood believes that there is still a cultural 
problem when it comes to cross-Governmental working and the natural tendency is for the 
Departmental line to be defended34. 
 
 
                                                          
33
 “All my key officials, the two Deputies for example, know that promotion comes to them not from 
the Minister – he has virtually nothing to do with it – but from the standing which they have in the 
eyes of the Treasury… It is this relationship which makes so many higher civil servants willing to spy 
for the Treasury and to align themselves with the Treasury view even against their own Minister.” 
(Crossman, 1979, p.148). 
 
34 Sir Jeremy Heywood: “…we are making less progress on finding the magic bullet to how we get 
cross-departmental working right the way down. That depends a lot on Ministers working co-
operatively together, having been asked to by the Prime Minister, and on permanent secretaries 
coming together in groups and agreeing: “We will get our teams to work together.” That is more of a 
culture problem, because people are still more inclined to defend a departmental line. So I think that 
is the bigger challenge than the Treasury and Cabinet Office. I do not think that we have got the 
answer to that...” (Public Accounts Committee (2), 2014, Q97). 
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Systemic reluctance to expose Ministers to internal policy debates 
 
Lord Jenkin hinted at another issue - that Ministers find it immensely beneficial to be 
exposed to the internal debate that their Civil Servants may be having on policy: 
 
“…some Departments…will only let you see the submissions from the top tier… [In 
HMT] you were able to see all the previous submissions down the line as part of the 
briefing you had.”  
 
Sir Malcolm Rifkind made a very similar point. He remembers an occasion where his 
officials gave him written advice, but the Department had been unable to reach a common 
view on what the conclusion or recommendation should be. They apologised, but he saw 
the lack of consensus as a positive. He realised that in most cases advice is drafted at a 
relatively junior level and is altered as it is approved through a management chain. It is 
therefore most likely to reflect the views of the last person to approve it, who will be the 
most senior: 
 
“So I said ‘well actually, from my point of view as a Minister, it makes a difference 
to me whether the advice from my officials is unanimous… or whether my officials 
themselves have a deep division of opinion on the merits of the various options.’ 
That’s actually important for me to know, and if that is covered up… as far as I am 
concerned that is negative, not positive.”  
 
Baroness Liddell told me about some untypical behaviour from her Civil Servants when she 
was trying to deal with the miss-selling of personal pensions: 
 
“…I had civil servants who were actually prepared to argue with one another in 
front of me, and that arguing actually helped me to form a view.”   
 
She went on to say that Civil Servants needed to be more open with Ministers and that it 
was important for Ministers to see them disagreeing with each other and that this was 
positive. Lord Luce gave a very similar view.  
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The consensus here indicates the rarity of Civil Servants having an open and intellectual 
debate on policy in front of Ministers, and the immense value to the Minister of being able 
to witness the discussion35. It is an unwritten Civil Service rule that officials should not 
argue in front of Ministers – and certainly not when one official out ranks the other. When 
people have not discussed in advance or coordinated a position, a Minister is unlikely to 
gain insight from beholding the muddle that might ensue. Lord Bradley’s earlier example is 
illustrative. However, when there are genuine differences of professional opinion, which 
are respectful, well founded and represent the fact that there are several viable options a 
Minister could choose – then hearing those issues debated in front of them can only be of 
value. There could be a connection between the challenge to Haldane considered in 
Chapter One, and the behaviour identified above. However, I suspect in this instance, the 
issue is rooted in long-standing hierarchical behaviours.  
 
Hierarchical Issues 
 
The sub-title above is relevant to the broader concerns my interviewees had concerning 
hierarchy. Ben Bradshaw found the hierarchical nature of the Civil Service a source of some 
frustration: 
 
“…what you would often find is some very good, talented, motivated people, young 
people in the more junior positions. Who in many ways were much better than 
some of the people who had been around a long time, but just hadn’t made their 
way up the hierarchy yet. So I think mechanisms to fast track young talent but also 
mechanisms to deal with underperformance I think is really, really important…” 
 
John Denham agreed. Once he had been in office for some time Lord Whitty felt that he 
had the necessary confidence and status to override the hierarchy, and ask for certain 
individuals to be instructed on certain tasks.  
 
When I asked John Healey what suggestions he might have for ensuring mutual 
understanding between Ministers and Civil Servants is improved, part of his answer focused 
directly on the need for senior managers to trust their staff: 
                                                          
35
 Tony Crosland was another Minister who enjoyed this rare tendency amongst his Civil Servants, 
according to Roy Denman: “Working for Crosland was also fun because he liked a certain amount of 
argument in the Department… he had a horror of the sanitised unanimity of a formal departmental 
presentation. He liked to hear opposing points of view argued out.” (Denman, 2002, p.111).  
100 
 
 
“Allow the civil servants with the expertise and the ideas access to ministers, 
instead of mediating at the most senior level.”   
 
Lord Blencathra told me about a speech he had asked an SEO staff member to write a 
speech. She had understood his steer, but her seniors had intervened: 
 
“I discovered she had drafted what she thought I wanted, the grade seven changed 
that, the grade five changed it too and the grade three changed it too and 
eventually I changed it back to what she wanted.” 
 
The various rungs in the management ladder all wished to add value here by intervening, 
when in reality all they did was make the process un-necessarily complicated. A more junior 
official is likely to have the highest degree of expertise in a distinct area of policy. More 
senior officials are likely to have a better grasp of the strategic implications of policy, and a 
better feel for its viability. Ideally both will contribute – in the manner described by Paul 
Goggins in Chapter Four.  
 
However, some of the Ministers I spoke to found the different approaches adopted in 
different departments confusing. It was clear that no one had ever explained to them why 
they existed. Perhaps the most obvious answer here is communication. If a senior official 
can explain to a Minister why officials of certain grades will or will not be interacting with 
them – then the Minister will not be left having to second guess why certain people have 
been sent to brief them and others have not.  
 
Incentivises the wrong behaviours, values the wrong skills and has the wrong recruitment 
priorities 
 
Some of my interviewees thought that one of the major systemic problems that the Civil 
Service has is that it incentivises the wrong behaviours and values the wrong skills. Fiona 
Mactaggart was generally negative in her views about the Civil Service. She suggested that 
the Civil Service will attract a certain type of person, and that will shape its collective 
organisational behaviour. For her, those at the top had certain skills that had allowed them 
to ascend:  
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“Actually [those who get] through the system on the whole have been able to kind 
of deflect, put down, and avoid challenge I think.” 
 
Whilst her general view about the quality of the Civil Servants she worked with was 
atypical, some of my other interviewees also had issues with the culture of the Senior Civil 
Service. Alun Michael considered that there was a problem in “the way that the Civil Service 
is structured to serve the Permanent Secretary and members of the Directorate General.” 
 
John Denham felt that whilst he had encountered a large variation in the quality of 
individual Civil Servants, the most critical problems were systemic ones: “…it (the Civil 
Service) is poorly equipped to meet the challenges of modern government.” He was critical 
of the value placed on certain skills as compared to others: 
 
“…the Civil Service is not sufficiently numerate very often… it’s surprising the 
number of people who were inept at budgets and other issues who really struggled 
with concepts like stock and flow, inevitability and risk and assessment.”  
 
Lord Blencathra referred to the establishment of the Major Projects Leadership Academy36 
– which aims to equip Civil Servants with better procurement skills. In his view, for this to 
work then trust must be placed in the person who has completed the training: 
 
“There’s no point any man or woman doing this course for a year… if you’re then 
going to put ten other people in their way, including the Perm Sec who hasn’t done 
the course.” 
 
Another issue which emerged concerned staff deployment, and an apparent lack of 
strategy. Lord Whitty told me that he thought staff moved around too much: 
 
“I’m not sure that the marketing of jobs, as opposed to having your career mapped 
out by someone in human resources, is actually necessarily the best way of doing 
things37.” 
                                                          
36
 The Major Projects Leadership Academy was established with the Saïd Business School at Oxford 
University – it is designed to bestow major project leadership skills within the Civil Service, engrain 
that knowledge, and reduce the reliance on expensive private sector outsourcing in relation to major 
projects (Saïd Business School, 2014).  
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Baroness Cumberlege, Lord Moore and Lord Cope all expressed very similar views – 
pointing out the likely detriment to collective memory.   
 
Concern over the changing nature of the relationship and potential politicisation 
 
Lord Waldegrave was concerned that under New Labour there had been a shift in the 
expectations placed on Civil Servants in terms of political presentation of policy: 
 
“…I was very anxious that Blair’s style of Government…and the erosion of Cabinet 
Committees, the erosion of Minutes – I thought that was making it far less clear for 
Whitehall what the marching orders from the politicians were. And there was a 
danger of eroding the distinction between political input and policy advice and 
obviously execution.”  
 
Lord Cope and Lord Luce shared the concerns above about politicisation. Lord Bradley gave 
a fascinating insight into what he seemed to regard as some scrambled minds in the Home 
Office. In a reversal of the usual formulation, he suggests that some of his Civil Servants 
were allowing the media frenzy around certain controversial law and order issues to drive 
their policy making, rather than looking at long term objectives: 
 
“…events all the time overtake sensible policy decisions, the media are very 
intrusive, and it’s very easy to be buffeted by those events. Politicians clearly have 
to reflect public opinion but it gets very uncomfortable if that agenda is being set 
externally… I sometimes felt the civil servants played to the more narrow 
perspective – they had tunnel vision on their policy area rather than seeing the 
bigger picture.” 
 
In this example, there is a clear suggestion that Lord Bradley’s Civil Servants had ‘swung too 
far the other way’. They had paid too much heed to the political realities, the media 
attention, and the pressure for instant and instinctive action. They may have let these 
factors drive their policy making rather than more traditional Civil Service considerations – 
                                                                                                                                                                    
37
 In my related research, Lord Butler made the same point about the marketisation of jobs – in 
almost exact terms. 
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particularly concerning the long term application and utility of policy. Lord Bradley’s 
example was atypical – but it should not be ignored.  
 
The answers my interviewees gave in this section corroborate the view expressed in 
Chapter One that greater societal expectations have increased the pressure on 
relationships in recent years.  The demands on Ministers appear to have increased, so the 
demands they have of their Civil Servants may also have increased accordingly. The fear 
that some of my interviewees expressed is that the Civil Service’s reaction to these 
demands is a consensual blurring of constitutional lines. This seems to be consistent with 
the changes to the relationship instigated by the Thatcher administration and not reversed 
under Tony Blair (as explored in Chapters One and Two). If this is an accurate picture, 
relationships in the short term might be better, but the Civil Servants involved are likely to 
be neglecting some of the intrinsic tenets of their role. The Civil Service, institutionally, 
needs to find a more effective way of responding to new and varied pressures.  
 
Inadequacy of training, preparation and induction for Ministers 
 
Towards the end of each of my interviews, I asked Ministers for their suggestions as to how 
understanding between Ministers and Civil Servants could be improved and relationships 
strengthened. The most frequent suggestion concerned improving training, preparation 
and induction for Ministers. 
 
Lord Knight considered that Ministerial training was conspicuous by its absence, telling me 
that “It is a bizarre thing that Ministers are not really trained...” 
 
Ben Bradshaw also felt that training was the most important thing that could help Ministers 
form better relationships with Civil Servants: 
 
“Oh yes, I think the most obvious thing for me is proper training for ministers, 
because ministers in our system, certainly in my experience, you’re thrown in the 
deep end, you’re called by the Prime Minister, one day you’ve got a job, you’re in 
charge of an office. You know I’ve never run anything in my life, I’ve never been in 
charge of anything in my life, I’d never run a team of people before, I’d had no 
managerial experience, there’s absolutely no induction or training or support at all - 
it’s literally sink or swim… I saw perfectly good bright young ministers in the Labour 
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years come a cropper because they didn’t have the experience, they made an easy 
mistake, which they needn’t have done with a little bit of support and training.” 
 
His subsequent analysis as to why this might be the case reveals that there is some 
confusion as to who should own this responsibility. He thought that sometimes it may have 
been the Secretary of State in the department in question who did not consider that their 
junior Ministers required any training. Although he also thought that Civil Servants were 
unlikely to create or promote any training for Ministers because it was not for them to do 
so. Ben Bradshaw’s strength of feeling on the issue hints at a serious omission that needs 
rectifying. He succeeded in spite of the circumstances, not because of them. Ministerial 
concerns about training are not a new phenomenon38, and it is concerning that the problem 
appears to persist.  
 
Pollitt & Bouckhaert (2004) corroborate the views of my interviewees from an academic 
perspective. They suggest that the missing public management reform narrative concerns 
Ministers. They question why civil servants are always perceived to be in need of reform, 
but Ministers are not. They advocate induction and training for ministers and suggest that 
“…the preparation of politicians for high office has…been a ‘no-go’ area for reformers for 
too long.” (ibid, p. 157).  
 
Baroness Cumberlege suggested that financing was the main barrier to training. Alun 
Michael, Baroness Liddell and Lord Bradley all suggested that Gerald Kaufman’s book, How 
to be a Minister (Kaufman, 1997), could aid understanding. It is of concern that a book first 
published in 1980 is still relied upon by new Ministers. In essence it remains a description of 
                                                          
38
 For example, Douglas Hurd, reflecting on his appointment as Minister of State in the Home Office 
in 1983, invokes the same terminology as Ben Bradhsaw: “There were no days of handover from my 
predecessor and no training of any kind. The British system throws infant ministers into the pool and 
expects them to swim…At the age of fifty-three I found myself a clumsy apprentice who must 
nevertheless at all times maintain the appearance of mastery.” (Hurd, 2003, p.320). Clive Ponting 
thought that Ministers were ineffective at managing their departments in the late 1980s because 
they “usually lack the experience and training as well as the inclination to enable them to do so 
effectively.” (Ponting, 1989, p.16). And Ken Clarke recently stated that “When I was first appointed… 
there was no induction or anything…no one in Downing Street could tell me where the department 
was, let alone give me any other guidance as to what I was supposed to do.” (Institute for 
Government, 2016). 
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Ministerial life in the 1970s. It does not fully account for the changes to the relationship 
that have occurred since the 1980s, as described in Chapter One.39 
The importance of contact with the Opposition was also highlighted by several of my 
Ministers – including Lord Triesman, Lord Cope, Lord Blencathra and Lord Luce. A further 
issue to emerge was the lack of an integrated programme of induction for Ministers. Lord 
Bradley, for example, told me: 
 
 “…I think there needs to be a little period of adjustment and a more integrated 
induction, civil service to ministers, ministers to civil service, to actually get that 
relationship going. Also to then install all the rules and regulations around what you 
can do and what you can’t do, what you should do and what you shouldn’t do and 
who’s where doing what and why.” 
 
Lord Moore and Lord Triesman made similar comments. A related set of issues concerned 
the lack of time to learn and reflect in the job (Nick Raynsford, Lord Triesman). Another 
significant issue is the absence of ministerial handover. Nick Raynsford told me: 
 
“There’s no attempt to evaluate performance… No one asked me to do an exit 
interview. No one tried to learn anything at all. I’d gone. That was it.”  
 
When Baroness Liddell left the Treasury she slipped a note for her successor under the 
blotter on her desk. It suggested that they meet for a discussion: 
 
“…it was [about] who I rated in the Department, who provided good work, what 
things were being worked up with enthusiasm by the Department, and what things 
they were trying to kick into the long grass.”  
 
Years later her successor told her that she had found the discussion the note prompted 
invaluable.  
 
                                                          
39
 Since conducting my interviews, former Minister Lord (John) Hutton, and former Permanent 
Secretary Sir Leigh Lewis, have published their own book on ‘How to be a Minister’. It deals with 
many of the issues that have emerged since Kaufman’s book was published – especially the rise of 
the Select Committee system and the role of Spads (Hutton & Lewis, 2014). I have cited the book in 
Chapter One (see footnotes) but as it was published after I conducted my review of ministerial 
literature (which helped inform my interview script) I have not considered it in depth in this piece. 
However, I consider it an extremely valuable addition to the very limited literature on this subject.  
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Conclusion 
 
In Chapter One, I argued that a radical, formal constitutional change to the relationship 
between Civil Servants and Ministers is unlikely in the near future despite the wealth of 
informal change that has occurred in recent years. As a result of this contention, I focused 
much of my research on individual relationships. In Chapter Seven, my work comes full 
circle in examining systemic issues that underpin the actions of those in the executive. Most 
of the contents of this chapter are rooted in ministerial frustration at the structure and 
culture of Whitehall. I suspect this frustration has been exacerbated by Ministers’ 
perceptions of increasing societal demands – reflected through the media and Parliament. 
The concern over feudalism suggests that a rather cynical, rational choice mindset may 
affect some parts of Whitehall. The tendency for the Civil Service to ‘close ranks’ on internal 
differences of opinion and not present them to Ministers appears long-standing. As 
Ministers increasingly demand plurality in policy advice, it is concerning that the Civil 
Service appears to lack the confidence to present Ministers with a spectrum of views – 
especially in person, during meetings.  
 
In the assessment of many authors, the current system must be subject to more radical 
reform to cope. Tant (1993) argues for a more responsive and participatory approach to 
Government. Diamond (2014, Pp 281-285) argues that change should involve: (i) a 
clarification of Whitehall’s role, in tandem with Governments that focus more on enabling 
(rather than directing); (ii) an overhaul of Ministerial-civil service relations, with officials’ 
advice transparent, disclosable and to be defended by the officials directly; (iii) a general 
decentralisation and dispersal of central government power; and (iv) a royal commission on 
constitutional principles. Richards and Smith (2014) question whether generalised 
institutional crisis in the UK might be as a result of elitist and traditional 19th century 
concepts failing to deal adequately with 21st century demands for responsiveness and 
transparency. Whether a more participatory, open, and ‘bottom up’ system of Government 
is required is an important question to consider. However, as many of these authors 
acknowledge, the chances of a radical overhaul occurring soon, on their own view of the 
self-perpetuating nature of the Westminster model, is low. That reality has helped shape 
the approach in this thesis. I have argued that better understanding of Ministers’ and Civil 
Servants’ roles and the optimisation of individual relationships can make a positive 
difference to the quality of Government. But the findings in this Chapter show that there 
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are a number of systemic issues that will always limit the effect of the personal behaviours I 
have focused on. This is a reality of which I am fully cognisant and wholly accept.    
 
Amongst the number of systemic issues that appear to have no prosaic solution, one 
emerges that I think does: the inadequacy of training, preparation and induction. During 
their time in office, many Ministers would not have felt able to admit that they were 
unprepared for the job. There should be a short, integrated induction programme – and it 
should be more detailed for those starting their first very ministerial jobs. In addition, there 
appears to be no proper evaluation of Ministerial performance or handover. Ministers felt 
that a lot of what they had learnt was instantly lost on the day of their departure. A simple 
mandatory handover between Ministers is likely to be hugely beneficial to the next 
incumbent. My interviewees perceived that small changes to the attitude of political 
parties, and the executive, to preparation, induction and training might have the potential 
to positively influence relationships and Ministerial performance. 
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CONCLUSION  
 
Summary of Findings  
 
In this thesis I have explored the relationship between Ministers and officials. I argue that 
while the formal bounds of the relationship remain the same, the reality has changed quite 
significantly. Thatcher incentivised officials to re-imagine their roles if they wanted to 
progress. This created dissonance between the formal constitutional position and the 
reality. This dissonance has increased the pressure on individual relationships, alongside 
interlinked demands for greater accountability, the rise of special advisors, changing 
societal expectations and the broader impact of regular reform programmes.  
 
Writing in the late 1980s and mid 1990s respectively, Ponting (1989) and Foster and 
Plowden (1996) considered the old model was broken and needed an immediate overhaul. 
More than twenty years on - formally - it prevails. The Coalition’s rejection of the PASC’s 
recommendation for a Royal Commission on the Civil Service (2013) shows that there is no 
appetite within the executive for a major constitutional reappraisal of the relationship. The 
contradictions and complexities inherent in the relationship that my work exposes suggest 
that a proper clarification of roles, accounting for the new realities, would be an extremely 
positive development. I add my voice to those who have called for an open review of the 
ministerial – civil service relationship to take place. It has been ninety-eight years since the 
last review of this kind (Haldane). But, as I have argued throughout, I consider the prospects 
of any such review occurring to be extremely low. 
 
This assessment has driven my focus on optimising individual relationships within the 
existing paradigm. As a professional doctorate candidate, it is also important for me to 
make recommendations to improve practice – especially in relation to an area that can be 
opaque. I used my primary research to derive a number of perceived positive or negative 
influences on relationships. I have articulated these perceived influences in a form which I 
hope will be of professional value to actors in Government in the future, supported by 
extended quotations from named former Ministers. To my knowledge, these potential 
influences have not been distilled in this form before. My contention is that any 
improvement in relationships, as a result of the better understanding that this work 
promotes, has the potential to improve the efficacy of Government itself.  
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According to my interviewees, Ministers are most likely to positively influence relationships 
with their Civil Servants when they show leadership, set direction, understand the 
importance of the embryonic relationship, demonstrate energy and charisma, and show 
their officials respect. Ministers who show they are able, who are confident in challenging 
their officials, and who carry their Civil Servants when making purely political decisions may 
also enjoy better relationships.  My interviewees thought that Ministers may negatively 
influence relationships when they lack external experience, do not work cohesively with 
ministerial colleagues, change their mind frequently, and do not think strategically. 
Ministers should avoid mediating relationships with Civil Servants through special advisors, 
or criticising their Civil Servants openly.  
 
My ministerial interviewees found that Civil Servants could positively influence 
relationships when they demonstrated commitment, expertise, fearlessness, honesty and 
independence. Civil Servants who take the time to understand their Minister’s philosophy 
and are dedicated to delivery once a final decision is made, even if they disagree with it, are 
likely to positively influence relationships with their Ministers. Those who lack competence, 
undermine policy and seek control, are change averse, and lack external experience are all 
likely to negatively influence relationships. Civil Servants who do not lead, refuse to take 
responsibility, and do not communicate clearly will diminish themselves in their Ministers’ 
eyes.  
 
Despite the institutional, cultural and constitutional restraints – it is still within the gift of 
individual Ministers and Civil Servants to learn from their predecessors’ experiences. The 
former Ministers I spoke to were united in their desire for their own knowledge of 
relationships in government to be shared for this reason.  
 
I identified themes in the ministerial literature concerning the behaviours of Civil Servants: 
a desire to seek control and resist change, and questions over competence. Their 
dominance in the literature was not corroborated by my interviewees. They thought that 
this disparity might exist because some of their ministerial counterparts were attempting to 
assuage blame for their personal failings and playing into the public’s scepticism of 
bureaucracy. For my interviewees the narrative was mostly a construction; consciously on 
the part of other Ministers, and unconsciously on the part of the public. My work does not 
seek to dismiss the claims in the literature about the Civil Service’s perceived weaknesses. 
My interviewees had numerous concerns – but these tended to manifest themselves 
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through systemic criticisms.  Feudalism and its consequences were highlighted. Other 
concerns identified include hierarchical practices, unwillingness to expose Minsters to a 
spectrum of opinion, and potential politicisation.  The culture of the service was also 
challenged, with some Ministers feeling that the wrong behaviours were incentivised, that 
recruitment strategy was wrong and that the wrong skills were valued. Training, induction 
and preparation for Ministers were seen as completely inadequate – I return to this below.  
 
Haldane endorsed 
 
A unifying point that emerged is the importance of both sides simply ‘being themselves’ 
and embodying traditional conceptions of their role. Both must appreciate that their 
success is dependent on the other, their strengths are generally different, and their roles 
are complementary. Ministers and Civil Servants may find each other challenging at times 
when exhibiting these behaviours. An improved understanding of respective roles may turn 
this into a positive scenario, rather than one that results in defensive attitudes being 
adopted. When the natural tension inherent is acknowledged, the energy, challenge and 
dynamism created may force each party to raise their game for the benefit of both. 
 
There is a clear connection between the positive picture painted by my interviewees and a 
classic vision of Haldaneian duality. The contraction in deliberative space that I argue has 
occurred since the Thatcher years cannot be endorsed or dismissed by a small sample of 
ministerial interviewees. What is clear from my primary research is that many of the 
positive influences identified concerning Civil Servants chimed with their role as envisioned 
by Haldane (thinking, creating, critiquing and deliberating about policy, in tandem with 
their Minister, before taking action).  The negative influences encompassed being divisive, 
defensive, parochial, selective as to what they tell their Minister, and resistant to change, 
without a rationale for their resistance. This list could be a description of a Civil Servant 
who has moved away from the core tenets of the role; embracing a binary approach and 
defining themselves apart from their Minister.  
 
The Minsters I spoke to still value symbiosis, mutuality and duality. The values enshrined in 
Haldane are the ones that Ministers told me that they still valued in their colleagues, and in 
their Civil Servants.  Haldane is implicitly endorsed as a positive model through the words of 
my interviewees. At a time when the deliberative space continues to contract, that 
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conclusion should sound a warning to all those who care about the quality of the governing 
relationship in the UK.  
 
My ‘insider researcher’ role, critical reflections on practice, and potential dissemination 
 
In the introduction to this thesis, I suggested that my own position as a Civil Servant could 
be seen as a potential strength and weakness of this work. Having worked in the Civil 
Service for over fourteen years, I have been subject to the culture, conventions and belief 
systems that I touch on above. It is inconceivable that these have not affected my approach 
to this work, or the manner in which I have weighed and judged the contributions to it. My 
agency as a researcher may have affected the responses my interviewees provided. My role 
could have affected my decision to focus on optimising relationships within the existing 
framework. I was aware from the outset that this piece could be construed as a defence of 
the civil service. I hope that the prominence of the Ministerial perspective throughout this 
work, and the concerns dealt with in Chapter Seven, answer this potential charge. Nor 
should this work be seen as a defence of the model in which Ministers and Civil Servants 
exist. One of my central contentions is that Haldane is being undermined; another is that 
former Ministers implicitly regard Haldane as a gold standard. That contradiction illustrates 
the tensions that the current framework has to try and bear. The direction of travel 
suggests this will only become more difficult as time passes.  
 
My professional role also provides me with the opportunity to reflect critically on my own 
practice, and follow my own recommendations when interacting with Ministers. For 
example, I have paid more attention to trying to understand the philosophy of the 
Ministers I deal with, factoring this in to policy design from the outset. I have also placed 
further emphasis on presenting a broader range of internal opinion; even if not all of this 
reflects my personal view. As long as this is made clear to Ministers, and the policy ‘owner’ 
takes responsibility for the advice and their ultimate recommendation, this is likely to 
improve the quality of Ministerial decision making. My work has also developed my ability 
to ‘reflect in action’ (Costley et al., 2010 Pp 118-119). I hope to adopt a more deliberative 
and conscious approach when applying my knowledge to practice, and analysing the 
assumptions behind decisions taken by myself and colleagues that might otherwise be left 
unexamined. 
 
113 
 
In a broader sense, two factors are likely to decide whether my work can be judged as a 
‘success’ in practical terms – i.e. will it help improve the mutual understanding of 
relationships between Ministers and officials?  
 
The first is whether it reaches its intended audience. I have been in contact with Martin 
Stanley – one of the former officials I interviewed in related research, and creator of the 
civilservant.org.uk website, which attracts over a quarter of a million visitors annually. 
Martin has indicated he is happy to consider placing my findings on the site. I may submit 
extended versions of Chapters Four to Seven of this work. In my assessment, an established 
web-resource, which is not operating under the limitations of the Cabinet Office, is the best 
avenue to reach present and future Ministers and officials. I would also like to publish at 
least one academic article40, expanding on Chapter Six and what we can draw from the 
disparity between the literature and my interviewees’ views. 
 
The second factor is whether my findings resonate. Whilst, as discussed, some of my 
findings appear to divert slightly from the ministerial literature, I hope that they capture a 
part of the relationship’s essence. My professional insight leads me to consider that they 
do, and that Ministers and Civil Servants would recognise many of the nuances and 
dynamics that my thematic analysis exposes. The specific stories I have included, from 
former Ministers, mean that the work is less abstract than some other material may be.  I 
also hope that the credibility of the work is enhanced by the agreement of my interviewees 
to be cited by name.  
 
Recommendations for future areas of research 
 
Ultimately my research has a practical bent, given my aim of improving understanding and 
trying to optimise relationships in government. However, the work has revealed a number 
of areas that might benefit from further academic research. I have focused on three specific 
issues. 
 
The first concerns Haldane. There is a broader tension between relationships as envisioned 
by Haldane, and the demands for greater accountability, transparency and clarity of roles in 
government. The Haldane model appears to be an absolutist one: constitutionally and 
                                                          
40
 Potential journals which might be suitable include the British Journal of Politics and Internal 
Relations, British Politics, Public Administration, Parliamentary Affairs, and Public Policy and 
Administration.   
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publicly the Minister and the Civil Servant are inseparable. That model does not chime with 
the demands above. At the moment, the executive seems to be in a half-way house. More 
transactional relationships, the rising strength of parliament, the diminishing strength of 
the Civil Service, the rise of special advisors and the increasing plurality of advice are all 
factors pushing towards a less deliberative system. Yet my interviewees did not see 
Haldane as a mythological cloak hiding a mass of inconsistencies; they simply identified the 
behaviours Haldane promotes as positive ones. This raises further questions: can the 
executive go back to Haldane? Would this be an objectively good thing if it could? And if 
not, can a sensible way be found to balance Ministerial-Civil Service duality with the 
demands for accountability and transparency that have emerged? These are all questions 
that further research should address.  
 
The second concerns the disparity that emerged between the views of my interviewees and 
the material in the ministerial literature. I have suggested various explanations for this, 
many of which drew on my interviewees’ own opinions. At the conclusion of Chapter Six, I 
advance my own suggestion that the disparity may not be as stark as it at first appears. This 
is because my interviewees had a range of criticisms and concerns, but these tended to be 
more systemic and structural, rather than being focused on the behaviours of individual 
Civil Servants. Whilst I would like to expand on this in a journal article, there is also scope 
for a much more developed analysis. This could include interviews with former Ministers 
who have been critical in memoirs or diaries – which might yield more nuanced counter-
opinions. 
 
The third concerns the inadequacy of training and preparation for aspiring Ministers, and 
induction for new Ministers. There is a fundamental question here about the apparent gap 
and why it continues to exist. I suspect that various constraints are likely to have prevented 
training, preparation and induction from becoming embedded. These constraints may be 
financial (lack of party funds to divert to preparation), practical (lack of time) and cultural 
(insufficient attention given to the issue and confusion over who is responsible). The 
Cabinet Office is historically reluctant to produce material designed for Ministers. It may be 
that Ministers do not feel able to ask for help, or raise these concerns whilst in post, 
without undermining their own credibility. The Civil Service is rightly the focus of the 
debate when it comes to the relationship, but the Ministerial perspective can be 
overlooked. The emphasis my interviewees placed on training and support indicate the 
importance of getting this right. Further research could address this issue in some detail: 
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considering the previous efforts to provide ministerial training, successes and failures in 
doing so, investigating the approach of each party, considering whether the Civil Service 
should have any role, considering whether the role itself is an inhibiting factor in Ministers 
asking for help, and developing training and induction programmes in this light.  
 
Recommendations for future practice 
 
In addition to my core findings concerning the behaviours that Ministers and Civil Servants 
may wish to aspire to, I conclude by making the following recommendation for future 
practice. Whilst I suspect some are extremely unlikely to occur, others could be quickly and 
easily implemented.  
 
1. The Government should review and clarify the roles and responsibilities of Civil 
Servants and Ministers. A fresh look should be taken at where the boundaries are 
drawn given the changes that have occurred in recent years. Lines of accountability 
should form part of this review. 
 
2. The Government/Civil Service should review the support provided to Junior 
Ministers. Junior Ministers often feel marginalised; simultaneously overwhelmed 
by their workload but underwhelmed by their responsibilities. This is not just a 
question of Civil Service support – it poses a more fundamental question about how 
we conceive of the junior ministerial role.  
 
3. Each political party with a realistic prospect of forming (part of) a Government 
should invest in training aspirant Ministers in the run up to a General Election. 
This need not be prohibitively expensive nor time consuming. Former Ministers 
from each party could be utilised. Former Civil Servants could also take part. 
Preparation could include case studies examining policy successes and failures. It 
could also encompass practical tips about how Departments work and how to work 
productively with Civil Servants.  
 
4. The Government should ensure that when a Minister is appointed, there is a 
short, mandatory handover with their predecessor. This should be followed by an 
integrated induction programme. The handover could take the form of a short, 
informal meeting – not requiring a Civil Servant to be present. The integrated 
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induction should involve key Civil Servants, Special Advisors and ideally ministerial 
colleagues in the Department. A more comprehensive induction programme should 
be provided for those starting their first ministerial job.  
 
5. The Civil Service should review its approach to staff deployment, especially in 
roles with frequent contact with Ministers, or on policies which are Ministerial 
priorities. My interviewees often considered that the needs of Ministers are not 
taken into account when Civil Servants are moved – especially those who Ministers 
have built good working relationships with. This is not a call for Ministerial 
appointments; rather for some flexibility and common sense to be exercised. 
 
6. The Civil Service should encourage Civil Servants to openly debate policy positions 
in front of Ministers. This is systemically discouraged given the hierarchical nature 
of the Civil Service and the perceived need to provide Ministers with an established 
policy view. There are many occasions where an informed discussion of alternate 
options, between Civil Servants who have a different opinion, will help Ministers 
make better decisions.  
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APPENDIX I: TABLE OF MINISTERIAL LITERATURE REVIEWED 
 
 
 
 
Year first 
published 
Form Highest 
position 
achieved 
Party Years as 
a 
Minister 
Tone of 
Civil 
Service 
refs 
Benn, T.  1995 Diary SoS Lab 11 Negative 
Blair, T.  2010 Memoir PM Lab 10 Mixed 
Blunkett, D.  2006 Diary SoS Lab 9 Negative 
Bruce-Gardyne, J.  1986 Memoir MS Con 2 Mixed 
Callaghan, J.  1987 Memoir PM Lab 11 Mixed 
Clark, A.  1993 Diary MS Con 9 Negative 
Crossman, R. 1977 Diary SoS Lab 6 Negative 
Healey, D.  1989 Memoir SoS Lab 11 Mixed 
Heseltine, M.  2000 Memoir SoS/DPM Con 18 Mixed 
Howe, G.  1994 Memoir Chancellor Con 15 Positive 
Hurd, D.  2003 Memoir SoS Con 16 Positive 
Jenkins, R.  1991 Memoir SoS Lab 8 Mixed 
Kaufman, G. 1980 N/A MS Lab 5 Mixed 
Lawson, N.  1992 Memoir Chancellor Con 10 Mixed 
Major, J.  1999 Memoir PM Con 12 Mixed 
Mandelson, P. 2010 Memoir SoS Lab 6 Mixed 
Mullin, C.  2009 Diary PuSS Lab 4 Negative 
Quin, J.  2010 N/A MS Lab 4 Mixed 
Thatcher, M.  1993 Memoir PM Con 16 Negative 
Williams, S. 2009 Memoir SoS Lab 9 Positive 
 
Notes:  
 
1. These can be split between a ‘diary’ and ‘memoir’, with the exception of Gerald 
Kaufman and Joyce Quin’s books (the former being a guide for Ministers, and the 
latter an examination of the constitution). Both offer ample insight into 
relationships with Civil Servants, hence their inclusion.  
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2. Acronyms - PM: Prime Minister; DPM: Deputy Prime Minister; SoS: Secretary of 
State; MS: Minister of State; and PuSS: Parliamentary Under Secretary of State. 
 
3. I have attempted to give a general score to the ‘tone’ of the references to the Civil 
Service/Civil Servants. This is intrinsically difficult, and is only intended as a very 
rough indicator, which gives some additional context to my textual analysis in 
Chapter Two. “Mixed” means that there was a reasonable balance of positive and 
negative comments concerning the Civil Service/Civil Servants, or that there was 
not a clear balance indicating the author’s “overall” view. All the diaries I 
considered I labelled as “negative”, and only one of the memoirs – which may 
indicate that the distinction between the two is of particular importance. 
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APPENDIX II: TABLE OF FORMER MINISTERS INTERVIEWED 
 
 Name Party Highest 
position  
Relevant 
election 
snapshot 
Position immediately after 
that election 
Total 
years as 
Minister 
1 Lord Knight Lab MS 2005 PuSS (Environment) 5 
2 Paul Goggins Lab MS 2005 PuSS (Home Office) 7 
3 Lord Jenkin Con SoS 1983 SoS (Environment) 12 
4 Sir Malcolm Rifkind Con SoS 1983 MS (FCO) 18 
5 Ben Bradshaw MP Lab SoS 2001 PuSS (FCO) 9 
6 Lord Browne Lab SoS 2001 Chief Sec (HMT) 9 
7 Nick Raynsford Lab MS 1997 PuSS (Environment) 8 
8 Alun Michael Lab SoS 1997 MS (Home Office) 7 
9 Lord Waldegrave Con SoS 1983 PuSS (Environment) 16 
10 Lord Whitty Lab PuSS 2001 PuSS (Environment) 4 
11 Fiona Mactaggart MP Lab PuSS 2005 PuSS (Home Office) 3 
12 Baroness Liddell Lab SoS 1997 Economic Sec. (HMT) 6 
13 John Healey MP Lab MS 2005 Fin. Sec (HMT) 9 
14 Lord Glenarthur Con MS 1983 PuSS (Health) 6 
15 Lord Moore Con SoS 1983 Fin. Sec (HMT) 10 
16 John Denham Lab SoS 2001 MS (Home Office) 9 
17 Lord Cope Con MS 1992 Paymaster General 13 
18 Lord Blencathra Con MS 1992 MS (Environment) 10 
19 Lord Triesman Lab PuSS 2005 PuSS (FCO) 5 
20 Lord Bradley Lab MS 2001 MS (Home Office) 5 
21 Baroness Armstrong Lab CW 1997 MS (Environment) 10 
22 Lord Howe Con SoS 1983 SoS (FCO) 15 
23 Lord Luce Con MS 1983 MS (FCO) 11 
24 Lord Skelmersdale Con PuSS 1987 PuSS (Health) 4 
25 Baroness Cumberlege Con PuSS 1992 PuSS (Health) 5 
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 Notes on the table 
 
1. The interviews are organised by number in the original order that I conducted 
them. Lord Knight was the first former Minister I interviewed (on 24 August 2012) 
and Baroness Cumberlege was the last (on 9 November 2012).  
 
2. Additional acronyms/abbreviations used (following  Appendix I) are:  
 CW: Chief Whip.  
 Chief Sec: Chief Secretary to the Treasury 
 Economic Sec: Economic Secretary to the Treasury 
 Fin. Sec: Financial Secretary to the Treasury 
 Paymaster Gen: Paymaster General (Treasury) 
 
3. The relevant election snapshot indicates the election where the Minister identified 
first appeared on the list I generated (e.g. 1983, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2001 or 2005). 
The following column indicates their position at that point in time, whereas the 
previous column indicates the highest Ministerial position they achieved 
throughout their career. 
 
4. The total years served as a Minister represent an estimate – compiled principally 
from the parliamentary website. It may not be an entirely accurate figure because 
former posts are recorded on the site by whole year only. The totals also span 
Ministerial office held outside of the period 1983-2010 (e.g. some Conservatives 
also served in Edward Heath’s Government).  
 
5. Paul Goggins, who I interviewed on 4 September 2012, died on 7 January 2014 aged 
sixty. I extend my sincere condolences to his family. Paul had approved the 
transcript of my interview prior to his passing, and Dominic Goggins approved the 
use of Paul’s quotes in the project. I would like to thank Dominic for his interest in 
my work and his enthusiastic support at such a difficult time.  
 
6. Lord Howe, who I interviewed on 5 November 2012, died on 9 October 2015, aged 
eighty-eight. I extend my sincere condolences to his family. Whilst I had been in 
correspondence with Lord Howe, he had not confirmed I could cite him by name 
prior to the submission of this thesis.  
135 
 
 APPENDIX III: TABLE SHOWING APPROVAL OF NAMED CITATIONS 
 
 Name Date 
cleared 
App 
for 
pub. 
App 
thesis 
only  
Status/ notes or 
corrections to be actioned 
1 Lord Knight 15/11/14 YES N/A No corrections 
2 Paul Goggins 02/02/15 YES N/A Cleared by Dominic Goggins 
3 Lord Jenkin 13/11/14 YES N/A No corrections 
4 Sir Malcolm Rifkind 17/11/14  YES N/A No corrections 
5 Ben Bradshaw MP 17/11/14 YES N/A No corrections 
6 Lord Browne 03/02/15 YES N/A No corrections 
7 Nick Raynsford 26/11/14 YES N/A No corrections 
8 Alun Michael 22/11/14 YES N/A Corrections made 
9 Lord Waldegrave 14/11/14 YES N/A Corrections made 
10 Lord Whitty 29/11/14 YES N/A No corrections 
11 Fiona Mactaggart MP 14/11/14 YES N/A Corrections made 
12 Baroness Liddell 15/11/14 YES N/A No corrections 
13 John Healey MP 02/02/15 YES N/A No corrections 
14 Lord Glenarthur 19/11/14 YES N/A No corrections 
15 Lord Moore 03/02/15 YES N/A No corrections (over phone) 
16 John Denham 02/02/15 YES N/A Corrections made 
17 Lord Cope 12/11/14 TBC YES Corrections made 
18 Lord Blencathra 18/11/14 YES N/A Corrections made 
19 Lord Triesman 02/02/15 YES N/A No corrections 
20 Lord Bradley 01/12/14 YES N/A No corrections 
21 Baroness Armstrong 24/11/14 YES N/A No corrections 
22 Lord Howe41 N/A N/A N/A Unable to confirm 
23 Lord Luce 12/11/14 YES N/A No corrections 
24 Lord Skelmersdale 15/11/14 YES N/A Corrections made 
25 Baroness Cumberlege 24/11/14  YES N/A Corrections made 
                                                          
41
 With the exception of Lord Howe (see Appendix II), I had approval to use the quotes, cited by 
name, from all my other ministerial interviewees. In seeking this approval I sent each interviewee a 
list of the quotations I wanted to use, a copy of the original transcript of the interview (which in 
nearly all cases they had previously approved), and a copy of the latest version of my thesis at that 
time. The list of quotations provided had cross references to page numbers in the latest version of 
the thesis, so that each interviewee could easily look up the context for each citation.  
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